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MANUAL OF STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES ON PHYSICAL SECURITY AND STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT FOR SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW)

(Agreed during the second preparatory meeting held on May 13, 2024)

**MANUAL OF STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES ON PHYSICAL SECURITY AND STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT FOR SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW)**

**INTRODUCTION**

1. The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) was approved in 1997 as a regional instrument to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials, and to promote and facilitate cooperation and the exchange of information and experiences. CIFTA is a binding legal instrument that contains a series of provisions that must be implemented by the States Parties in order to strengthen their legal framework in this area.
2. Article VIII of the CIFTA determines that States Parties, to reduce losses or diversions, shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure the security of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials within their respective territories. Among these measures, physical security and stockpile management measures are highlighted, aimed at reducing the diversion of firearms, ammunition, and explosives from state arsenals, and decreasing the risks of unplanned accidents in state institutions' depots. Stockpile management is the term used to describe the procedures and activities necessary for the management, accounting, storage, transportation, and handling of firearms.
3. To facilitate the implementation of Article VIII, the States Parties to CIFTA have requested the Department of Public Security of the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security of the General Secretariat of the OAS (DPS/OAS) to develop an Operational Procedures Manual for Physical Security and Arsenal Management, through Resolution AG/RES. 3009 (LIII-O/23)[[1]](#footnote-2).
4. In compliance with this mandate, the DPS/OAS, through the Program of Assistance for Control of Arms and Munition (PACAM), with funding from the European Union, developed this manual focused on the stockpile management of small arms and light weapons (SALW), providing guidelines on the safe and effective management of SALW arsenals to support the States Parties to CIFTA in regulating and controlling arms of state institutions (Armed Forces, National Police, and other civil institutions). The objective of the manual is to provide written guidance that directs and contributes to the application of techniques, procedures, and safety standards for national institutions in the management of arsenals for small arms and light weapons (SALW). This manual does not address aspects of ammunition and explosives management, which, due to their nature and characteristics, require different processes and activities than the management of SALW.
5. This manual is primarily based on MOSAIC 05.20 (Management of SALW Arsenals). The document includes relevant excerpts, as well as the experience of the Program of Assistance on Control of Arms and Munition (PACAM), and the assistance provided to OAS member states. Additionally, feedback received during various training sessions provided to national institutions on Physical Security and Arsenal Management is also incorporated into this document.
6. According to the principles of Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM), the guidelines in this manual are structured to be applied particularly in large-scale weapons storage areas (depots) that contain hundreds or thousands of weapons. For small-scale storage (unit/barracks), some procedures and activities change depending on the type of functions for which these units are intended (see Chapter III, Section 3.8 Physical Security in Armories or Barracks Installations).

# **CHAPTER I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS**

## Terms, definitions, and frame of reference

It's important to emphasize the meaning of the definitions detailed below, which are critical for compliance with what is specified in this document:

1. Shall or must: These are the minimum actions or obligations to comply with best practices in the processes.
2. Should: These are recommendations considered ideal and would improve the execution of the processes outlined in this manual.

Both MOSAIC and IATG use terms such as "shall" and "should" in accordance with ISO standards.

**REFERENCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK**

**United Nations Firearms Protocol**

Each State Party to the **Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components, and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime** (United Nations Firearms Protocol) is required by Article 11 to:

“take appropriate measures [...] to require the security of firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition at the time of manufacture, import, export and transit through its territory."

**Arms Trade Treaty**

To the States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, Article 5 requires them to adopt

"...the measures necessary to implement the provisions of this Treaty and shall designate competent national authorities to establish an effective and transparent national control system to regulate the transfer of conventional arms..."

**The United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA)**

Section II:

"To encourage States to promote safe, effective stockpile management and security, in particular physical security measures, for small arms and light weapons, and to implement, where appropriate, regional and subregional mechanisms in this regard."

**Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA)**

Article VIII:

"States Parties, in an effort to eliminate loss or diversion, undertake to adopt the necessary measures to ensure the security of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials imported into, exported from, or in transit through their respective territories."

**CHAPTER II. STOCKPILE GENERAL SECURITY MEASURES**

As International Guidelines establish: The purpose of proper stockpile management has to do directly with reducing residual risk to a minimum; therefore, preventive, and corrective measures must be taken to ensure the safety of personnel engaged in these activities and should be guided by the following general principles:

* Observance of the safety standards established in this manual and international standards.
* Development of national protocols on stockpile management of SALW.
* Checks and monitors to ensure that designated personnel involved in the activities, whether directly or in a support capacity, are trained to carry out their duties.
* Ensure that the methods and protective equipment used meet safety requirements.

a. Safety is paramount in tasks or operational activities that represent a hazard to or endanger the well-being of individuals, population centers, and ecosystems.

b. National personnel are responsible for the control, safeguarding, handling, and transportation of weapons, in accordance with national legislation.

c. All designated personnel working in depots-storage facilities must have the minimum required personal protective equipment (PPE): gloves, helmet, goggles, back support belt, mask, reflective vest, and whenever possible, use flame-retardant clothing and steel-toed boots

d. Ensure frequently that all emergency equipment, such as fire extinguishers, first aid kits, and personal protective equipment (PPE), are available and in optimal condition for use.

e. All members of the working group designated to work in weapons management shall belong to the area to which their functions, knowledge, and academic training correspond, due to the the work demands in all areas of management.

f. The communications system shall only be authorized for control by the internal and external security system with the different areas that make up the general system of custody of weapons— whether UHF, HF, telephony, signals, etc.— and conform to restrictions implemented to prevent accidents.

g. The personnel who do not perform specific functions in any of the areas of weapons management, will be considered visitors and therefore, must:

1. Receive written clearance from the person in charge of the storage facility or facilities, stating the reason for the visit and the activities to be carried out on the premises.
2. Senior officers who report to their superiors on monitoring, custody, and manipulation of SALW are not classed as visitors.

h. The use of electronic media and equipment shall be restricted in storage areas, as shall the use of other objects that produce heat or energy (matches, lighters, cigarettes, etc.).

1. In the area of the depot(s), routine inspections of the premises must be carried out, and all deficiencies found in infrastructure (internal and external) should be noted. These deficiencies will serve to generate a report with the respective recommendations for improvement.

j. All persons present in the work area should raise the alert if they observe a situation that adversely affects safety.

k. Develop fire and natural disasters action and contingency plans, a medical evacuation plan, an operational safety plan, an accident investigation plan, and a cooperation plan with other entities if necessary (fire department, environmental authority, Red Cross, law enforcement, etc.). Maintenance Plan for SALW and Facilities. The National Authority shall specify the training periods for the aforementioned plans, as well as their respective supervision and monitoring.

l. Custodial personnel working in the storage area should raise the alert if they observe a situation that adversely affects safety and security.

m. Have suitable personnel available to respond to unwanted events to ensure control of all activities and outsiders attempting to gain entry from areas surrounding depots.

n. Deploy as few people as possible during the monitoring, storage, and destruction of SALW.

# **CHAPTER III. STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT FOR SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW)**

The security and management of SALW facilities are governed by the Modular Small-arms- control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC 05.20), which provides comprehensive and best practice recommendations for weapons facility infrastructure. This part contains relevant extracts from MOSAIC 05.20.

For weapons storage and safekeeping, qualified personnel must ensure that:

Weapons with their packaging and factory seal will remain so until their next status or type of use is designated.

**For weapons in use the custody team shall:**

1. Unload the weapon.
2. the magazine is separated, and
3. the safety catch is put on "safe."

**If a weapon is considered dangerous it must be:**

1. Located in a place that ensures the safety of the workgroup.
2. Labeled dangerous.
3. Sent to the weapons specialist team for review.

**Special weapons (MANPADS)**

Particularly dangerous weapons such as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) should be disassembled, and their key components stored in different locations (unless required for current operational needs).

It is also recommended to:

* Use containers and safety cabinets specifically designed for the storage of weapons. These must comply with specific regulations to ensure their protection.
* If there is an Air Conditioning System in the warehouse, monitor it regularly, maintaining the storage area in optimal humidity and temperature conditions to prevent corrosion and degradation of the weapons.

3.1 Composition of SALW stockpile types

The State Parties to CIFTA typically designate their arsenals as: in use (operational), out of use (obsolete, for destruction), reserve, confiscated, and for training.

The total stock, understood as all SALW, including their parts and components, designated for use by state security forces, should consist of several stocks of different categories with specific functions, such as in the following table:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **ITEM** | **PURPOSE OF THE WEAPON** | **QUANTITY** | **OBSERVATIONS** |
| 1 | Operational weapons |  |  |
| 2 | Reserve weapons |  |  |
| 3 | Training weapons |  |  |
| 4 | Experimental weapons |  |  |
| 5 | Weapons to destroy |  |  |
| 6 | Weapons confiscated, recovered |  |  |
| 7 | Factory weapons |  |  |

In the particular case of arms depots, the first three categories in the above table may be stored in different facilities suitably located, as provided by the competent authority, and the other categories, as far as possible and depending on the volume, should be centralized in one or two warehouses. SALW stockpiles may generally be dispersed in several facilities, to ensure the preservation capacity of the weapons in case of catastrophic accidents, fire, sabotage, or the outbreak of war. However, in all cases, safety studies of the installations must be carried out.

3.2 Conditions for the Installation of a Weapons Arsenal

* Stockpile risk assessment (threats, financial value, natural disasters, fire, theft, loss, sabotage, terrorism, etc.)
* Access requirements
* Estimated time for deployment of external security support in the event of a major incident at the storage site
* Local planning and environmental aspects
* Local infrastructure
* Necessary number of security personnel

3.3 SALW Stockpile Risk Assessment

Risk assessments should be carried out for facilities storing SALW and should be renewed according to changing circumstances. Therefore, the risk assessment should examine warehouse areas and security systems to determine:

a. Physical threat that the weapons pose to the local population.

NOTE: While unlikely with SALW, some, especially weapons containing explosive components, such as MANPADS, pose an explosion risk.

b. Financial value of the facility and its contents

c. Active weapons-security risks and their frequency (e.g., loss, theft, damage, or destruction by sabotage or other forms of attack)

d. Passive risks and their frequency (e.g., natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, fires, hurricanes, etc.)

e. Value of a facility as a target for internal or external attack (depending on the contents of the facility, e.g., types and number of weapons stored and their susceptibility to direct or covert attack)

f. Vulnerability to espionage, theft, or loss.

g. Vulnerability to sabotage or terrorist attack.

The information obtained from a stockpile risk assessment should be used to prioritize stockpile management safely and cost-effectively and minimize residual risk.

Conducting a risk assessment facilitates the identification of threats and vulnerabilities associated with the lifecycle of weapons, as well as updating information according to the particular context of the area. This should include considerations regarding the type of material, quantity, and specific risks involved.

If necessary, it would also be ideal to consider the following:

* Develop and maintain a specific Emergency Plan for the storage area, including procedures that are easily understandable for evacuation, fire containment, and/or accident response.
* Maintain emergency equipment in all storage areas, such as fire extinguishers, first aid kits, and personal protective equipment, ensuring they are always available and accessible.
* When addressing emergencies, it is advisable to conduct emergency drills frequently to ensure that personnel are well-prepared for possible events and become familiar with response procedures.

3.4 Principles of Physical Security

These principles should be applied in large-scale weapons storage areas (depots) that contain hundreds or thousands of weapons.

1. Physical security systems shall be the result of a risk assessment;
2. Physical security must be incorporated into warehouses from the design stage
3. Weapons should be stored separately from ammunition;
4. Dangerous weapons (e.g., MANPADS), when stored for long periods, should be disassembled and their key components stored in different premises (unless they are necessarily operational);
5. Perimeter security infrastructure;
6. Permanent access control;
7. Restricted access, only for authorized personnel;
8. Security-cleared personnel must be designated as authorized personnel to work within the facility;
9. Staff training (on safety regulations, standard operating procedures, safety plan) regularly;
10. Temporary personnel must always be accompanied.

3.5 Objectives of Physical Security

Even when warehouse facilities are protected, they are not exempt from threats such as theft and diversion from within; therefore, the objectives of physical security of stockpiles are to:

1. Prevent and reduce any attempted break-ins or internal theft;
2. Thwart any attempted security breach;
3. Immediately detect a security breach or threat;
4. Assess the magnitude of any security breach or threat;
5. Increasing the time needed to illegally remove weapons from warehouses;
6. Enable security personnel to respond and take appropriate action.

3.6 Physical Security Requirements[[2]](#footnote-3)

* Type of weapons and other assets to be protected;
* Location of weapons storage facilities;
* Economic value of the arms and other material assets to be protected;
* Threats to those assets (see Chapter III, section 3.2 - Conditions for Installation of Weapons Stockpiles);
* Desired level of protection against such threats, which should include a cost/benefit analysis;
* Design constraints foreseen by the organization storing the weapons.

3.7 Components of Physical Security

* **Safety regulations**

Safety regulations governing the storage and security of SALW should be simple, clear, and drafted in the form of legal instructions and regulatory instruments without imposing disproportionate administrative or financial pressures.

Safety regulations must be:

a. Prepared and published as regulatory documents.

b. Made known to all personnel and imparted during training.

c. Clear, complete, and consistent, without contradictions.

d. Applicable to SALW stockpiles.

e. Periodically reviewed and updated.

* **Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)**

Security standards are a regulatory matter and must be supported by operating procedures that establish clear operational activities and obligations; personnel working in a weapons storage area should be trained in following standard operating procedures.

Standard operating procedures should be developed for each SALW storage facility and contain, at a minimum:

a) Scope of application of the instructions.

b) Specific manager in charge of the premises (professional title, position, rank, and telephone number).

c) Details of any generic security threats.

d) Names, ranks, positions, and telephone numbers of all security personnel at the site (including transportation, storage, accounting, etc.).

e) Individual roles of all those with security-related responsibilities (in plain, unambiguous language).

f) Access control policies.

g) Security-key control policies.

h) Inventory and accounting procedures.

i) Security procedures to be followed in different areas of the weapons storage facility.

j) Actions to be taken upon discovery of a break-in, theft, loss, or accounting inconsistencies.

k) Actions to be taken in response to alarms.

* **Security plan**

Effective SALW stockpile management needs to be based on SOP requirements. A written safety plan should be developed for each stockpile location, including periodic training sessions conducted for personnel. All staff members working in a storage facility should be familiar with their specific role in this security plan.

Security plans may differ depending on the requirements in the areas where they are located, so this plan should be periodically updated to reflect changing circumstances and situations. The security classification of the plan shall be the responsibility of the designated security officer at the weapons storage facility.

* **Personnel Vetting and Selection**

Physical security and weapons inventory systems fail if personnel do not perform their duties and/or fail to follow standard operating procedures. The workgroup composed of the warehouse manager, security manager, head of registration and control, and warehouse operative must:

* Have no criminal record.
* Receive regular, integral training on their duties.
* Have completed at least secondary-level education.
* Comply with pre-service, in-service, and post-service vetting procedures.
* Receive a decent wage to avoid involvement in arms theft.
* Ensure that all personnel involved in material reception have received specific training in safe handling, including emergency procedures and first aid in case of incidents.
* Conduct regular drills and training sessions covering specific security procedures for the reception of war material.
* Ensure that all personnel responsible for the storage of weapons and ammunition receive regular training on safe storage practices, emergency handling, and security procedures.
* Conduct periodic emergency drills to prepare personnel for responses to fires, explosions, or unauthorized access situations.
* Conduct thorough background checks on all personnel with access to the facilities to ensure their reliability and minimize the risk of complicity in theft or sabotage.
* Provide regular and specific security training to all personnel, including emergency procedures, safe handling of weapons and ammunition, and first aid.
* Present strategies to keep training programs updated in the face of new technologies and emerging threats.
* **Access control**

**Keys** for all areas where SALW is stored, including buildings, containers, shelves, intrusion detection systems, etc., should be stored separately and not left unattended.

Personnel whose duties require them to have access to weapons will be authorized to use them. The head of weapons security within the facility shall maintain a regularly updated record of authorized personnel (custodians). The number of keys shall be kept to a minimum and the master key shall not be used.

**Combinations (combination locks)**

Combinations (codes) for locks should be handled in the same manner as keys. Combinations should be changed periodically and when security personnel are rotated.

A security office should be assigned to store the combinations in sealed envelopes even if they are also stored in secure computer systems. Therefore, each facility or container that is secured with a combination lock shall have a written access log (names, dates, and times) in a visible place on the inside of its front door.

**Entry to weapons storage areas**

Should be allowed access only to:

* Authorized personnel and strict access control for personnel and vehicles should be implemented in all areas.
* Personnel employed and located in the weapons storage area, and those whose duties require them to have access to weapons, may be issued a permanent clearance, which shall be valid only for the time their duties require such access. The chief of weapons security shall keep a record of these permanent clearances indefinitely.
* Staff without functions or responsibilities in the weapons storage area must request written clearance from the chief of weapons security for each entry to the storage area.

This official must keep an indefinite record of such visits by logging the details of each, as follows:

- name, address, and contact information.

- position

- the purpose of the visit

- date of visit

- time of entry and exit from the weapons storage area.

Visits with vehicle entry shall always be subject to random inspection and review upon entering and exiting the weapons storage areas.

Regarding access, additionally, it is recommended:

* If possible and resources permit, develop and implement an electronic authorization system, including aspects of cybersecurity, as well as access control requiring biometric identification, magnetic cards, or PIN codes to enter facilities and restricted areas.
* Evaluate newer access control technologies based on different levels of required security and consider their feasibility for implementation.
* **Physical security of facilities and structures**

**Buildings**

The structure of SALW storage buildings should be sufficiently robust to minimize the possibility of forced entry through its walls, roof/ceiling, floor, windows, gates/doors, and electronic security

**Walls**

Walls should be built to one of the following specifications:

* Solid reinforced concrete with a minimum thickness of 25 cm
* Solid bonded brick or masonry with a minimum thickness of 32.5 cm
* Hollow walls of dense concrete block, brick, or stone not less than 27.5 cm thick, not including the cavity

Any of the above-mentioned existing walls that do not meet the specified dimensions should be reinforced in the following ways:

* increasing the thickness of the inner (surface) sheet material to obtain a wall with a minimum thickness of 27.5cm.
* in the case of brick or solid masonry, bonded material should be added to the existing thickness to obtain a wall of not less than 32.5 cm.
* installing a substantial internal reinforcement of wire mesh with a thickness of not less than 2.3 mm and a maximum mesh size of 5 cm by 2 cm, which should be fixed either:

1. directly to the wall at 30/40 cm with steel washers and suitable fittings or resin anchors, with adequate overlap between sheets, or
2. to a steel angle frame not less than 50cm by 50 cm by 0.3 cm thick with cross rails not more than 1.2 m from the center, to form an internal wire mesh cell.

**Roof/Ceiling**

They should be built to one of the following specifications:

* Solid reinforced concrete, fixed to the walls, with a minimum thickness of 15 cm. It should be structured so that it is sloped to help drain water. In this case, the thickness of the roof edge should not be less than 12 cm.
* Vaulted brickwork or masonry to obtain a ceiling of solid materials with a thickness of not less than 30 cm.

An existing roof/ceiling, as listed above, that does not meet the specified dimensions should be reinforced in one of the following ways:

* retrofitting with reinforced concrete comparable with a genuine reinforced concrete roof
* installing substantial internal wire reinforcement with a minimum thickness of 0.45 cm and a maximum mesh size of 5 cm by 2 cm attached to the floor joists with appropriate steel washers or staples held in place by minimum 10 gauge screws and penetrating the wood to a depth of at least 6 cm in cores of not more than 30 cm; This reinforcement will make it possible for the mesh, when it comes in contact with the ceiling/roof, to be:

1) folded down and secured to walls with masonry or other strong fittings;

2) welded into a steel frame secured to the wall with masonry or other strong fittings.

**Floor**

It should be built to one of the following specifications:

* solid reinforced concrete with a minimum of 15 cm attached to the walls. If connected to other areas this required thickness will only need to be extended as much as possible to ensure the integrity of the joint between the walls and the floor of the armory.
* vaulted brickwork or masonry to obtain a floor of solid materials not less than 30 cm thick.
* An existing floor should be adequately conditioned with concrete, brickwork, or masonry to meet the above specifications.
* For an existing suspended wood floor:

1) by fixing a steel sheet floor, with a minimum thickness of 0.3 cm, securing it to the floor joists with at least 10-gauge screws, and penetrating the wood to a depth of at least 6 cm in cores of not more than 30 cm.

2) by fixing a strong internal wire reinforcement with a minimum thickness of 0.23 cm and a maximum mesh size of 5 cm by 2 cm. A minimum 1.8 cm-thick wood floor is laid on the panels and secured to the floor joists with 10-gauge screws penetrating the wood joist to a depth of at least 6 cm in cores of not more than 30 cm. When the edges of the floor are reached, they are bent upward and secured to the walls (bolts, welded) or to the steel frame secured to the wall. Any retrofitting of existing floors shall not compromise the strength of the existing structure, beams, or supports.

**NOTE:**

In relation to these three structural components (walls, roof, and floors), which are a fundamental part of physical security, when the infrastructure does not meet the aforementioned standards, state agencies must implement additional security measures to enable the safe custody of firearms until the residual risk is minimized. In doing so, they should consider factors such as:

1. Shortage of financial resources.

2. The facilities were not designed for this purpose.

3. Lack of training in the area of firearms management.

4. Development of protocols for the proper care of warehouses.

Therefore, where the specific standards for these structures are not met, preventive actions should be taken, if possible, in the short term (1-3 months), to prevent the weapons from being vulnerable to internal and external threats. Among others, possible measures to take are:

* In the absence of personnel, use of security cameras (perimeter intrusion detection system – PID’S).
* If there are no protocols in place, implement security and custody regulations.
* If the infrastructure is substandard, reinforce it internally with a metal structure with rated security locks.
* In the absence of lighting, install a perimeter fence that serves the purpose of delaying the threat.
* In the absence of adequate lighting, working hours should be during daylight hours.
* Depending on the type of infrastructure, temperature, and humidity, it is recommended to implement extractors and dehumidifiers.

**Doors**

They should be sufficiently robust to prevent them from being forced, specifically:

* Made of steel or solid wood with a steel plate on the outside.
* Door frames should be rigidly anchored to prevent disengagement of the lock from the door frame, by levering or use of hydraulic jacks.
* Door and entrance hinges should be located on the inside and must be of the fixed pin security type or its equivalent.
* Doors and entrances must be secured with padlocks or high-security locks.

**Windows[[3]](#footnote-4)**

There should be as few windows and other openings as possible, and they should be equipped with security bars or grills with appropriate locks.

**Intrusion detection systems**

Buildings and structures used to store small arms and light weapons should have appropriate intrusion detection systems installed on all doors, windows, and other openings. Indoor motion or vibration detection systems may also be used.

**Weapons storage racks**

All weapons within the warehouse that are not packed in shipping crates or other containers should be stored individually in racks to ease counting, inventory management, and theft detection.

In warehouses not equipped with intrusion detection systems, weapons should be secured to racks with padlocked chains or steel cables; racks should be bolted or welded to the wall and/or floor to prevent their easy removal.

* **Physical perimeter security**

All SALW storage facilities should be surrounded by a fence or wall to act as a barrier and identify the boundary of the restricted area. The level of protection depends on its height, the type of construction, and the materials used to increase its effectiveness, e.g., overhead surveillance, PIDS, lighting, or closed-circuit television (CCTV).

Pedestrian or vehicular access points should be kept to a minimum and consistent with operational requirements. Signage should be visibly displayed at all perimeter approaches in order to indicate to unauthorized persons that they are approaching a restricted area; the most appropriate are those that indicate the presence of armed security or guard dogs.

Fences are classified from Class 1 (least protection) to Class 4 (greatest protection). Their effectiveness depends largely on the level of security at each access point.

**Class 1 security fence**

Provides minimum security and is at least 1.5 m high. Its purpose is only to demarcate and delay an intruder for a short time.

**Class 2 security fence**

About 2.9 m in height, it provides a degree of resistance to climbing and penetration by an intruder using break-in materials and implements. It should be supported with other perimeter security systems such as PIDS or CCTV.

**Class 3 security fence**

An intermediate security barrier approximately 4 m high that is designed to deter and delay a clever intruder with access to a limited range of handheld tools. Its construction provides resistance to climbing and penetration attempts and offers a good balance between intrusion delay and cost. It should also be supported with other perimeter security systems such as PIDS and CCTV.

**Class 4 security fence**

A high-security barrier approximately 4.8 m high is designed to provide maximum deterrence and delay. It is built to provide a high degree of resistance to climbing and penetration. It should also be supported with perimeter security systems such as CCTV and PIDS. (We can rely on BS1722 Standard for fences)

To the extent of possibilities and depending on resource availability, consider:

* Surveillance cameras with continuous recording at strategic points to monitor activity in real-time and review recordings in case of incidents.
* Consider installing an alarm system connected to security services or the local police for a rapid response in case of intrusion, fire, or other emergencies.

**Clear area**

An area 4 m inward and 10 m outward from the security fence should be cleared of vegetation.

**Drainage**

Drainage structures and water passages penetrating the perimeter of the security fence shall have a cross-sectional area of not more than 0.25 m. Access to drainage structures and water passages with a cross-sectional area greater than 0.25 m shall be blocked at both ends with security bars.

**Perimeter lighting**

* Sufficiently intense to allow security personnel to detect any type of threat.
* All perimeter access points should have direct overhead lighting.
* Install switches so that they can only be accessed by custodial and authorized personnel.
* Warehouses should have a backup power generator, which should be located inside the perimeter fence to make sabotage or destruction more difficult.
* The light should be directed somewhat outward to improve night vision inside the perimeter and make it difficult to see from the outside.

**Perimeter intrusion detection systems (PIDS)[[4]](#footnote-5)**

PIDS should be installed on perimeter fences surrounding buildings and structures where SALW is stored. Alarm signals from these systems must be received at a central control or monitoring station from which a response force can be dispatched, capable of arriving on site within a maximum of 15 minutes after alarm system activation.

**Electrical system of the facilities**

It is important to take into account the type of cable to be used, which must comply with the regulations of the national technical authorities in that regard and be made of fireproof plastic materials with low smoke and gas emissions. The following are some minimum recommended materials:

* PVC or synthetic rubber insulated cables in bolted steel or PVC conduits.
* PVC or synthetic rubber insulated cables in trunk or non-metallic conduits.
* Heavy duty (750 volts) mineral insulated metal sheathed (MIMS) cable. The outer shell shall be made of low smoke and acid gas emission material. The cables shall be equipped with terminals that comply with the regulations of the national technical authority.
* Multi-core shielded cable of cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE) or PVC insulated cable may require additional protection against mechanical damage.
* All cables with single-core conductors are prohibited, as are cables with a single layer of insulation, except MIMS cable.

Lighting fixtures (contacts, timers, sensors, power outlets, etc.) and individual lighting units (luminaires) shall comply with standards consistent with the design of the infrastructure. Lamps with the correct rated wattage shall be used, consistent with the installation drawings; the lighting shall be designed to provide the levels and quality established by the national technical authority.

The keys to access lighting fixtures will remain in the possession of the chief of security, will be kept in their office, and will only be given to authorized personnel.

**Switches**

The electrical supply to any building shall be controlled by one or more main switches located on the exterior of the building. Main switches shall not be placed inside a technical room if one exists. If there is more than one main switch, they should be placed close to each other with the function of each clearly marked.

The main switches shall be of a design capable of immediately isolating each phase and neutral conductor entering the building and deactivating the output of any uninterruptible power supply system.

If there are other switches and distribution boxes that control the electricity supply in an explosives building, they should be located outside the building or in a technical room that has a minimum fire resistance of half an hour.

**Types of PIDS**

The installation of different types of Perimeter intrusion detection systems (PIDS) can be considered:

1. In-ground detection 5. Installed on fences.

2. Electrified fences. 6. Field effect.

3. Continuous monitoring. 7. Independent systems.

4. Tensioned wire 8. Rapid deployment.

**Patrols and dogs**

Security personnel (comprising military, police, or civilian security personnel) should verify the security integrity of weapons storage areas during off-duty hours, both on an ad hoc and periodic basis, which should be recorded and retained for at least 90 days.

These clearly trained and equipped personnel performing their duties in accordance with appropriate standard operating procedures may also use trained working dogs to provide support.

3.8 Physical Security in Armory or Barracks Facilities[[5]](#footnote-6)

**General**

Smaller-scale SALW storage at the local level (e.g., in police stations, barracks, or production centers) requires different protection systems than those described in the **physical security components.**

Therefore, the physical security of weapons at the unit level in police stations and barracks is facilitated by the fact that the facilities are more compact or smaller because they are staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and usually have security systems installed to monitor access and record delivery and receipt of weapons.

The physical security of weapons in such circumstances should be managed through an armory or a security room (arms room), or, for small premises, with security cabinets due to the operational nature and practicality of the designation and the accounting controls of the weapons themselves. In the absence of cabinets, safes, showcases, clamps, security cables, and closets could be used.

**CHAPTER IV - FIREARMS ACCOUNTING (INVENTORY MANAGEMENT)**

Firearms accounting is key in detecting the loss or theft of firearms from storage, as well as facilitating the identification and disposal of surplus firearms. Effective stock management should be a priority for all national agencies with firearms inventories.

The MOSAIC 5.20 establishes that national agencies should have precise information concerning:

1. Number of weapons in the national arsenal

2. Detailed information on weapons (records system)

3. Physical location of stockpiles

4. Stockpile status

5. Weapons categorization (see Chapter III, section 3.1 - COMPOSITION OF SALW STOCKPILE TYPES).

The above information shall be collected and controlled by the national authority, providing an overview of:

1) individual gun shops

2) future requirements for the acquisition and supply of weapons

3) weapons movements

4) requirements for disposal and/or final destination of the weapons.

This forms the basis for an EFFECTIVE STOCKPILE AND MUNITIONS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM within a centralized database that allows for the COLLECTION AND COLLATION of weapons stockpile information.

4.1 Weapons Accounting

Records must be maintained for a minimum of 20 years, in electronic format, but also printed for each weapons storage facility, with the following information:

1) Make

2) Model

3) Caliber

4) Serial number

5) Country of manufacture or of most recent importation

6) Unit where it is currently located and the location

7) Date of entry in the system

8) Date of transfer to another storage facility

9) Record of modifications and/or repairs

10) Overall number of weapons, disaggregated by type.

The following information must be recorded for handmade and/or homemade weapons:

a. Make and model of the handmade weapon, if applicable;

b. Short description of the weapon;

c. Caliber;

d. Any visible identification markings on the weapon;

e. Its designation is "handmade weapon".

In all cases, a high-resolution electronic photograph of the complete weapon, as well as close-up photographs of any markings on the frame of the weapon, must be taken and the weapon entry added to the database record.

Through PACAM, the DPS/OAS aims to support Member States in the accounting of their arsenals. For this purpose, the states that request it have access to the software: Firearms and Ammunition Inventory System - SAM, to strengthen inventory control in both firearms and ammunition depots.

REMEMBER:

* During an inspection, aspects such as the physical condition of the weapons, the functionality of the safety mechanisms, and the integrity of the ammunition (if applicable) should be assessed.
* Describe how to set up and maintain a digital recording system, emphasizing the importance of data security and providing use cases to illustrate its application.

4.2 Loss Reporting

Any loss or theft of a weapon shall be reported immediately to the appropriate authority so that it can initiate an independent inquiry by a person or organization not connected with the weapons management system, which shall prepare an inquiry report containing the following information:

1) Weapon data (make, model, caliber, serial number, country of manufacture).

2) Date, location, and unit involved.

3) A short description of the circumstances surrounding the loss.

4) Reason for loss (e.g., negligence, theft, etc.)

5) Any disciplinary measure or criminal action taken.

6) Recommendations to prevent recurrence.

7) Date and place where the weapon(s) was (were) recovered (if applicable).

8) A short description of the circumstances of the recovery (if applicable).

To enhance security and prevent losses, one could investigate, compare, and contrast the use of barcode and RFID technologies, and assess the feasibility of their implementation and benefits for improving the traceability of weapons and ammunition (if applicable) within the facilities. Additionally, prioritizing the maintenance of complete and up-to-date documentation of all inventory, including records of entries, exits, and transfers of weapons and ammunition, facilitates the identification of weapons in case of loss or detection of an anomaly.

* 1. Independence of Functions

The duties of the personnel that make up the work team in charge of SALW stockpile management must be well defined, so that they do not assume other duties beyond those already established, thus avoiding the possibility of misplacement, theft, diversion, or illicit circulation. Therefore:

* 1. Personnel responsible for storage should not assume accounting and auditing tasks
  2. Personnel responsible for weapons transfer of should not carry out weapon registration.
  3. When audit personnel carry out verification activities, they should be accompanied by supervisory personnel.
  4. The personnel responsible for storage must adhere to and ensure compliance with the procedures.

4.4 SAM - Weapons and Ammunition Inventory System

SAM was created in response to a requirement raised by various States Parties to CIFTA, and its purpose is to contribute to effective inventory management in accordance with international best practices. It was developed by PACAM, with funding from the European Union.

**Objectives**

* To provide member states with a simple tool that would allow national institutions to control their inventory of arms and ammunition
* Strengthen the technical and operational capabilities of the states to ensure better management and control of their conventional firearms and ammunition inventory.

**Features**

* Web-based multilayer
* Spanish/English
* Use open-source software
* Contains the physical description, location, condition, inputs, and outputs of weapons and ammunition.
* Developed based on good practices on Weapons Inventory (MOSAIC 05.20 - Chap 11, 11.1.2 - 11.1.3) and International Standard IATG 03.10

**THE SYSTEM IS AVAILABLE FOR FREE TO OAS MEMBER STATES NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS**

**CHAPTER V - DUTIES OF WORKING PERSONNEL**

5.1 Duties

**Warehouse Manager**

* Labeling of all internal and external areas of arms storage.
* Periodically train personnel in handling and use of handguns for best practices in warehouse management.
* Record all personnel entering and leaving weapons storage areas (daily, weekly, or semi-annual).
* Review warehouse infrastructure and report any faults.
* Responsible for minimum use of PPE.
* Responsible for the security of keys and padlocks.
* Cleaning and clearing between armory shelves.
* Coordinate any activity with other area managers to ensure good warehouse management practices.

**Chief Registrar**

* Maintenance, updating, and periodic replenishment of the following documented information: personnel in charge, visitor entry log, weapons data log, weapons accounting log, key and padlock log and control, and weapons entry and exit log, among others.

**Head of Security**

* Develop the General Safety Plan for the facilities.
* Develop the Fire Plan.
* Signage of all perimeter areas (visible from a distance of 50 m).
* Regulation or rotation of personnel at different surveillance points.
* Inspection of alarm systems (alarms, cameras, patrols, dogs).
* Develop written safety regulations.
* Safekeeping of keys (only to authorized personnel).
* Surveillance of facility perimeter.

**Warehouse operative**

* Recording of information concerning arms warehouses.
* Receive adequate training in the handling and use of firearms.
* Be attentive to the warning signs of any event.
* Radio communication of incidents or accidents.
* Maintain labeling according to the weapons classification.
* Registration of personnel entering warehouses.

**CHAPTER VI – SALW TRANSPORTATION**

Within the management of SALW stockpiles, **transportation** is a critical area. International best practices consider that transportation can be carried out by land, rail, air, and sea, with each mode required to meet certain requirements before, during, and after the transfer to maintain reliable security levels.

The national authority may choose the type of transportation as deemed appropriate, whether using military transport (trucks, ships, or planes) or civilian company and contractor transportation that meets all security requirements, such as alarms and trackers allowing monitoring during the travel route.

Among other things, for the transportation of SALW, one should not resort to transport agents in all their modalities if:

* They are named in reports from monitoring groups of the UN Sanctions Committee.
* They are known by National Authorities to have been previously associated with the illicit trafficking of SALW or other forms of illicit trafficking.

For each transport operation, it must be carried out beforehand:

* **Risk assessment** to determine the required level of security taking into account the following aspects:

1. Quantity and types of weapons to be transported;
2. Transit time along the transport route;
3. How many times the weapons will need to be loaded/unloaded/reloaded;
4. Probabilities of incidents on the proposed route.

* **Transportation Plan**, taking into consideration the aforementioned and depending on the means to be used for transporting the weapons and/or ammunition, making the corresponding arrangements with the involved entities such as the fire department, police, or military (if applicable), or regional or national authorities accompanying sections or the entire route. This includes all secure and possible access routes, scheduling delivery times, and assigning personnel and resources, thus minimizing the risks associated with transportation

It is important to have established direct communication and coordination with the entities sending the materials, including drivers and suppliers, to have clear and established details of the shipment and logistical needs.

Keep in mind that, in all transportation variants, the following must be implemented:

* Authorization, security, supervision, and inspection procedures;
* Transporting weapons and ammunition separately;
* Ensuring that crates or packaging are secured and sealed before being loaded into transport containers;
* Combination locks that comply with established security standards;
* Shipments should be inspected upon receipt, if possible, during transit, to ensure that locks and sealing seals are intact.

Another important issue is that each APAL transfer must be accompanied by shipping/freight documents. In addition, protocols for transfer requiring verification and signatures at the time of receipt of the goods should be designed, whether these APALs are imported or the transportation is carried out within the national territory boundaries.[[6]](#footnote-7)

During transportation, consideration should also be given to the arrival of the material at its final destination, which should, as far as possible, take into account the following aspects:

* Verify that the designated area for receiving the weapons is free of obstacles, properly marked, and equipped with safety gear, tools, and necessary work means.
* Check that all documentation related to the arrival of the material, such as permits, invoices, cargo manifests, and security certificates, is in order and no documentation is missing.
* It is important to ensure that all necessary authorizations for receiving, storing, and handling the weapons are in place, in accordance with current legislation.
* Keep the storage area clean and organized, free of obstacles that could cause accidents, thus facilitating safe access in case of emergencies.
* It is important to be aware of and discuss the latest innovations in physical security, analyzing their applicability and effectiveness in protecting installations.

**ANNEX I - CHECKLIST FOR ARMS DEPOTS OR WAREHOUSES**

As with ammunition and explosives management, weapons storage facilities must meet explicit requirements detailing administrative and operational activities that support their security.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **No.** | **ACTIVITY** | **NO** | **YES** | **OBSERVATION** |
| **I** | **Documentation** | | | |
| 1 | Security plan |  |  |  |
| 2 | Internal safety regulations |  |  |  |
| 3 | Standard operating procedures (SOPs) |  |  |  |
| 4 | Personnel selection, location, and information |  |  |  |
| 5 | Personnel entry and exit control (including vehicles) |  |  |  |
| 6 | Registration of key handover |  |  |  |
| 7 | Registration and control of weapons exit and entry |  |  |  |
| 8 | Registration of weapons data (digital and printed) |  |  |  |
| 9 | Registration of weapons loss reports |  |  |  |
| 10 | Weapons inspection procedure and registration (daily, weekly,  semi-annual) |  |  |  |
| 11 | PIDS test record |  |  |  |
| 12 | Alarm response procedures (audible or verbal) |  |  |  |
| 13 | Registration of work teams (counting-supervision-movement) |  |  |  |
| **II** | **Infrastructure - Storage - Equipment** | | | |
| 1 | Reinforced concrete walls (25 cm thick) |  |  |  |
| 2 | Internal and external wall protection (sheet or mesh) |  |  |  |
| 3 | Roof 12–15 cm thick |  |  |  |
| 4 | Concrete or brick floor (15–30 cm thick) |  |  |  |
| 5 | Steel or solid wood doors |  |  |  |
| 6 | Welded hinges on doors to avoid pin removal |  |  |  |
| 7 | Doors open outward |  |  |  |
| 8 | High-quality padlocks or locks |  |  |  |
| 9 | Windows (minimum of two) |  |  |  |
| 10 | Windows protected with steel bars |  |  |  |
| 11 | Intruder alarm system (cameras, motion, or vibration) |  |  |  |
| 12 | PIDS are placed at warehouse entrances and openings |  |  |  |
| 13 | Weapons placed in racks |  |  |  |
| 14 | Racks joined by welds or bolts |  |  |  |
| 15 | Weapons placed in boxes or containers |  |  |  |
| 16 | Weapons secured with chains and padlocks (in the absence of  PIDS) |  |  |  |
| 17 | Perimeter security fence or wall (1.5 – 4.8 m high) |  |  |  |
| 18 | Clearance of vegetation inside (4 m) and outside (10 m) security  fence |  |  |  |
| 19 | Warehouse drainage system |  |  |  |
| 20 | Drains protected at ends by safety bars |  |  |  |
| 21 | Internal and external perimeter lighting |  |  |  |
| 22 | Lighting at warehouse access points |  |  |  |
| 23 | The lighting system is LED-type |  |  |  |
| 24 | Switches located in restricted access areas |  |  |  |
| 25 | Standby power generator (power plant) |  |  |  |
| 26 | Visual surveillance system (cameras) |  |  |  |
| 27 | Surveillance with patrols and dogs |  |  |  |
| 28 | Stored weapons are sealed with tape or other special seal |  |  |  |
| 29 | Gun clearing box |  |  |  |
| 30 | Labeling of internal and external areas of the warehouse |  |  |  |
| 31 | Weapons cleaning area |  |  |  |
| 32 | Weapons are in a single warehouse |  |  |  |
| 33 | Functional parts are stored separately |  |  |  |
| 34 | Containers, boxes, bins, etc. are sealed |  |  |  |
| **III** | **Other considerations** | | | |
| 1 | Weapons are separated from ammunition, explosives, and other  hazardous materials |  |  |  |
| 2 | There are MANPADS |  |  |  |
| 3 | The components of the air defense systems are separate |  |  |  |

**ANNEX II - FIREARMS LOSS/THEFT REPORT FORM**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **LOSS OR THEFT FIREARM REPORT FORM** | | | |
| **SECTION I** | | | |
| **GENERAL INFORMATION** | | | |
| Report Date: | Report Time: | |  |
| Names of the person completing this Report: | Surnames of the person completing this Report: | |  |
| Organization: |  | |  |
| Unit or Dependency Involved: | Theft | Loss Other  Specify: | |
| Reason for Loss: |
| **LOST/STOLEN WEAPON DETAILS** | | | |
| *Lost or Stolen weapon Details*  Make:  Type:  Model:  Note: |  | Serial No.:  Caliber:  Country of Manufacture:  *If it is necessary to add more weapons, specify them in Section II.* | |
| **DESCRIPTION** | | | |
| *Brief description of the circumstances surrounding the loss, including as much information as possible:* | | | |
|  | | | |
| **MEASURES** | | | |
| *Disciplinary measure or criminal action executed. Specify:* | | | |
|  | | | |
| **RECOMMENDATIONS** | | | |
| *Include recommendations or measures to be taken to prevent theft and/or loss in the future* | | | |
|  | | | |
| **RECOVERY (If is applicable)** | | | |
| Recovery Date:  Place:  Brief Description of Recovery: |  | Recovery Time: |  |
|  |
|  | | | |
|  | | | |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **SECTION II** | | |
| *Lost or Stolen Weapon Details* | | |
| Make: | Serial No.: |  |
| Type: | Caliber: |  |
|  | | |
| Model: | Country of Manufacture: |  |
| Note: | *If it is necessary to add more weapons, specify*  *them in Section II.* | |
| *Lost or Stolen Weapon Details* | | |
| Make: | Serial No.: |  |
| Type: | Caliber: |  |
| Model: | Country of Manufacture: |  |
| Note: | *If it is necessary to add more weapons, specify*  *them in Section II.* | |
| *Lost or Stolen Weapon Details* | | |
| Make: | Serial No.: |  |
| Type: | Caliber: |  |
|  | | |
| Model: | Country of Manufacture: |  |
| Note: | *If it is necessary to add more weapons, specify*  *them in Section II.* | |
| *Lost or Stolen Weapon Details* | | |
| Make: | Serial No.: |  |
| Type: | Caliber: |  |
| Model: | Country of Manufacture: |  |
| Note: | *If it is necessary to add more weapons, specify*  *them in Section II.* | |
| *Lost or Stolen Weapon Details* | | |
| Make: | Serial No.: |  |
| Type: | Caliber: |  |
| Model: | Country of Manufacture: |  |
| Note: | *If it is necessary to add more weapons, specify*  *them in Section II.* | |

CIFTA01052E01

1. "38. Instruct the Department of Public Security, in coordination with the States Parties to CIFTA and in consultation with the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and relevant expert organizations, to develop an Operational Procedures Manual for the Destruction of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), and an Operational Procedures Manual for Physical Security and Arsenal Management, which shall consider existing international standards, best practices, national regulations, and the experience of the Program for Assistance in Control of Arms and Ammunition (PACAM) in the region, and to submit them for consideration by the Advisory Committee of CIFTA for their inclusion as complementary documents of CIFTA, for voluntary use by the States Parties to CIFTA." [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Sections 3.2.,3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 from this manual are extracts from MOSAIC 05.20 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. It is appropriate to cite the good practice established in Argentina through Resolution ANMAC No. 119/2018 "Guard and storage of controlled materials - safety conditions and recommendations." The standard indicates that openings (windows) facing the interior of the installation must have grilles embedded in the wall made of solid iron rods, with a minimum thickness of 12.7 millimeters in diameter or approved shielding. The rods cannot be spaced more than twelve (12) centimeters apart. The grilles should be installed with a separation from the wall of no more than five (5) centimeters. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. As a good practice, an example from Argentina is cited, according to Resolution ANMAC No. 119/2018, which states the following: Security systems installed (alarm and CCTV) must have power supplied by UPS (uninterruptible power supply) or a battery bank with a charging source, depending on the current type of the system, allowing operation automatically in case of power outage for a period not less than 4 or 5 days. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Additionally, further information on the topic can be found in:

   Resolution ANMAC No. 119/2018 – Annex I, of Argentina

   Firearms Security Manual of the United Kingdom, paragraphs 45-75 of Annex A. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. This chapter contains excerpts from Chapter 13 - Transportation of Weapons of MOSAIC 05.20. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)