FINAL REPORT
Expert Verification Mission of the Vote Tabulation of the November 28, 2010 Presidential Election in the Republic of Haiti

Port-au-Prince, Haiti
January 13, 2011
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Invited by the Government of Haiti on December 13, 2010, the OAS Expert Verification of the Tabulation Mission was requested to assess the practices and procedures used in tabulating the preliminary results of the November 28, 2010 presidential elections as well as other factors that had an impact on these results. On Election Day, international and national observers witnessed a number of problems: disorganization, irregularities as well as instances of ballot stuffing, intimidation of voters and vandalism of polling stations. These problems were further exacerbated by the precipitous decision of many candidates to call for the cancellation of elections, hours before the polls closed. In the days following Election Day, the OAS-CARICOM Joint Election Observation Mission received numerous allegations of ballot-box stuffing and alterations to the official result sheets (“Procès-Verbaux”) of the individual polling stations. By any measure, these were problematic elections.

In the Center de Tabulation de Vote (CTV), where the Expert Mission focused its efforts, these problems manifested themselves in two particular ways. Some 1,045 Procès-Verbaux (PVs), 9.3 percent of the total from the 11,181 polling stations, never arrived and were identified as “missing.” Secondly, although electoral participation ebbed to 22.8 percent, 216 PVs recorded participation rates of 75 percent and above and 118 PVs reached or exceeded 100 percent.

The critical question facing the Expert Mission was did the irregularities of November 28 impact the outcome of the presidential elections? After a thorough statistical analysis, explained in more detail in the body of this report, the Expert Mission has determined that it cannot support the preliminary results of the presidential elections released on December 7, 2010. The Expert Mission offers three concrete recommendations for the immediate term that would mitigate some of the anomalies caused by the more egregious irregularities and instances of fraud and ensure that the preliminary results better reflect the will of the people.

Procedure dictates that upon receipt of the PVs, staff in the Tabulation Center reviews the results through its plastic, transparent cover. If there are no visible signs of alterations, these results are immediately inputted separately by two data-entry operators. Initially, the Tabulation Center visually reviewed those PVs in which a single candidate obtained 225 or more votes. Subsequently, the Tabulation Center lowered that threshold to 150.

The Expert Mission’s examination of a large number of PVs indicates that despite the disposition of Articles 171 and 173.2 of the electoral law of Haiti, there was no consistent framework to decide whether or not a Procès-Verbal under review should be included or excluded in tabulating the preliminary results.
Consequently, despite all the problems on Election Day, only 312 presidential PVs were excluded from the final vote tally.

As stipulated in Article 173.2, when sent to the Tabulation Center, the Procès-Verbal should be accompanied by the voters list for that particular polling station and the tally worksheet used to count the ballots. According to Article 161.1, the Secretary of the polling station is supposed to record the voter’s national identity (“CIN”) number on the voter list. This allows the validity of the elector to be confirmed.

In accordance with these provisions of the law, the Expert Mission set specific criteria to determine if a PV should be included: the inclusion of the required signatures of the polling officials on the Procès-Verbal; the presence of the list of registered voters; the presence of the CIN numbers to identify those voters who cast their ballots at that particular polling station. The Mission also took into account the validity of the CIN numbers. In addition, though not part of the electoral law, if a Procès-Verbal had been obviously altered to change the results that PV was also excluded.

After careful statistical analysis of a national random sample of the vote count, the Expert Mission determined that as the recorded voter participation rose above the national average, the probability of serious irregularities increased. Thus, using the criteria extracted from the electoral law, the Mission reviewed and evaluated all 205 Procès-Verbaux with a participation rate of 50 percent or greater and where a single candidate received 150 votes or more. In addition, the 118 PVs with a participation rate of more than 100 percent were reviewed in their entirety irrespective of the number of votes received by the winning candidate.

1. The Expert Mission found 234 of the PVs did not meet the criteria previously mentioned. Based on these findings, the Expert Mission recommends that these Procès-Verbaux, listed as an appendix to this report (Appendix VI), be excluded from the final vote tally. Should this recommendation be implemented, the position of the candidate in third place would change to second. The candidate now in second place would move to third.

2. For the second round, the Tabulation Center of the CEP should continue to use these criteria to determine whether or not a PV should be included in the final vote tally.

3. Lastly, the Expert Mission recommends that complete standards be drafted to determine when a Procès-Verbal should be reviewed and under what conditions its results should be excluded. These standards should conform to the electoral law and be applied consistently.
Other significant changes need to be implemented before the second round elections. To that effect, the Expert Mission strongly recommends that the CEP undertake a number of improvements prior to the second round:

1. Reinforce the training of polling workers on the use of the sachet and the documents that must be placed in it, including the PV, Voters List with CIN numbers, tally sheet and other supporting documentation;

2. Create a more transparent and consistent verification process at the Tabulation Center;

3. Replace poll workers and supervisors of polling stations and voting centers where irregularities were discovered.

The OAS Expert Mission recognizes that these recommendations do not completely remedy everything that went wrong on November 28. They cannot bring back the lost votes of those destroyed polling centers. Nevertheless, the Expert Mission believes that the immediate implementation of these recommendations will at least partially rectify the consequences of the problems and outright fraud on Election Day and will begin to restore the confidence of the Haitian people in their electoral process.

The 2010 presidential election was the fifth conducted since the adoption of the Haitian constitution in 1987. While the OAS Expert Verification Mission has identified significant irregularities, which it believes influenced the outcome of the first round of the presidential election, the Haitian electorate should regard the first round of the presidential elections as an opportunity to draw lessons for the future. In learning from the shortcomings and irregularities which marred these elections, a number of measures can be implemented which would, in the short and long term, avoid the repetition of these failings and strengthen the process. Such reforms and improvements can become a major step forward in reinforcing the integrity, transparency and legitimacy of the electoral process as the true and faithful expression of the will of the people.
II. INTRODUCTION

A. Background
Following the post-electoral crisis, triggered by the publication on December 7, 2010 of the preliminary results of the first round of the presidential elections, the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) proposed a review of the tabulation of the preliminary results by a Mixed Commission including Haitian electoral authorities, national and international observers and representatives from the private sector and the international community. The presidential candidates and others objected that the electoral code did not contemplate such a commission and thus, it was not constituted.

On December 13, 2010, President René Préval requested that the Organization of American States (OAS) send two expert missions, one to verify the tabulation of the preliminary results of the presidential elections and the other to accompany the “contestation” process in which political parties and candidates can present challenges to the preliminary results. The OAS and the Government of Haiti and the CEP signed an Agreement which includes the Terms of Reference for the two expert missions. The Agreement is attached as Appendix I.

Comprised of nine members, the Expert Verification Mission arrived in Haiti on December 30, 2010. Its members included people with experience in statistics, voting results auditing, data analysis, voting results tabulation, information technology, election organization and election monitoring. The list of the team members and their nationalities is included as Appendix II.

B. Structure of Report
This report is organized into five major sections:

1. A description of the methodologies employed by the Expert Mission regarding data collection, document custody, and statistical sampling techniques;

2. An evaluation of the practices and procedures of the Tabulation Center (CTV) and of other factors that had an impact on the preliminary results of the first round presidential election;

3. A set of findings from the data collected and its impact on the first round election results;

4. A recommendation to the CEP on a course of action to take in its certification of the first round results based upon the Mission findings; and
A set of recommendations to the CEP on policy and procedural improvements intended to correct the deficiencies of the first round.

III. METHODOLOGIES

A. Terms of Reference
The scope of the expert verification mission is described in Paragraph 3.a of the Agreement as follows:

"Evaluate, in accordance with the Charter of the OAS, the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the standards developed and applied thereto by the GS/OAS for OAS electoral observation missions, the Constitution of the Republic of Haiti and the electoral law of July 9, 2008, the practices and procedures implemented during the November 28, 2010 Presidential elections relating to the vote tabulation and any other factors affecting and relating to the preliminary results published by the CEP."

B. General Approach
The Expert Mission initiated its activities in accordance with the following precepts:

1. To conduct the verification in a transparent and impartial manner adhering to the Electoral Law of Haiti as well as internationally accepted electoral and statistical norms and practices;

2. To maintain accountable controls so that the chain of custody in its inspection of CEP documents is auditable; and

3. To examine as many sources of data as possible in developing its recommendations.

In conducting its activities, the Expert Mission remained cognizant of international precedents involving electoral verification, certification and, the employment of statistical modeling in electoral forensics. The methodology employed to determine the statistical sample for the national review of PVs is shown as Appendix III.
C. Statistical Approach
The Expert Mission drew a national representative sample to begin its work. The sample served to demonstrate parameters to determine potentially problematic areas, such as geography, voter participation or individual candidate vote count. The CTV had already used the latter indicator, specifying initially 225 and, subsequently, 150 as a threshold for review. The use of the national sample also allowed the mission to become familiar with the contents of the package (“sachet”): the Procès-Verbal, the voters’ list, the tally sheet and the forms to record irregularities and incidents. Team members were able to view many PVs that conformed to legal requirements and compare them to the other, problematic ones. Factors included comparing the vote tallies from the PVs to those of the tally sheets, confirming that the written numbers corresponded to the digits, and verifying the presence of a sufficient number of CIN numbers in the voter lists.

The Expert Mission first looked at a small sample of eleven together as a team in order to achieve minimum consensus about what to consider “irregular” and what to consider “conforming.” The team drafted a checklist, which has been included as an appendix of this report (Appendix IV). Utilizing the services of a statistician, the Expert Mission utilized “replicates” to control the workload and maintain representative samples at every point. (See Appendix III for more information on “National Statistical Sampling Methodology.”)

D. Complete Review and Evaluation of PVs
Upon completion of the national sample, the members of the Expert Mission had identified what constituted the most regularly viewed irregularities that contravened the electoral code of Haiti, specifically the lack of accurate CIN numbers in the voter lists or the lack of complementary documentation altogether. The sample also demonstrated that using parameters of voter participation and individual vote count would be the most effective in identifying irregularities and fraud.

The Expert Mission narrowed its evaluation criteria to those points noted in the Executive Summary and other sections of this report. Its members reviewed every single Procès-Verbal (205) with a participation rate of greater than 50 percent and a vote total of at least 150 votes for any single candidate. Every one of the 118 PVs with a turnout rate of 100 percent or greater was reviewed. In total, the Expert Mission reviewed 919 Procès-Verbaux, representing 192,063 votes and 16.9 percent of the total votes processed by the CTV. The reviews focused on the state of the Procès-Verbal, the presence of the voters list and the tally sheet as well as the validity of the CIN numbers listed. The Mission confirmed the validity of the CIN numbers through a barcode scanner linked to the electoral registry allowing to verify barcodes which are printed next to everyone of the names on the electoral list.
E. Document Processing and Quality Control Procedures
Teams of two inspected every document contained in the sachet. In nearly all cases, teams were bi-national with at least one native or fluent French speaker. To ensure chain of custody, each team member signed his or her name on the required document before recording information with regard to a particular sachet. Other team members recorded their names on the chain of custody document spot checks and comparisons, which are described below. When not being reviewed, sensitive election materials were kept under lock at the CTV with tamper evident seals. The CTV is under guard by MINUSTAH.

To ensure that each member of the Expert Mission applied the same review criteria, it first changed the two-member teams after one day. This provided an opportunity for the team members to compare with one and the other how each analyzed the points on the checklist and to determine the point at which they would deem that the PV under review did not comply with one of the criteria. Secondly, the teams entered data on previously evaluated sachets and the results were compared by a third person independent of the data entry process. Once the information was entered, the PVs were labeled according to the specific groupings and the team members’ names were recorded on the packages. Two different members of the Expert Mission conducted spot checks by randomly pulling PVs from the different groups and teams. They visually inspected the contents and compared them to the evaluation made of the sachet to determine the accuracy of the assessment of the team.

IV. ELECTORAL PROCESS TABULATION SYSTEM

The Tabulation Centre aggregates the tally of votes on the results sheets (Procès-Verbaux) sent from each polling station. On arrival at the Tabulation Centre, an inventory is taken of the PVs with a bar-code scanner, and they are then submitted to the first visual control. The PVs that have been incorrectly inserted in the transparent sachets are rearranged in order to facilitate the inputting of the results by the computer operators. Once this has been completed, the PV is brought to the attention of the Visual Control Unit. If irregularities are encountered, the PV is sent to the Legal Control Unit (LCU) for closer examination. If the lawyers consider that the PV conforms to the stipulations of the Electoral law, its results are inputted. If it does not, that PV is set aside and its results not taken into account.

The task of inputting the results into the tabulation system is carried out separately by two operators selected randomly. If the information input by the
two operators is the same, it is stored in the data base and the PV is sent to the archives to facilitate extraction. If there is a difference in the input information, the process is renewed. Should the problem persist, the PV is then sent to the LCU for closer examination.

A. System Controls
The tabulation system was programmed initially to isolate all PVs that exceeded 225 votes for a single candidate. Subsequently, during a second control measure, this threshold was lowered to 150 votes for a single candidate.

In addition, all PVs that exceeded the number of voters registered in a given polling station (450) were identified and sent to the Legal Control Unit for review. Finally, Tabulation Center officials decided to put under observation or set aside all PVs that exceeded 300 votes or more. These PVs were not tabulated for the preliminary results.

Despite the verification guidelines and the fact that the CTV review process was based on all available evidence, it was uncertain whether the control and monitoring procedures utilized by CTV officials were uniformly implemented. In the course of its own PV verification exercise, the Expert Mission came across a number of PVs that were either not accompanied by any of the required supporting documents, or from which one of the legally required documents was missing, but whose results were tabulated. In addition, a number of PVs with abnormal winning results for one candidate were accompanied by voter lists on which many of the identity card number were invalid and clearly fabricated.

Despite shortcomings in the uniform and consistent application of the guidelines and criteria, the Tabulation Center’s review process resulted in the identification of a number of irregular PVs which were excluded from the tabulation of the preliminary results. The 64,867 excluded votes were unevenly shared by the two first candidates. The second candidate lost 38,541 votes, which represent 59.4% of the disallowed votes.

The Expert Mission reviewed the user access logs of the Tabulation Center system. A reference analysis was conducted to detect irregularities by implementing cross-examinations between the tabulation system logs and the extracts of the PV results. The logs were also reviewed to verify that the first and second data entry operators were completed by other users. Finally, a review was conducted to verify that the person verifying the quality control was not involved in data entry. The review concluded that all user control policies were followed.
V. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The Expert Mission utilized the following sources of information to inform its verification study.

1. Sachets or packets containing the Procès-Verbaux, from a national sample of polling stations.

2. Sachets with PVs displaying anomalous patterns, but whose results were tabulated.

3. Sachets with “mis à l’écart” or disallowed PVs.

4. An extract from the CTV database of full results by candidate, polling station, and vote status as counted, set aside (“mis à l’écart”) or missing.

5. A sampling of voted ballots from each Bureau Electoral Départemental (BED) and a comparison of voted ballots with the results recorded in the CTV.

6. A review of the Election Day Call Log from the CEP Emergency Call Centre.

7. A review of Election Day reports from international and domestic election observation organizations.

8. A review of the Election Day incidents log from the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH).

9. User access logs for the CTV tabulation system.

The Expert Mission verified 442 PVs from a national sample representing 71,423 votes and 454 PVs where it applied the criteria for disallowing PVs, which represent 118,478 votes. Additionally, the Expert Team retrieved 23 ballot bags from all Electoral Departments, representing 2,162 votes. Team members traveled to the Electoral Departments and brought the bags to be reviewed in the receiving center where electoral materials from the West Department were returned on Election Day. In the presence of CEP authorities, they reviewed the contents of the bags and conducted a manual count of the ballots.

The Expert Mission reviewed a total of 919 PVs or 8.2 percent of the total PVs processed by the CTV. This number represented 192,063 votes or 16.9 percent of the total votes processed by the CTV.
Finally, the Expert Mission’s mandate required it to conduct interviews with electoral stakeholder to obtain their insights and opinions about the first round of the presidential elections. In fulfilling this mandate, Mission members met with advisors of the presidential candidacies of Mr. Martelly, and of the Group of Twelve presidential candidates which is petitioning the election results. Contact was made with Mrs. Manigat, but the proposed meeting with her representatives never materialized. Mission members also met with representatives of the following civil society organizations – Initiative de la Société Civile, (ISC), Réseau National de Défense des Droits de l’Homme (RNDDH) and the Conseil National d’Observation des Elections (CNO). These informative meetings also permitted the Expert Mission to offer information on its composition, its methodology and on some of its own insights.

VI. ELECTORAL VERIFICATION FINDINGS

For the purposes of this Expert Mission, an “electoral irregularity” is defined as the purposeful or erroneous violation of official electoral procedures resulting in the disputed validity of voted ballots, electoral documents, or voter eligibility and, as a consequence, electoral results. Keeping in mind the relevant provisions of the Haitian Electoral Law, the Expert Mission noted the following kinds of irregularities in its verification process:

1. Absence of PVs, voter lists, tally sheets and other supporting documents to record incidents and irregularities in the sachets.

2. Absence of required signatures on the PVs or the tally sheets.

3. Alterations (an attempt to change the results on the PV) versus corrections, which did not change results.

4. The absence of written CIN numbers on the voter lists indicating that an elector had voted.

5. Irregular patterns when recording CIN numbers (e.g. the first few pages completely full of electors who voted with the remaining pages blank.)

6. Invalid CIN numbers confirmed by using a bar code scanner linked to the national voter registry.

From the analysis of the information obtained from these sources, the Expert Mission made the following findings:
1. As the participation rate and total number of votes for the winning candidate increases, so too does the probability of irregularities and fraud.

2. When compared to the total field of candidates, the irregularities impacted two candidates in particular. (See table below.)

3. Given that most of the irregularities were found on source documents coming from polling stations, the Expert Mission must conclude that most of the irregularities and fraud emanated from the polling stations.

4. At the Tabulation Center, however, the Legal Control Unit’s inconsistent practices and ambiguous lines of authority contributed to the uncertainties surrounding the validity of the preliminary results.

In recommending remedies to address these irregularities, the Expert Mission identified four options for consideration:

1. Conduct a new nationwide election.

2. Conduct a new election in certain problematic locations.

3. Conduct a nationwide recount of presidential ballots.

4. Review those PVs in the particularly problematic areas, as identified by voter participation and vote total for a single candidate, and disallow those that do not comply with Articles 171 and 173.2 of the electoral code of Haiti.

The option to conduct a new national election was ruled out. As it pertains to the presidential election, which is the focus of the Expert Mission’s mandate, the irregularities identified most profoundly affected the candidacies of the first, second and third place presidential candidates in the first round. The Expert Mission believes that a new election would involve more contests and candidacies than the evidence warranted.

The Expert Mission has ruled out the option of organizing a presidential election in selected areas for similar reasons.

The Expert Mission does not consider a nationwide recount of presidential ballots as a feasible option. The Electoral Law of Haiti does not have explicit provisions to conduct a physical recount of ballots. According to Haitian legislation, the PVs serve as the final accounting of election results and the basis for any recalculation of the preliminary outcomes.

The Expert Mission therefore proceeded with the option of verifying the preliminary results by way of the visual verification of a large number of PVs in
order to determine whether the preliminary results reflected the will of the people.

In accordance with the provisions of the electoral law, the Expert Mission set specific criteria to determine if a PV should be included: the presence of the required signatures of the polling officials on the Procès-Verbal; the presence of the list of registered voters; the presence of the CIN numbers to identify those voters who cast their ballots at that particular polling station. The Mission also took into account the validity of the CIN numbers. In addition, though not part of the electoral law, if a Procès-Verbal had been obviously altered to change the results that PV was also excluded.

Following the second “red flag” utilized by the LCU in the Tabulation Center, the Expert Mission reviewed those PVs where any single candidate received more than 150 votes or more. Because of the statistically significant patterns demonstrated in the national sample, it reviewed and evaluated all 205 PVs with a turnout of 50 percent and above and the previously mentioned candidate total. Every single one of the 118 PVs with a participation rate that exceeded 100 percent was reviewed, irrespective of the candidate vote total. Other PVs reviewed in the national sample that had participation rates lower than 50 percent and candidate totals lower than 150, were also recommended to be disallowed if they did not meet the abovementioned criteria.
A. Major Finding and Recommendation

The Expert Mission found 234 of the PVs did not meet the criteria previously mentioned. Based on these findings, the Expert Mission recommends that these Procès-Verbaux, listed as an appendix to this report (Appendix VI), be excluded from the final vote tally.

The table below shows the impact of disallowing these irregular PVs on vote totals for each presidential candidate when these criteria are applied compared with the officially reported election results from the CEP.

Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>CANDIDATE</th>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>Total As Reported By CEP</th>
<th>OAS Recommends Exclusion</th>
<th>Revised Total</th>
<th>Revised % Total Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ALEXIS JACQUES EDOUARD</td>
<td>MPH</td>
<td>32,932</td>
<td>1,497</td>
<td>31,435</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>MARTETLY MICHEL JOSEPH</td>
<td>REPONS PEYZAN</td>
<td>234,617</td>
<td>7,150</td>
<td>227,467</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>CELESTIN JUDE</td>
<td>INITE</td>
<td>241,462</td>
<td>17,220</td>
<td>224,242</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>JEUNE LEON</td>
<td>KLE</td>
<td>3,738</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>3,556</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>ABBELLARD AXAN DELSON</td>
<td>KNDA</td>
<td>3,110</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>2,996</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>CRISTALIN YVES</td>
<td>LAVNI</td>
<td>17,133</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>16,391</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>JOSEPH GENARD</td>
<td>SOLIDARITE</td>
<td>9,164</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>8,833</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>VOLTAIRE LESLIE</td>
<td>ANSAM NOU FO</td>
<td>16,199</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>15,544</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>BAKER CHARLES HENRI</td>
<td>RESPE</td>
<td>25,512</td>
<td>2,116</td>
<td>23,396</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>ANACACIS JEAN HECTOR</td>
<td>MODEJHA</td>
<td>4,165</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>3,909</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>CHARLES ERIC SMARCKI</td>
<td>PENH</td>
<td>2,597</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>2,440</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>JEUDY WILSON</td>
<td>FORCE 2010</td>
<td>6,076</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>5,830</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>JEUNE JEAN CHAVANNES</td>
<td>ACCRHA</td>
<td>19,348</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>18,673</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>LAGUERRE GARAUDY</td>
<td>Wozo</td>
<td>2,802</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>2,678</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>CEANT JEAN HENRY</td>
<td>RENMEM AYITI</td>
<td>87,834</td>
<td>4,088</td>
<td>83,746</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>BLOT GERARD MARIE NECKER</td>
<td>PLATFOM 16 DESANM</td>
<td>2,621</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>2,409</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>NÉPTUNE YVON</td>
<td>AVISYEN POU AYITI</td>
<td>4,217</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>3,960</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>MANIGAT MIRLANDE</td>
<td>RDNP</td>
<td>336,878</td>
<td>13,830</td>
<td>323,048</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>BIJOU ANNE MARIE JOSETTE</td>
<td>INDEPENDANT</td>
<td>10,782</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>10,094</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>OKENN KANDIDA</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,869</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>12,474</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,074,056</td>
<td>50,935</td>
<td>1,023,121</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In compliance with its mandate to produce findings and recommendations, the above voting figures resulting from the verification exercise undertaken by the OAS Expert Verification Mission are recommended to the CEP to inform its decision on the certification of the preliminary results of the presidential elections and the ranking of the three leading candidates. In terms of the number of votes received, should this recommendation be implemented, the
placement of the second and third candidates will be reversed and bring the preliminary results of the presidential elections in line with the intent of the voters who cast their votes.

The implementation of the recommendation of the OAS Expert Verification Mission by the CEP should be included as part of the statutory process of contestation for a legal hearing of disputes so that a final result for the first round of the presidential elections can be certified.

VII. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to improve the integrity of polling and tabulation in the second round of voting, the CEP can consider instituting the following policy and administrative improvements.

A. Polling Station Administration

1. It is essential to reinforce the training of the polling staff in order to guarantee the accuracy of the information contained in the PV transmitted to the CTV and avoid the irregularities noted during the examination of PVs and to include the supporting documentation. Poll worker training should emphasize the proper search techniques on the voter registry in identifying the names of voters, vote tabulation procedures, and the proper completion and inclusion of electoral documents in the sachet. Attendance at the training sessions should be mandatory and a senior officer from the Tabulation Center should be present at the training of trainers to improve the quality of the information recorded on the PV and other material included in the sachet.

2. In order to improve the accuracy of accounting for ballots cast and voters, the record of voting by Political Party Agents ("mandataires") and poll workers not on the voters list of the polling station where they officiate should be documented and accounted for on a dedicated Procès-Verbal.

3. Further, the President, Vice-President, and Secretary of the polling stations should not only be required to list their names on the PV, but also sign the form for authentication. The PV may require a change in format to accommodate these signatures.

4. Improved training should be provided for the “ Agents de Sécurité Électorale (ASE) " to better prepare them in polling station security and conflict management. This training should include establishing communication protocols among the ASE, Haitian National Police, and MINUSTAH for rapid
responses to security incidents. Poll workers should receive better training in electoral security incident documentation and reporting.

5. The performance of poll workers employed at stations where irregularities occurred should be reviewed. Those individuals who served in polling stations where the malfeasance occurred should not be re-employed for the second round. Similarly, the PVs yield the evidence that in some cases entire polling centers were subject to irregularities. In those cases, the polling center supervisors should not be re-employed for the second round.

6. Numbering the names of voters on the partial list in each polling station would also facilitate the identification of the names of voters by the poll workers.

B. Tabulation Center Administration
The Expert Mission focused its efforts and activities in the CTV. Its two chief deficiencies concerned the lack of clear criteria for determining the validity of the Procès-Verbal and for assessing the impact of the absence of complementary documentation. To this end, the Expert Mission provides the following recommendations.

1. The Legal Control Unit should continue using the specific criteria defined by the Mission of experts to determine if a PV should be included: the inclusion of the required signatures of the polling officials on the Procès-Verbal; the presence of the list of registered voters; the presence of the CIN numbers to identify those voters who cast their ballots at that particular polling station. In addition, though not part of the electoral law, if a Procès-Verbal had been obviously altered to change the results that PV should also be excluded.

2. A clear chain of authority should be established for the examination of those PVs, which after the first review, remain in doubt as to their validity. This chain should include lawyers with particular knowledge of the electoral law.

3. Additional recommendations should include:

   a) The CTV should formalize the Manual of Operations and have it approved by the CEP thereby giving it a statutory base. This manual would improve the quality control measures through greater consistency, uniformity and thoroughness in the application of the verification criteria. Likewise, it could take steps to improve the organization of the chain of visual verification process with practical measures to isolate the results sheets being worked on from those already verified and those awaiting verification.
b) The CTV should be provided with sufficient resources to open during the visual verification process a larger number of sachets in order to check for the statutory presence of the voters lists and tally sheets. Without such documents, the PVs should be sent for further investigation by the LCU.

c) The CTV should employ scanners to create an electronic log of the image of the PVs received. By creating PDF copies, the PV can be posted on the CEP web site for public inspection and transmitted electronically when required. By initiating the scanning capability at the Tabulation Center, the basic technology will be put into place which could then be expanded downward to Electoral Departmental Offices (Bureaux Électoraux Départementaux, BED), Electoral Communal Offices (Bureaux Électoraux Communaux, BEC), and even voting centers in future elections.

d) The resources for the Tabulation should be increased so that the PV tabulation completion time can be reduced from its current ten days.

e) International and domestic election monitors should be permitted to observe all of the activities of the CTV including the intake of sachets, initial inspection procedures, the organization of PV for tabulation as well as the various stages of the verification process.

C. Legal Control Unit (LCU)

1. Strengthen the training provided to the LCU lawyers, in particular with regard to the voting and tabulation processes.

2. A mechanism of accountability for the work being performed by the lawyers should be put in place in order to ensure a quality control of the legal verification of irregular PVs.

3. Information on PVs verified, even if they were not set aside, should be made public.

4. Provide a larger cadre of trained lawyers in order to increase the volume of verification undertaken.

5. The LCU attorneys should be provided with improved office facilities and equipment to facilitate better document control, processing, and organization.
D. Provisional Electoral Council

1. The CEP should expand the incoming call capacity of the Emergency Call Center so that security responses to intimidation, threats, and attacks at polling stations can be effectively organized.

2. For improved ballot control and accountability, the CEP should print ballots with numbered counterfoils. This procedure should allow poll workers to reconcile ballots cast with voter turnout enhancing the integrity of the tabulation figures on the PVs.

3. The CEP should improve the format of the PV form to reflect the following changes:
   
a) The official copy of the form should not be white as this copy is easier to fraudulently reproduce;

   b) The total votes from all the candidates should be placed at the bottom of the tally column;

   c) The form should contain space for the signature of all polling staff and political party agents.

4. The CEP and the Office of National Identification need to better coordinate their registration activities in order to avoid the dispersal of voters from the same household over two or several distant polling stations.

E. International Community

1. The number of international observers should be increased for the second round and deployed in greater numbers at the polling locations where irregularities were identified in the first round as a deterrent to fraud.

2. The OAS Expert Verification Mission has identified polling locations where violence occurred and voting was disrupted. Such patterns of electoral violence provide the international community with a map of “hot spot” locations where the probability of a repetition of such violence exists. Therefore, in these areas where polling stations are designated as “hot spots,” the international observation presence can be more robust and the presence of MINUSTAH forces can be reinforced in support of the Haitian National Police.
VIII. CONCLUSION

The 2010 presidential election was the fifth conducted since the adoption of the Haitian constitution in 1987. While the OAS Expert Verification Mission has identified significant irregularities, which it believes influenced the outcome of the first round of the presidential election, the Haitian electorate should regard the first round of the presidential elections as an opportunity to draw lessons for the future. In learning from the shortcomings and irregularities which marred these elections, a number of measures can be implemented which would, in the short and long term, avoid the repetition of these failings and strengthen the process. Such reforms and improvements can become a major step forward in reinforcing the integrity, transparency and legitimacy of the electoral process as the true and faithful expression of the will of the people.
APPENDIX I. Agreement on OAS Expert Mission

ACCORD ENTRE
LE SECRÉTARIAT GÉNÉRAL DE L’ORGANISATION DES ÉTATS AMÉRICAINS,
LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE D’HAÏTI ET
LE CONSEIL ÉLECTORAL PROVISOIRE
SUR LA MISSION D’EXPERTS DE
DE LA MISSION D’OBSERVATION ÉLECTORALE CONJOINTE DE
L’ORGANISATION DES ÉTATS AMÉRICAINS ET DE LA COMMUNAUTÉ DES
CARAÏBES

LE SECRÉTARIAT général de l’Organisation des États Américains (“SG/OEA”), le
Gouvernement de la République d’Haïti et le Conseil Électoral Provisoire (“CEP”),
Parties au présent Accord,

CONSIDÉRANT :

Que le 4 août 2010, le SG/OEA et le Gouvernement de la République d’Haïti ont signé
un Accord concernant l’observation des élections du 28 novembre ainsi que d’un
deuxième tour qui pourrait en découler, le cas échéant, en Haïti, (“Accord P&I”), et que
le 9 novembre 2010, le SG/OEA et le CEP ont convenu d’un Accord concernant ces
mêmes élections (“Accord d’observation”);

Que pour accomplir leurs fonctions aux termes de ces Accords, le 22 octobre 2010, le
SG/OEA et la Communauté des Caraïbes (“CARICOM”) ont signé l’Accord de
coopération par lequel ils ont créé la Mission d’Observation Électorale Conjointe
(“MOEC”);

Que le 13 décembre 2010, le Président de la République d’Haïti, Son Excellence René
Préval, a demandé à l’OEA d’envoyer une mission d’expertise d’appui à la vérification
de la Tabulation des Votes et une assistance technique juridique pour la phase
contentieuse du processus électoral;

Que le Président de la République d’Haïti et le Secrétaire général de l’OEA, monsieur
José Miguel Insulza, ont convenu que l’OEA enverra en Haïti une mission (la “Mission”)
suivant les conditions établies ci-dessous,

DÉCIDENT :

1. Que l’Accord P&I et l’Accord d’observation doivent tous deux demeurer en vigueur
selon les conditions qu’ils contiennent, et que le présent Accord doit être interprété
de façon conséquente avec ces Accords.

2. Que la Mission sera composée d’experts en droit, en statistique, en technologie
électorale et en technologie de l’information (“Experts”), choisis par le SG/OEA en
consultation avec la CARICOM. En tant que membres de la MOEC, les Experts
jouiront de tous les privilèges et immunités conférés aux membres de la MOEC aux termes de l’Accord P&I et de l’Accord d’observation.

3. Que les objectifs de la Mission sont les suivants:

a. Évaluer les pratiques et procédures appliquées lors des élections présidentielles du 28 novembre 2010 relativement à la tabulation des votes ainsi que d’autres facteurs affectant celle-ci et relativement aux résultats préliminaires publiés par le CEP, à la lumière de la Charte de l’OEA, de la Charte démocratique interaméricaine et des normes établies et appliquées en la matière par le SG/OEA pour les missions d’observation électorale de l’OEA, de même que de la Constitution de la République d’Haiti et de la Loi électorale du 9 juillet 2008;

b. Assister aux auditions du Bureau du Contentieux Électoral National ("BCEN") portant sur l’élection présidentielle et faire les observations et recommandations appropriées;

c. Fournir au CEP une assistance technique juridique, à la demande de celui-ci, pour la phase contentieuse du processus électoral;

d. Remettre au Gouvernement de la République d’Haiti deux rapports (les "Rapports"), l’un sur l’évaluation du processus de tabulation et l’autre sur le contentieux électoral, et en discuter immédiatement avec le Gouvernement d’Haiti. Les Rapports porteront sur les conclusions de la Mission conformément aux paragraphes 3a, 3b et 3c ci-dessus, y compris, sans toutefois s’y limiter, les conclusions concernant l’évaluation du processus de tabulation et du contentieux électoral, de même que les recommandations correspondantes;

e. Après avoir remis les Rapports au Gouvernement de la République d’Haiti et après en avoir discuté avec celui-ci conformément au paragraphe 3d ci-dessus, publier et/ou commenter publiquement les Rapports ainsi que toute autre observation ou recommandation que la Mission jugera pertinente; il est entendu que ni la Mission ni aucune des Parties au présent Accord ne doit publier ou commenter publiquement le travail de la Mission tant que les Rapports n’auront pas été remis au Gouvernement d’Haiti et que la Mission n’en aura pas discuté avec ce dernier conformément au paragraphe 3d;

f. Par le truchement de la MOEC et suivant la pratique des missions d’observation électorale de l’OEA, transmettre une copie des Rapports ainsi que toute autre observation ou recommandation au Conseil permanent de l’OEA;

g. Contribuer à accroître la confiance du peuple haitien dans le résultat final de l’élection du 28 novembre 2010.
4. Que pour atteindre ses objectifs, la Mission doit faire ce qui suit:

a. Examiner les feuilles contenant les résultats ou procès-verbaux ("PV") des bureaux de scrutin et tout autre document électoral que la Mission jugera pertinent;

b. Réaliser des entrevues avec des chefs de partis politiques, des candidats à la présidence, des dirigeants d’organisations non gouvernementales qui ont participé au processus d’observation des élections ainsi qu’avec d’autres intervenants importants dans le processus, choisis par la Mission;

c. Demander au Gouvernement et au CEP toute assistance qu’elle juge nécessaire pour faire enquête.

5. Que le CEP garantira à la Mission un accès illimité à toute personne et lui fournira tous les documents, toute l’assistance et toute l’information qu’elle jugera utiles pour atteindre ses objectifs, y compris mais sans s’y limiter:

a. Tous les PV originaux, y compris ceux qui auront été rejetés pour les résultats préliminaires, la liste électorale partielle, les feuilles de dépouillement du scrutin/de comptage, et les déclarations d’irrégularités de chaque bureau de scrutin;

b. Tous les documents originaux relatifs aux recours entrepris par les candidats auprès des bureaux du contentieux électoral;

c. Une analyse des résultats et des décisions du BCEN pour contrôler l’application des normes;

d. Une analyse statistique de tous les résultats pour chercher des anomalies dans ces résultats, y compris des décompositions spécifiques à des fins statistiques demandées par la Mission;

e. Toutes les comparaisons des PV avec les listes électorales partielles;

f. Tous les PV mis de côté ainsi que les documents d’appui (registre des électeurs/listes partielles, feuilles de dépouillement du scrutin/de comptage et PV d’irrégularités et d’incidents), y compris l’accès aux documents des bureaux de vote qui n’ont pas été transmis le jour de l’élection;

g. Un accès illimité aux experts du Centre de Tabulation des Votes ("CTV") et aux auditions du BCEN ainsi qu’à toute autre personne ayant des connaissances relatives au processus électoral;
6. Que le CEP fera tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour recevoir de tous les candidats qui le désirent leurs copies carbone des PV, si disponibles, des divers bureaux de scrutin dans le cadre des contestations introduites auprès des bureaux du contentieux électoral.

SIGNÉ, par les représentants dûment nommés des Parties, en trois exemplaires originaux, aux dates et endroits indiqués ci-dessous:

SG/OEA

Amb. Colin Granderson
Chef de Mission
Mission d'Observation Electorale Conjointe OEA/CARICOM
Le 29 décembre 2010
Port-au-Prince, Haïti

GOUVERNEMENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE D'HAÏTI

M. Jean-Max Bellerive
Premier Ministre
République d'Haïti
Le 29 décembre 2010
Port-au-Prince, Haïti

CONSEIL ÉLECTORAL PROVISOIRE (CEP)

M. Gaëtus Dorisvil
Président
Conseil Electoral Provisoire
Le 29 décembre 2010
Port-au-Prince, Haïti
APPENDIX II. OAS Electoral Verification Team Roster

A. Electoral and Topical Experts

**Marie-Violette César (France)**

Ms. Cesar served as the Team Leader for the European Commission’s Electoral Expert Mission in Haiti for the 2010 general elections. In this capacity, she was responsible for the coordination of all expert activities, liaison with other observer organizations, and the Mission’s output. She worked as an electoral expert for the European Commission in Haiti for the 2006 presidential elections. She has also served the European Commission as an electoral expert in Chad, Burundi, and Iraq. She has been working with electoral matters for more than 20 years.

**Robert Donovan (United States)**

Mr. Donovan has served as a member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Observation and Supervision missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1998, 2000), Kosovo (2001), Macedonia (2002), and Republic of Georgia (2003, 2004). Since 2004, he has designed and managed incident reporting and tracking technologies for domestic election monitoring activities in the United States and regularly provides expert testimony to state and local government evaluating the conduct of elections.

**Marguerite Garcia (France)**

Ms. Garcia has served as a member of MICIVIH in 1995-1996 in Haiti observing local, legislative, and presidential elections. She has served as a long-term electoral observer for the European Union in Africa and America. She participated in the European Union Electoral Observation Mission (EUEOM) for the 2005-2006 general elections and she was an observer for the JEOM OAS-CARICOM in the 2010 general elections. She served on the National Commission for Political Party Finance which examined political party campaign contributions and expenditures (2008).

**Jeff Fischer (United States)**

Mr. Fischer served as a consultant to the first CEP for the 1987 elections and subsequently the 1990 election in Haiti. He has directed electoral processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996), East Timor (1999), and Kosovo (2000). Mr. Fischer has been a Visiting Lecturer at Princeton University on *Elections in Fragile States* and an Assistant Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University on *International Electoral Policy and Practice*. 
Martin Nadon (Canada)

Mr. Nadon currently serves as the Chief Technical Advisor for the Electoral Assistance Project of the United Nations Development Program in Burundi. He has previously served as Chief Electoral Advisor for United Nations electoral assistance projects in Mali and Comoros. His other international electoral assistance experience includes Niger, Togo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In Canada, Mr. Nadon has served as an advisor for Elections Canada and “Directeur Général des Elections du Québec”.

Fritz Scheuren, PhD (United States)

Dr. Scheuren is a statistician and author of numerous books specialized in elections and data quality. He is a Professor of statistics and methodology at the University of Chicago. He currently serves as the 100th president of the American Statistical Association.

Danville Walker (Jamaica)

The Honourable Danville Walker was conferred with one of the highest honour, the Order of Jamaica, for his outstanding contribution to the Public Service in October 2008. He successfully conducted seven (7) elections and served on several Electoral Observer Missions (Chief of Mission on three occasions) as Director of Elections at the Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ).

Steven Griner
(United States)

Head of Electoral Observation Section
Department for Electoral Cooperation and Observation

Alex Bravo
(Chile)

Senior IT Specialist
Department for Electoral Cooperation and Observation
### B. Organization of American States (OAS) - CARICOM Secretariat Joint Electoral Observation Mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ambassador Colin Granderson</strong> (Trinidad and Tobago)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General for Foreign and Community Relations CARICOM Secretariat Chief of Mission Joint Electoral Observation Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pablo Gutierrez</strong> (Chile)</td>
<td>Director Department for Electoral Cooperation and Observation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Jean-François Ruel</strong> (Canada)</td>
<td>Specialist Department for Electoral Cooperation and Observation General Coordinator Joint Electoral Observation Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Micaela Martinet</strong> (Bolivia)</td>
<td>Specialist Department for Sustainable Democracy and Special Missions Political Analyst Joint Electoral Observation Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>David Alvarez Veloso</strong> (Chile)</td>
<td>Specialist Department for Electoral Cooperation and Observation</td>
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APPENDIX III. National Statistical Sampling Methodology

As part of the Review of the Haiti Election, a frame of all the election voting locations in the country (N=11,181) was obtained. The frame was geographically sorted with voting locations being at the lowest level, up through Department, the highest level.

To start off the process a small sample (of k =11) voting locations was examined. Procedures were set up and tested in the pilot, tested and documented, then a second larger sample was chosen (n = 300+) from the remaining cases for review.

The total sample size was set by how labor intensive and time consuming the new reviews might be. Two considerations bear:

If there is no nonsampling error, or in our terms here, no election irregularities, the sample would have to be large enough to statistically significantly distinguish between the second and third candidates.

If there was evidence of nonsampling error, then the issue of sample size does not arise with the same force, since we added special samples in the presence of nonsampling error.

Throughout the process, the interpenetrating sample ideas of Mahalanobis was employed and so the work was batched in replicates that would allow timely processing and verification of sampling and nonsampling ideas at the same time. The use of replicates (small subsamples) was employed to control the workload and, at the same time, to have representative samples at every point, so if the reviews were terminated early the results would still be representative.

In particular, the work was designed to be done in 6 subsamples (replicates, r=6) of size m =50. This would mean that the overall sample would 311, obtained by

\[ n = k + rm \]

Some of the selected locations were missing, about 9%, so for these we had to develop a separate estimation procedure.

This initial stratified sample of 311 was set by how labor intensive and time consuming the expert reviews might be. Two considerations were central to the approach. If there were no non-sampling errors or no election irregularities, the initial sample would have to be large enough to statistically significantly distinguish (validate the difference) between the second and third candidates,
since only the top two could go on to the run-off. This test was performed and we were able to conclude that even at n=311 the sample was sufficient.

From the initial sample (and other information), there was evidence of large nonsampling errors (election irregularities); thus, the issue of a still larger initial sample size does not arise. Instead, additional special samples were added. In the end, the analysis was no longer based only on the initial sample of 311 but was based on reviews of n = 919 election sites, plus extensive tallies from the available Election Commission data.

There were a number of forensically special aimed samples to explore further the hypotheses that came from the Expert Team's initial 311 sample reviews.

The Expert Team also consulted with the other election observers and used those conversations to confirm our approach or to follow up on specific instances or suggestions about possible problems.

To check the work we also instituted two internal quality procedures. The review teams of two internally reviewed their own procedures (in the language of quality they put themselves under self-control. Self-control is a form of producer quality). Through management reviews, an external (Consumer) quality measure was provided.
APPENDIX IV. Checklist

Checklist

Sign the procès-verbal de disposition

Record names of team members acting as reader, checker, intaker.

Is the PV missing? Y / N

Has the PBV been “set aside” (mis à l’écart)? Y / N

1. Open packet and verify contents –
   a) Procès-verbal is present the transparent envelope - Y / N
   b) Tally sheet is present in the transparent envelope - Y / N
   c) Voters list is present in the transparent envelope - Y / N
   d) Incident report is present in the transparent envelope - Y / N
   e) Irregularity report is present in the transparent envelope - Y / N
   f) Supplementary voters list is present in the transparent envelope - Y / N
   g) If Supplementary voters list is present, how many voters - Input number of voters
   h) Other documents – Enter description
   i) Comments – Free text

2. Inspect the PV
   a) Is the Plastification in place on the PV ? Y / N
   b) If there are visible alterations on the PV, please describe - Free text
      Alterations: visible changes to the number of votes for a candidate that change the total number of votes.
   c) If there are visible corrections on the PV, please describe - Free text
      Corrections: visible changes to the number of votes for a candidate that appear to be due to clerical error. For instance, the values from one candidate’s line are crossed out and moved to an adjacent line, apparently because the values had been entered in the wrong place in error.
   d) Do the spelled out, written numbers match the numerals – Y/N
   e) Input the votes cast as shown on the PV for each presidential candidate, including the number of PV Total Bilten Ki Bon, Total Bilten Ki Gate, Total Bilten Ki Pa Sevi, Total Bilten Ki Nil.
   f) Has the PV been signed by the BV Members or others:
      a) President Y / N
3. Check Voter list
   a. Count and enter the number of CINs on the Voter List
   b. Do you observe any irregular patterns or marks Y / N
   c. Please describe any irregularities you observe – Free text
   d. Compare votes cast with number of CINs – this is done automatically
   e. Comments – Free text

4. Tally sheets
   a) Input the votes cast as shown on the Tally Sheet for each presidential candidate.
   b) Has the tally Sheet been signed by the BV Members or others:
      a. President Y / N
      b. Vice-President Y / N
      c. Secretary Y / N
      d. Mandataires/observers – Y / N
   c) Please provide any Comments you think appropriate – Free Text

5. Evaluation – Enter text to provide your evaluation of the following:
   a. Problems with process-verbal – missing signatures, differences between written numbers and numerals, obvious alterations – do you think this was problematic or not?
   b. Problems with voters list – CIN number irregularities – problematic or not
   c. Problems with tally sheet – missing signatures and missing tally sheet - problematic or not
APPENDIX V. Departmental Maps of Haiti

Haiti – Reported Vote Totals in Reporting Vote Locations

Haiti – Percent of Reported Votes

Haiti – Departmental Share of Votes Disallowed
APPENDIX VI – List of PVs OAS Recommends for Exclusion from Preliminary Results

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