

Report No. 37820

# **Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean**

March 2007

A Joint Report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the  
Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In his 2006 New Year's address as then prime minister of Jamaica, P.J. Patterson said, "Without a doubt, the high level of violent crime remains our most troubling and pressing problem." In opening the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago in September 2005, President George Maxwell Richards said the country was in crisis due to the escalating crime rate. Through multiple channels, crime and violence threaten the welfare of Caribbean citizens. Beyond the direct effect on victims, crime and violence inflict widespread costs, generating a climate of fear for all citizens and diminishing economic growth. Crime and violence present one of the paramount challenges to development in the Caribbean.

Several factors which cut across the diverse countries of the region heighten their vulnerability to crime and violence. Primary among these is the region's vulnerability to drug trafficking. Wedged between the world's source of cocaine to the south and its primary consumer markets to the north, the Caribbean is the transit point for a torrent of narcotics, with a street value that exceeds the value of the entire legal economy. Compounding their difficulties, Caribbean countries have large coastlines and territorial waters and many have weak criminal justice systems that are easily overwhelmed.

Key messages and recommendations from the report include the following:

- 1) Crime and violence are a **development issue**. The high rates of crime and violence in the region have both direct effects on human welfare in the short-run and longer run effects on economic growth and social development. Estimates suggest that were Jamaica and Haiti to reduce their rates of homicide to the level of Costa Rica, each country would see an increase in its growth rate of 5.4 percent annually.
- 2) While levels of crime and associated circumstances vary by country, the strongest explanation for the relatively high rates of crime and violence rates in the region—and their apparent rise in recent years—is **narcotics trafficking**. The drug trade drives crime in a number of ways: through violence tied to trafficking, by normalizing illegal behavior, by diverting criminal justice resources from other activities, by provoking property crime related to addiction, by contributing to the widespread availability of firearms, and by undermining and corrupting societal institutions. At the same time, it should be recognized that there is a trade-off between resources spent on combating drug trafficking and those spent on other forms of crime and violence prevention.
- 3) In general, there has been an **over-reliance on the criminal justice approach** to crime reduction in the region, to the detriment of other complementary approaches which can be effective in reducing certain types of crime and violence. Over the last few years, however, several countries such as Jamaica and the Dominican Republic are increasingly investing in different approaches. Crime prevention through environmental design (**CPTED**), the study and design of environments to encourage desirable behavior and discourage antisocial behavior, has significant potential to generate rapid decreases in property crime and some forms of inter-

personal violence. Integrated **citizen security approaches** have seen initial success in the Dominican Republic and should be explored elsewhere. These programs, by combining modern methods of policing with prevention interventions undertaken by both government and non-governmental organizations, are extremely promising. The **public health approach**, which focuses on modifying risk factors for violent conduct, is especially promising for addressing violence against women and youth violence.

- 4) At the same time, it is also crucial to note that **certain types of crime and violence**—in particular, organized crime and drug trafficking—are **largely impervious to prevention approaches; a criminal justice-focused approach is essential in dealing with them**. Within the criminal justice approach, there is much room for improvement. An especially **urgent priority is the development of management information systems and performance indicators** for better problem diagnosis, tracking of system outputs, monitoring reform programs and providing increased accountability to citizens.
- 5) These different approaches mean that there are **multiple possible entry points to engage in violence and crime prevention**. In one instance, the most promising approach may be in the context of a slum-upgrading project; in another, in the context of a reform of the health service; in a third, in the context of a reform of the criminal justice system. There is no one “ideal” approach. The common denominator is that successful interventions are **evidence-based**, starting with a clear diagnostic about types of violence and risk factors, and ending with a careful evaluation of the intervention’s impact which will inform future actions.
- 6) Evidence from Jamaica and other countries shows that the average deportee is not involved in criminal activity, but a minority may be causing serious problems, both by direct involvement in crime and by providing a perverse role model for youth. More **services should be offered to reintegrate deportees**, along the lines of those provided by the Office for the Resettlement of Deportees in St. Kitts and Nevis. Options should be explored for deporting countries to shoulder a significant portion of the costs of these programs, in exchange for serious monitoring and evaluation of program impacts.
- 7) Given that Caribbean countries are transit and not producer countries of cocaine, **interdiction needs to be complemented by other strategies outside the region** (principally demand reduction in consumer countries and eradication and/or alternative development in producer countries). Within the region, policies **should focus on limiting the availability of firearms and on providing meaningful alternatives to youth**. Since the Caribbean nations have limited resources to effectively fight the drug trade, **significant assistance should come from the destination countries in support of interdiction efforts**. The case study of the Netherlands Antilles shows this to be both effective and in the self-interest of developed countries.
- 8) **Gun ownership** is an outgrowth of the drug trade and, in some countries, of politics and associated garrison communities. Within these environments, which

promote the demand for weapons, reducing gun ownership is a difficult undertaking. **Better gun registries, marking and tracking can help, as can improved gun interdiction in ports.** Long run and sustained reduction in the demand for guns, however, will hinge on progress in combating drugs.

- 9) To address issues of **youth violence**, policy makers in the short run should **borrow from the toolkit of evidence-based programs** from other regions, such as early childhood development and mentoring programs, interventions to increase retention of high-risk youth in secondary schools, and opening schools after-hours and on weekends to offer youth attractive activities to occupy their free time. While there are a multitude of programs in the region that address youth violence, few if any have been subject to rigorous impact evaluation. In the medium and long run, impact evaluations should systematically document what works in youth violence prevention in the Caribbean.
- 10) This report has culled many different sources of data to present as comprehensive a picture as possible of crime and violence in the Caribbean. Yet it is clear that there are major **data gaps that hinder policy making**. Chief among them is the lack of regular, periodic **victimization surveys** that permit comparison of crime levels both across countries and over time.

## **ROAD MAP OF THE REPORT**

The report is organized as follows. It begins with an overview of crime in the region, separately considering conventional and organized crime. Two subsequent chapters examine risk factors and the costs of crime for the region as a whole. Next, a series of chapters presents case studies designed to highlight particular issues in specific countries. These case studies were chosen in order to provide a detailed analysis of the most pressing issues that are amenable to policy making at the regional and national levels. The specific issues were chosen in consultation with stakeholders in the region to ensure that the report was responding to their demands and needs. The report ends with a chapter on public policy responses to crime in the region.<sup>1</sup>


## **Overview of Crime Trends**

Murder rates in the Caribbean—at 30 per 100,000 population annually—are higher than for any other region of the world and have risen in recent years for many of the region's countries. Assault rates, at least based on assaults reported to police, are also significantly above the world average. These reported rates are highly sensitive to the level of trust in the local police in general and the willingness to report domestic violence, in particular. Victimization surveys are needed to even approximate true levels of assault, yet standardized victimization surveys have rarely been undertaken in the Caribbean.


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<sup>1</sup> Note that this report does not contain an in-depth analysis of political violence in the Caribbean.

### Murder Rates in Selected Caribbean Countries: 1999-2005



### Murder Rates by Region of the World



Sources: (left figure) Procuraduría General of the Dominican Republic; Central Statistical Office of Trinidad and Tobago; Central Statistical Office of St. Lucia.

Sources: (right figure) UN Crime Trends Survey and Interpol, 2002 or most recent year.

Note: Figures shown are annual murder rates per 100,000 population.

Violence against women affects a significant percentage of women and girls in the Caribbean. Police statistics offer only a very imperfect picture of violence against women, since the majority of these incidents are not reported to police and increased trust in police will increase reporting. To get a more precise idea of prevalence rates, one must use victimization surveys that focus on violence against women. One such regional victimization survey revealed that 48 percent of adolescent girls' sexual initiation was "forced" or "somewhat forced" in nine Caribbean countries (Halcon et al., 2003).

According to the latest available data from the UNODC's Crime Trends Survey (CTS), which is based on police statistics, three of the top ten recorded rape rates in the world occur in the Caribbean. All countries in the Caribbean for which comparable data are available (Bahamas, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Dominica, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago) experienced a rate of rape above the unweighted average of the 102 countries in the CTS.

Despite their diversity, one thing all Caribbean countries have in common is that they have long been caught in the crossfire of international drug trafficking. The good news is that the flow of drugs through the region may be decreasing. The transshipment of cocaine to the United States, the most significant flow in economic terms, appears to be in decline. Cannabis production for export from Jamaica, the largest cannabis producer in the region, appears to be in a slump.

Despite these recent shifts, large quantities of drugs continue to transit the Caribbean. In 2005, it is estimated that about 10 tons of cocaine transited through Jamaica, and 20 tons through Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

In addition to drug trafficking, kidnapping and corruption are other forms of organized crime which affect the region. Two countries—Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago—have seen recent and rapid increases in kidnappings. The kidnapping rate nearly doubled in Trinidad and Tobago between 1999 and 2005 (Central Statistics Office of Trinidad and Tobago, 2006).

Corruption is a difficult crime to measure. While there are methodological concerns about Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), it remains the standard for international corruption comparisons and boasts one of the few datasets with near-global coverage. In the 2006 CPI, ten Caribbean countries were included in the world rankings. Haiti was ranked as the most corrupt country in the world, while Barbados was ranked as the 24<sup>th</sup> least corrupt country, ahead of many European countries.


### **Risk Factors for Crime and Violence**

Potential risk factors for crime victimization encompass conditions at the individual, relationship, community, and societal levels. As a whole, Caribbean countries exhibit crime patterns similar to those in other countries. Both murder and robbery rates are higher in countries with low economic growth while murder rates are highest in countries and communities that are poor and have large populations of young men. But these factors alone cannot explain the high rates of crime in the Caribbean. In Caribbean countries overall, homicide rates are 34 percent higher and robbery rates are 26 percent higher than in countries with comparable macroeconomic conditions.

Household-level victimization data from Jamaica, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic were analyzed to generate a profile of key risk factors. Poorer households in poor communities face higher risk of violent crime, while property crime more often strikes the wealthy. The presence of a large population of young men in the community is associated with higher levels of both types of crime in both Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. In all three countries, crime is highly concentrated in urban areas and in most cases in areas with high population density.

While these risk factors provide a profile of who is most likely to be victimized, observable variables have low predictive power in a statistical sense because victims vary widely in their characteristics. In other words, crime victimization is a general phenomenon which strikes citizens of all stripes, and few if any are immune from the threat. This can be seen in part for Haiti by the fact that while property crimes most often strike those in the richest quintile, and those in the poorest quintile most often suffer injury due to crime, victims are spread across all five quintiles of the income distribution.

## Murder Rates for Countries of the World vs. GDP per Capita, Late 1990s



Sources: Own analysis. UNODC data and other (see Annex 3.1) for crime rates, Penn World Tables for GDP per capita.

An important finding of this study is that in Jamaica a lower percentage of crimes are reported to the police in areas with higher crime rates. The reporting rate can plausibly be interpreted as a measure of confidence in the police, as people will be more likely to report when they trust the police and believe they will respond. Lack of trust and confidence in the police is then lower in areas with higher local crime rates. This suggests also that official police data distort the true geographic profile of crime, because official data are biased downwards for higher crime areas.

## Socioeconomic Costs of Crime and Violence

This report reviews the literature on the effects of crime in the region and presents new analysis of the costs of crime in terms of loss of quality of life for victims, responses to fear of crime, and economic growth.


Few studies in the region have examined socioeconomic costs of gender-based violence and its effects. Morrison and Orlando (2005) find that women victimized by physical violence in Haiti are: i) less likely to receive antenatal care; ii) more likely to suffer from genital sores and ulcers; and iii) more likely to be anemic (as are their children).

Due to the high levels of violence in parts of urban Jamaica, residents are afraid to leave the homes and interact less often with friends and family who live elsewhere. Similarly, survey data from the Dominican Republic and Haiti show that people avoid activities and locations that are perceived to expose them to a high risk of criminal victimization.

Another channel through which crime exacts costs is through its effects on businesses, which can be particularly damaging because they can involve both short-run costs and long-run consequences for development, by diverting resources to crime prevention measures and otherwise discouraging investment. In Jamaica, 39 percent of business managers in a World Bank survey responded that they were less likely to expand their business because of crime, and 37 percent reported that crime discourages investments that would improve productivity. Because of the key role that tourism plays in many Caribbean countries, the effects of crime on tourism are of particular concern. Alleyne and Boxil (2003) examined the relationship over time between tourist arrivals and crime in Jamaica and concluded that crime has discouraged tourists.

It is possible to add up the total costs of crime through the accounting method. A study by Francis et al. (2003) found that the total costs of crime in Jamaica in 2001 came to J\$12.4 billion, which was 3.7 percent of GDP. Security costs dominate the total costs of crime as calculated by the accounting method.

**Potential Boost to Annual Economic Growth Rate from Reducing Homicide Rate to Costa Rica Level**




Source: Own analysis.

The impact of crime on overall economic growth can also be estimated using cross-country panel data. Results from this kind of analysis suggest very large potential gains from reduction in violence for Haiti and Jamaica. Both countries could boost annual economic growth per capita by 5.4 percent if they were to bring their homicide rates down to the levels of Costa Rica. Guyana and the Dominican Republic would also benefit substantially, with potential growth rate increases of 1.7 percent and 1.8 percent, respectively.

**Criminal Deportees in Jamaica**

Each year, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada deport thousands of people convicted of various crimes to their countries of citizenship in the Caribbean. There is a widely held belief in the Caribbean that recent crime troubles can be tied directly to the activities of deportees who have learned criminal behavior in the developed countries. This report examines the situation in Jamaica, which is proportionately most affected by criminal deportations, and where officials have worried that the country’s rising murder rate may be linked to the growing stock of deported convicts. The figure below shows both the number of murders and the number and source of deportee arrivals over the 1998-2004 period. Whether these two variables are related cannot be determined from this figure.

## Deportees and Murders in Jamaica by Year



Source: Social and Economic Survey of Jamaica; Jamaica Constabulary Force.

committing violent crime in Jamaica. At the same time, although the majority of the criminal deportees were deported for non-violent offenses, 224 convicted murderers were included in the flow between 2001 and 2004. Relative to the Jamaican population, this is not a small number, and it does not take a large number of offenders to have a potentially large impact.

Are deportees contributing significantly to crime in other countries of the region? Of 332 criminal deportees returned to Barbados between 1994 and 2000, only 13 percent were subsequently charged with a criminal offense. Similarly, in Trinidad and Tobago, of the 565 deportees received between 1999 and 2001, only 15 percent were subsequently charged with a crime. This recidivism rate is low compared to the reoffense rate of prisoners released from local prisons.

Developed countries provide a variety of forms of aid to the Caribbean to support development. Subsidizing reintegration for deported offenders would be a very cost-effective way of achieving similar ends. It would save Caribbean societies the cost and trauma of recidivism; reduce criminal justice costs involved in processing and incarcerating repeat offenders; and promote the stability essential to attracting investment, promoting tourism, and reducing emigration. Another result might be weakened international crime networks, which also will benefit developed countries.

## Guns in Trinidad and Tobago

The data for several countries shows that not only have levels of crime and violence increased, but so too has the use of weapons in criminal acts. The profile of these

Some commentators have argued that many deportees left their home countries at a young age and learned criminal behavior while abroad. A recent study (Headley, 2005) examined approximately 5000 records of criminals deported from the U.S. between 1997 and 2003. The data indicate that the average age of a criminal deportee entering the United States was 23 and the average age on deportation was 35. According to official Jamaican statistics, 81 percent were returned to Jamaica for non-violent offenses. While there is clearly heterogeneity in the pool of deportees, the typical deportee does not fit the profile of an individual who is likely to be a violent criminal on return to Jamaica. Thus, it appears unlikely that the *average* deportee is

incidents has also changed, with increased use of more powerful weapons resulting in higher mortality levels.

The CARICOM Regional Task Force on Crime and Security recently commissioned a report on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the Caribbean (CARICOM, 2002). The resulting report identified three levels of SALW proliferation in the region: countries with *established* high levels and patterns of armed crime (Jamaica), countries with *emerging* high levels of armed and organized criminality (Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago), and countries with *indications of increased use* and availability of small arms (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines).

At that time, it was determined that, among CARICOM nations, only Jamaica fell in the first category, with indications that military type weapons were available and that paramilitary units were operating (Burrows and Matthias, 2003). If such an evaluation were done today, Trinidad and Tobago might also be included in this tier, as the murder rate doubled between 2002 and 2005. In 2004, the country experienced 160 firearm murders, more than 450 firearm woundings, and 1,500 firearm incidents that did not result in injury (Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, n/d).

A major factor contributing to the surge of guns-related criminality in the region is the trafficking of narcotics, which has facilitated the availability of firearms. More specifically, the firearms required for protection of contraband during transportation are smuggled in along with drugs. Within these environments that promote the demand for weapons, reducing gun ownership is a difficult undertaking. Better gun registries, marking, and tracking can help, as can improved gun interdiction in ports. In the long term progress will hinge on changes in the drug trade, changes in the “gun-culture,” and progress in the implementation of international treaties and agreements on small arms and light weapons, such as the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

### **Drug Trafficking and the Netherlands Antilles**

The drug trade is a prime driver of crime across the Caribbean. This report examines unusual interdiction efforts in the Netherlands Antilles, where authorities estimate that 75 percent of crime is drug-related. Some 60 percent of all the cocaine seized in the Caribbean in 2004 was seized in the Netherlands Antilles, and cocaine seizures increased dramatically between 2001 and 2004.

Confronted with large numbers of people attempting to smuggle drugs by plane, authorities implemented a “100% Control” strategy, by which passengers landing in Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam and originating from the Dutch Caribbean, Suriname, and Venezuela are subject to extensive searches. Persons found with drugs on their person had the drugs confiscated and were immediately deported to their country of origin but were not arrested. Rather than attempting to scare off potential smugglers with the threat

of incarceration, the Dutch approach was based on increasing the rate of interdiction to the point that smuggling became unprofitable. In other words, the focus was on the drugs, rather than the couriers.

The authorities estimate that between 80 and 100 couriers per day were passing through the airport in 2003. This was cut to an estimated 10 a month by October 2005. While displacement effects would need to be tallied to properly evaluate the impact of this intervention, the 100% Control strategy has apparently disrupted what was once a major trafficking route.

Commercial air flights are only one of the vectors through which cocaine transits the Netherlands Antilles and not necessarily the most significant one. The 100% Control approach has seized 7.5 tons of cocaine in 2.5 years, but multi-ton seizures can be made in a single instance of maritime interdiction. Detecting maritime trafficking requires intelligence work and a dedicated interdiction force.

Even eliminating the Netherlands Antilles as a drug transit area altogether would not stop the flow of drugs, and displacement effects are inevitable. Nonetheless, focusing on the drugs rather than the couriers is a powerful approach because it defeats the “shotgun” technique, where traffickers are willing to sacrifice an endless stream of gullible couriers as long as sufficient quantities of drugs arrive for them to make a profit. It has proven itself to work in the case of the Netherlands Antilles, and could be tested in other contexts, including other Caribbean countries suffering from drug transshipment. The Antillean example also highlights the need for cooperation between Caribbean transshipment countries and destination countries in maritime interdiction.

### **Youth Violence in the Dominican Republic**

Deaths and injuries from youth violence constitute a major public health, social and economic problem across the Caribbean, where youth are disproportionately represented in the ranks of both victims and perpetrators of crime and violence. Moreover, in many Caribbean countries violent crimes are being committed at younger ages. The Dominican Republic is one of the countries in which this pattern has become more stark over time, as rates of crime and violence overall have increased. In 2005, homicides of those aged 11-30 accounted for approximately 46 percent of total homicide deaths.


A wide variety of risk factors contribute to the prevalence of youth violence, including poverty, youth unemployment, large-scale migration to urban areas, drug trafficking, a weak education system, ineffective policing, the widespread availability of weapons, drug and alcohol use, and the presence of organized gangs.

Nonetheless, youth violence is preventable. A broad range of strategies for preventing and reducing youth violence have been implemented in the Dominican Republic and elsewhere. Evidence from evaluations (unfortunately, almost exclusively in developed countries) documents that most highly effective programs combine components that address both individual risks and environmental conditions, by building individual skills

and competencies, supporting parental effectiveness, improving chances for youth to access and complete their secondary education, improving the social climate of schools, providing second chances, and promoting changes in involvement with peer groups.

The best youth violence interventions target specific populations of young people associated with risk factors, such as school leavers, those involved with delinquent peers, gang members, and those exposed to family violence or substance abuse. Targeting high-violence communities with a holistic approach to address violence and emphasizing violence prevention directed at children and youth, as exemplified by the Barrios Seguros program in the Dominican Republic, is a very promising—albeit not yet formally evaluated—approach.

### Homicide Deaths by Age in the Dominican Republic, 2000-2005



Source: Dominican Republic National Police, unpublished data.

Early child development interventions and effective parenting training for poor and at-risk children and their families are some of the most cost-effective investments in reducing youth violence and delinquency over time. Incentives for youths to complete their secondary education have also proven to be effective.

Overall, reducing “mano dura” or repressive programs in favor of expanding prevention strategies (including prevention-focused law enforcement) would represent an effective and potentially cost-saving strategy. Finally, promoting interventions that reduce gun and alcohol availability—and their social acceptance—among youth can play a crucial role in countries like the Dominican Republic, where the use of both is widespread at young ages and the links to violence are significant.

## **Criminal Justice Systems**

Many countries in the Caribbean have experimented with reform of their criminal justice systems, and the experience is mixed. This chapter focuses on the criminal justice reform experience of two countries: the Dominican Republic and Jamaica. Two important lessons emerge: (i) the need to pursue better coordination among institutions, including the introduction of information systems capable of tracking systemic performance and generating a set of performance indicators, and (ii) the desirability of linking criminal justice reforms to a broader, multi-sector strategy of crime and violence prevention.

Performance indicators should not be the product of ad hoc efforts to measure outputs currently of interest. Instead, basic data on work processes should be routinely gathered and transferred to centralized databases, where it can be reviewed and analyzed for its broader implications. Once in place, such systems provide a very potent tool for reviewing organizational performance and identifying and diagnosing problems. They also facilitate the creation of new indicators as they are needed.

A key performance indicator for the police is the “clearance” rate at which dockets leave the authority of the police and become the primary responsibility of the prosecuting authority. Another important indicator is the number and nature of complaints against the police. The most common indicators for measuring prosecutorial performance are the rate of convictions and the percentage or number of prisoners awaiting trial. Prison performance can be measured at a basic level by the rate of escape and amount of violence in prisons. The performance of the prison system in rehabilitating inmates can be measured by the re-arrest rate within a specified time period.

Governments also need inter-agency governance mechanisms and incentives to help individual agencies in the justice sector align their work with system-wide goals. If sector-wide governance mechanisms are to succeed, their authority must go beyond performance measurement to include real executive powers (see Vera Institute of Justice, 2004)<sup>2</sup>. The recent history of justice reforms in both Jamaica and the Dominican Republic illustrates the need for such interagency mechanisms and effective performance evaluation systems.

## **Public Policy of Crime and Violence Prevention: National and Regional Approaches**

In the Caribbean and most other regions, efforts to prevent violence have fallen into two categories: sector-specific approaches—such as criminal justice, public health, and conflict transformation and human rights—and cross-sectoral approaches—such as crime prevention through environmental design and citizen security. These approaches are complementary. For example, criminal justice reform initiatives (e.g. improved policing and better rehabilitation in prisons) can be pursued simultaneously with citizen security

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<sup>2</sup> An example of sector-wide coordination currently limited to performance measurement is the role played by National Commission for the Coordination of the Reforms in Chile.

programs that employ social prevention interventions and crime prevention through environmental design. In other words, there is no one “magic bullet” or single approach that can address all the risk and protective factors for crime and violence.

It is important to note that many of the issues facing the Caribbean transcend national boundaries and require a coordinated regional response. Demand for drugs emanates from Europe and the United States; deportees are sent back to the region from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada; and many weapons that are trafficked are sourced from the United States.

CARICOM has undertaken several important steps to deal with emerging regional security issues. Perhaps the most important regional initiative in the area of crime and violence reduction was the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS). The Task Force identified the following principal security threats to the region: illegal drugs, illegal firearms, corruption, rising crime against persons and property, criminal deportees, growing lawlessness, poverty and inequity, and terrorism. For the areas of illegal drugs, illegal firearms, terrorism, and deportees, the report included a short discussion of key issues and challenges and a long list of detailed recommendations at both national and regional levels (CARICOM, 2002).<sup>3</sup> The Task Force presented its report to a meeting of Heads of Government in July 2002 and the recommendations of the Task Force were endorsed by this meeting.

Caribbean heads of government endorsed a new Management Framework for Crime and Security in July 2005. This framework establishes a Council of Ministers responsible for security and law enforcement, a Policy Advisory Committee, and an Implementation Agency to implement CARICOM policy initiatives in this area.

Yet no regional strategy in these areas can hope to succeed without significant support from OECD countries. This support has so far been limited predominantly to security sector reforms initiatives and drug interdiction, but has been lacking in the areas of weapons control and deportees.

Nor does good policy making to reduce crime and violence happen by accident. The Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (CARICOM, 2002) called for the development of national crime control master plans and the establishment of national crime commissions to ensure multi-sectoral collaboration. National plans allow for cross-sectoral collaboration and serious discussions about the priorities in resource allocation. Equally importantly, they offer a vehicle for the involvement of civil society organizations, where much of the expertise in violence prevention resides. While the Task Force recommendations have been heeded in some countries, in some they have not. Preparation of a national plan should be a priority in these countries.

Crime and violence are not immutable. While the Caribbean faces serious challenges, especially in the areas of drugs, guns and youth violence, intelligent policy making at the national and regional levels can make a difference. Given the high social and economic

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<sup>3</sup> The key findings from these sections have been incorporated into the relevant sections of this report.

costs associated with crime and violence, the development of sound policies and programs is a key development priority for the region.

The table below summarizes the key policy recommendations of the report.

### Summary of Policy Recommendations

	<b>Priority Recommended Policy Actions</b>	<b>Medium-Term Policy Actions</b>
<b>Data/evidence based policy-making</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct regular, periodic and standardized victimization surveys that permit comparison of crime levels both across countries and over time</li> <li>• Use data and analysis to identify geographical and demographic foci for interventions:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Employ geographical information systems (GIS) to analyze crime trends and allocation prevention and control resources in large cities</li> <li>○ Pilot “integrated citizen security” approaches to rapidly reduce crime in violent areas</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Create Injury Surveillance Systems</li> <li>• Conduct impact evaluations of all types of crime and violence prevention/reduction programs in the Caribbean region</li> </ul>
<b>Criminal Justice Reform</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop information systems and performance measurement indicators to promote institutional efficiency and accountability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Undertake institutional reform to promote systemic alignment and crime reduction</li> <li>• Modernize policing through the use of information systems and problem-oriented policing</li> </ul>
<b>Social and Situational Prevention</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrate crime and violence prevention into sectoral programs such as slum-upgrading, education, and health</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct impact evaluations of social and situational crime prevention initiatives</li> <li>• Scale up successful civil society crime and violence prevention programs</li> </ul>

<b>Youth Violence</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Finance programs with proven track record of success with youth violence prevention</li> <li>• Invest in early childhood development programs and programs targeting children aged 4-10</li> <li>• Target specific youth-at-risk populations</li> <li>• Reduce emphasis on ineffective “mano dura” programs</li> <li>• Apply existing laws separating incarcerated youth from adults</li> <li>• Restrict availability of alcohol and other drugs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Undertake impact evaluations that systematically document what works in youth violence prevention in the Caribbean</li> <li>• Provide skills training and internships for at-risk youth</li> </ul>
<b>Deportees</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improve coordination with sending countries (who, when, share criminal records, etc.)</li> <li>• Undertake robust research on contribution of deportees to crime</li> <li>• Finance deportee reintegration, targeting deportees most likely to re-offend</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enlist sending countries to finance programs for reintegration of criminal deportees</li> </ul>
<b>Drug Trafficking</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improve both commercial air and maritime interdiction by building on regional successes such as drug-focused interdiction</li> <li>• Implement/expand drug abuse treatment programs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enlist consuming countries to provide financial and technical assistance for improved interdiction.</li> <li>• Create alternative opportunities for youth.</li> <li>• Reduce demand in consuming countries</li> </ul>
<b>Guns</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Create/improve marking and tracking systems</li> <li>• Create/improve national gun registries</li> <li>• Enforce gun laws and regulations for licensing, selling, import/export</li> <li>• Improve illegal gun interdiction</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Change gun culture</li> <li>• Implement and enforce international and regional agreements on the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)</li> </ul>

<p><b>Regional and international cooperation</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Follow-up and finance recommendations of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security</li> <li>• Create/strengthen national crime prevention plans and commissions</li> <li>• Ratify the relevant international conventions on drug trafficking and organized crime, including in particular the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols..</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Create regional facilities for police training</li> <li>• Create regional forensics/ballistic laboratory and technical capacity</li> <li>• Improve intelligence sharing</li> </ul>
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