THIRTY‑FIRST REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT COUNCIL ON THE MISSION TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (MAPP/OAS)

The following report is submitted pursuant to resolution CP/RES. 859 (1597/04), in which the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) instructs the Secretary General to report periodically on the work of the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia of the Organization of American States,[[1]](#footnote-2) hereinafter “the MAPP/OAS” or “the Mission.”

This report covers the findings for the period from January 1 to June 30, 2021. Due to travel restrictions imposed by government authorities to contain the public health crisis caused by COVID‑19, the Mission adapted its monitoring and accompaniment arrangement during this period, combining remote means[[2]](#footnote-3) with in‑person activities whenever possible.

During this period, owing to the trust that has been built with actors in Colombia, 6,511 monitoring and accompaniment tasks were carried out (5,926 virtually and 585 in person) in 684 population centers located in 193 municipalities across 26 departments. The population centers in which this work was done included municipal seats, districts (*corregimientos*), villages (*veredas*), indigenous reserves (*resguardos*), and community councils.

Due to its nature and length, in this report the OAS General Secretariat (GS/OAS) condenses the principal dynamics identified by the Mission during the six months covered. In addition to this report, the MAPP/OAS regularly, and in coordination with state agencies, generates and delivers in‑depth analyses on matters within its mandate and/or concerning the territories covered, including specific recommendations to address the situations identified and to contribute to peacebuilding.

Implementation of the MAPP/OAS mandate is possible thanks to the trust and steadfast support of the international community, which recognizes the Mission as a key player in peacebuilding in Colombia. The GS/OAS wishes to thank the member states and observers, in particular the Basket Funds countries—Canada, Germany, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States—whose political and financial support make the Mission’s operations possible. The GS/OAS also recognizes the important contributions made by Norway and Switzerland and the support in the form of secondments[[3]](#footnote-4) from Germany, with the assignment of three professionals, and Switzerland, with two specialists, an enormous contribution to the Mission in terms of human talent.

1. **GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS**

In the fifth year of the implementation of the Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace (hereinafter “the Final Agreement”), the GS/OAS recognizes the progress made and encourages the Colombian State, its institutions, and society as a whole to maintain a strong political will and solid coordination that, coupled with partnerships and ongoing support from the international community, will put Colombia on the path toward strengthening its social rule of law and achieving comprehensive peace.

The persistence of the COVID‑19 pandemic has led to major social and economic impacts for communities and groups experiencing vulnerability, further deepening structural inequalities and widening gaps in access to rights. This situation has resulted in a more complex governance scenario, especially in territories with illegal armed groups, affecting the social fabric and the level of trust between citizens and authorities.

On April 28, various segments of the population took to the streets to make economic and structural social demands. Through the Mission, the GS/OAS noted the peaceful mobilization of hundreds of thousands of Colombians (youth, indigenous and Afro‑descendent peoples, peasants, unionized workers, and human rights and women’s organizations, among others), many united under the National Strike Committee, with numerous others grouped under organizations with no ties to this committee and more still not affiliated with any organization.

In addition to peaceful demonstrations, there have been serious acts of violence, such as assaults on police officers and civilians, excessive use of force by National Police members against civilian demonstrators, vandalism, main road blockades, and alleged illegal armed group infiltrations. These events left many peopled dead, injured, displaced, and detained, led to the destruction of public and private property, hindered the supply of vital medical supplies, food, and fuel, and restricted access to health, work, education, and justice, to name but a few of the main negative impacts. At the same time, the unrest occurred in different geographic locations and diverse sectors, emerged in a multitude of agendas, and manifested itself through various types of actions and levels of violence. This diversity added a high degree of complexity to the overall situation, making it difficult to understand and address.

The GS/OAS encourages the Colombian State to continue actions that guarantee peaceful social protest and calls for the condemnation of all types of violence, the setup of channels of dialogue to address the causes and effects of conflict, the creation of spaces for cooperation and compliance with agreements, and the strengthening and promotion of assertive mechanisms for political and social participation and deliberation. It also calls for the continued investigation and punishment of all those responsible for acts of violence during the National Strike and for reparation to all victims. Addressing the rights, needs, and interests of society and coordinating efforts between all social actors are conditions necessary for democratic governance.

For the reporting period, the Mission increased its presence in the territories and observed, with concern, threats to the participation of Communal Action Organizations (OACs), ethnic territorial authorities, and social processes, increased illicit crops in some areas, as well as the forced recruitment and other forms of conscription of children and adolescents into illegal armed groups. It also noted disputes over control of illegal economies and the strengthening of these groups in territories.

Given this context, the GS/OAS recognizes the efforts that the Colombian State is making through numerous, diverse policies subject to monitoring and follow‑up by the MAPP/OAS. These include: Peace with Legality, the public policy for victim assistance and comprehensive reparation; Future Route, the policy to tackle the drug problem; the public policy to guarantee and respect human rights defense work; and concrete strategies, such as the Rural Development Programs (PDETs), the National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS), the Integral Plans for Substitution and Alternative Development (PISDAs), the Strategic Zones for Comprehensive Intervention (ZEIIs), the social and economic reintegration of former combatants,[[4]](#footnote-5) the prevention of the recruitment and use of and sexual violence against children and adolescents through the “Join for Me” strategy, the Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines (AICMA), access to and the formalization of land, the Ten‑Year Justice Plan, and the National Criminal Policy Plan, which includes actions to militarily and financially weaken illegal armed groups, reduce people’s conditions of vulnerability, and disrupt illicit economies.

The GS/OAS welcomes the extension of the mandate of the Commission for Truth, Coexistence, and Non‑Repetition (CEV) for nine more months until August 27, 2022. This is an opportunity to overcome the impacts that the pandemic has had on CEV efforts and to make headway in consolidating the Final Report, with an emphasis on furthering the findings and recommendations geared to non‑repetition as well as preparing and delivering the Legacy[[5]](#footnote-6) to Colombian society. It also encourages strengthening the joint work with the Disappeared Persons Search Unit (UBPD) and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) to make progress in fully guaranteeing victims’ rights and in appropriating the CEV’s Legacy.

The GS/OAS recognizes the reactivation of the Special Transitory Electoral Districts for Peace, part of the Final Agreement, as an act of peace that seek to give a voice to victims of armed conflict in the Congress of the Republic, which undoubtedly translates into enhanced political participation in Colombia. The GS/OAS cautions that, in order to guarantee the potential of this democratic exercise, an unprecedented effort will need to be made in preparing and promoting participation, by all actors, and institutional will in order to support electoral and security guarantees in the territories involved.

With regard to migration, particularly assistance to and the protection and integration of the Venezuelan population, one of the actions taken by Colombia was the issuance of the Temporary Protected Status for Venezuelan Migrants, demonstrating its real commitment to migrants and its attention to this unprecedented crisis. The GS/OAS considers this to be an exemplary decision reflective of the brotherhood and solidarity of the people of the Americas.

While undeniable progress has been made in peacebuilding, tremendous challenges persist, such as the dispersal and reshuffling of illegal armed groups, especially in areas used as mobility corridors for drug trafficking, contraband, and income from the illegal extraction of mining deposits. Disconcerting observations have been made of violent actions against public servants, such as attacks on an aircraft carrying the President of the Republic, the placement of an explosive device within the National Army’s 30th Brigade, located in the border city of Cúcuta, and the detention and killing of four individuals making up a commission of the Land Restitution Unit in the department of Meta.

The dynamics of violence persist, with differentiated and intersectional impacts on the individual and collective rights of vulnerable populations. The presence and actions of illegal armed groups seriously affect women, children and adolescents, social leaders, indigenous communities, Afro‑descendants, land claimants, victims of armed conflict, human rights advocates, promoters of the implementation of peace policies on such issues as the substitution of illicit crops, persons from FARC‑EP in the process of reincorporation, and state agents.

The main negative impacts affecting organizational processes, civic participation, territorial governance, access to rights, and the establishment of trust between citizens and institutions are forced displacement, threats, killings, disappearances, forced recruitment, confinement, and restricted mobility due to antipersonnel mines (APMs), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and unexploded ordnance (UXO).

The election of OACs was postponed twice in 2020 because of the public health emergency. Although the authorities and actors involved in coordinating and preparing the electoral process have kept up their efforts, the GS/OAS notes serious risks for the role of community action at the territorial level, such as an increase in threats against community dignitaries, a general feeling of resignation, frustration, and fatigue with the performance of the role, leading to resignations from management positions, and a reduction in OAC activities, impacting the legitimacy and trust earned by the organization in its communities.

The final year of the Colombian Congress and Government offers an opportunity to solidify the peacebuilding efforts, the achievements made, the accomplishments in overcoming obstacles, and the improvements in security and development conditions to definitively guide the approach to social conflict through dialogue and the implementation of commitments and to offset the negative effects of the pandemic.

The GS/OAS is particularly grateful to the members of the Special Body on Women, the Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation, and the Commons Party and National Government component of the Commission for Monitoring, Impetus, and Verification of Implementation (CSIVI) for entrusting the MAPP/OAS with the supervision of the 32 departmental assemblies and 4 national assemblies to elect new members of the Special Body on Women. The recognition of this advisory body as a mechanism for participation is a great achievement in the framework of transitional justice across the world, and its renewal has revived the debate on the progress and challenges of the gender and peace agenda.

Through the MAPP/OAS, the GS/OAS continues to support rapprochement and dialogue initiatives between the National Government and the National Liberation Army (ELN). In this context, it encourages the parties to continue to strive for peace and to embody peace efforts that prioritize the safety and wellbeing of the civilian population. It also calls on society as a whole and the international community to continue to support comprehensive peacebuilding.

Furthermore, the GS/OAS extends its appreciation to President Iván Duque Márquez for renewing his confidence in the work and capacity of the OAS in Colombia and for providing support for the proper performance of the Mission’s functions. The GS/OAS is grateful to the National Government for its decision to extend the MAPP/OAS mandate for three years starting in 2022 and to the international community for the generosity and support.

The MAPP/OAS will continue to work and consolidate as a multilateral expression of support for the peace efforts in Colombia, dignifying and recognizing the efforts of victims, former combatants, institutions, ethnic and peasant communities, women’s organizations, and leaders who, despite suffering as a result of the ongoing conflict, act from their territories toward peacebuilding and the all‑round development of their communities.

1. **SECURITY CONDITIONS**
	1. **Presence and activities of illegal armed groups[[6]](#footnote-7)**

The reshuffling of illegal armed groups and the shifting of relationships between them persist in the territories and are expressed differently in every area. The geographic and economic importance of the places in which illegal armed groups are present is crucial to these dynamics in terms of the benefits it represents for survival and the economic exploitation of contexts of illegality, such as zones with large swaths of coca crops and gold mining, transit corridors for illicit activities, and border areas. Border areas see greater interference from illegal armed groups interested in expanding their sources of funding, presenting changes in the dynamics of gasoline and essential goods contraband, marijuana routes, greater control over transit in unauthorized crossings,[[7]](#footnote-8) and human trafficking.

The ELN has stepped up illegal social control actions and acts of violence in the Catatumbo region and the department of Nariño against not only the civilian population through threats and killings, but also even public service enterprises and international cooperation agencies through the detention of their staff and vehicle thefts.[[8]](#footnote-9) Government forces have also been subject to harassment and attacks with firearms and explosive devices in Antioquia, Arauca, and Norte de Santander. In some cases, these acts against government forces occurred in urban areas of municipal capitals, making it difficult for authorities to respond due to the risk involved for the civilian population in those areas.

Some patterns can be observed in the relationship between the ELN and other illegal armed groups. In Catatumbo, the armed confrontation with the EPL/Los Pueblos has subsided, although these two groups clashed in June in the municipality of La Playa de Belén and were behind homicides perpetrated in Ocaña (Norte de Santander), allegedly in connection with that dispute. Conversely, in other areas such as Cauca, Chocó, and the Cúcuta Metropolitan Area (Norte de Santander), the ELN continues to have confrontations with dissident or residual FARC‑EP groups and with the AGC/Clan del Golfo, with humanitarian consequences for the civilian population and public servants due to the displacement, confinement, threats, and killings to which they are exposed.

As mentioned in the Thirtieth Semiannual Report, it is still difficult to identify the existence of a unified command that brings dissident or residual FARC‑EP groups together. In some cases, they seem to come together under umbrella structures, such as Comando Coordinador de Occidente, which comprises factions from the departments of Cauca, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca, Bloque Jorge Briceño Suárez in Guaviare and Meta, and Bloque Magdalena Medio in Antioquia, Bolívar, and Norte de Santander.

These structures do not appear to diminish the autonomy of each faction comprising them, which is why they could thus far be considered spaces for coordination, rather than for political or military leadership. Some still tend to identify themselves based on the numbering system used in the FARC‑EP, such as Frente 33, Frente 36, and Frente 28 in the departments of Norte de Santander and Antioquia and in the Llanos Orientales region, respectively. Others use different names, such as Frente Óliver Sinisterra (FOS) in Tumaco or Comandos de la Frontera in Putumayo.

The relationship of dissident or residual FARC‑EP groups with other illegal armed groups follows different patterns. In Cauca, confrontations continue with the ELN in the Micay river canyon and on the Pacific coast. In southern Bolívar[[9]](#footnote-10) and Catatumbo,[[10]](#footnote-11) tensions are heightened. In northern Antioquia, there is a dispute with the AGC/Clan del Golfo that continues to cause forced displacement in the municipality of Ituango.

The same is true for the various dissident or residual FARC‑EP groups. In Putumayo, confrontations continue between Frente 1° Carolina Ramírez and the Comandos de la Frontera – Ejército Bolivariano.[[11]](#footnote-12) In Nariño, the FOS and the Bloque Occidental Alfonso Cano continue to strike agreements with the AGC/Clan del Golfo to keep Frente 30 from advancing south from the Sanquianga subregion, violating the integrity of the population.

The AGC/Clan del Golfo have consolidated their presence in the Cúcuta Metropolitan Area (Norte de Santander), sustaining a confrontation with the ELN, which is leading to threats, targeted killings, and forced displacement. In late February, the group put forward a “gun plan”[[12]](#footnote-13) against members of the National Police, focused on some municipalities and rural areas of Antioquia, Bolívar, Chocó, and Córdoba, in retaliation for the murder of a man known as “Marihuano,” the second‑in‑command of the group behind the man known as “Otoniel.”[[13]](#footnote-14)

The Colombian State has developed strategies to weaken the military and financial structures of illegal armed groups. In particular, members of the EPL/Los Pelusos[[14]](#footnote-15) chain of command were arrested during this period, contributing to the group’s decline despite its attempts to keep operating in Norte de Santander through targeted killings and kidnappings for ransom. The National Government also announced in June the dismantling of the Bloque Virgilio Peralta Arenas or Los Caparros,[[15]](#footnote-16) which until April had had an intense confrontation with the AGC/Clan del Golfo in the Bajo Cauca subregion of Antioquia. However, although the weakening of these groups has been clear in some cases, the establishment of temporary agreements and the existence of various sources of funding have enabled them to rearrange themselves and continue to cause negative impacts on the population.

* 1. **Negative impacts on the civilian population[[16]](#footnote-17)**

The civilian population continues to be a victim of acts of violence perpetrated by illegal armed groups as a result of either clashes between them, which lead to forced displacement or confinement, or actions linked to the interest of these groups to retain territorial, economic, and social control.

Children and adolescents, indigenous peoples, Afro‑descendent communities, and women and their organizations continue to be particularly impacted. Coercive dynamics persist against them, particularly forced recruitment and use of and sexual violence against children and adolescents, governance and own justice violations, and persecution against forms of mobilization and organization by women. This limits their individual and collective rights.

Official figures on violent deaths of and threats against women shed light on the problem in municipalities such as Tibú, Villa del Rosario, and Cúcuta (Norte de Santander); Cáceres, Valdivia, and Yondó (Antioquia); Caldono, Guapi, Morales, and Toribio (Cauca); and Puerto Caicedo, San Miguel, and Valle del Guamuez (Putumayo). According to SIEDCO[[17]](#footnote-18) data for these municipalities, during the first half of the year, there was more than a 100‑percent increase in violent deaths of and threats against women compared to the total recorded in 2020.[[18]](#footnote-19)

With regard to risk scenarios for indigenous and Afro‑descendent peoples, the most critical departments were Antioquia, Cauca, Chocó, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Valle del Cauca. In most cases, the influence of one or more illegal armed groups in their collective territories leads to threats, forced displacement, imposition of social control measures,[[19]](#footnote-20) and confinements. In particular, food security among the ethnic population is undermined due to limited access to hunting, fishing, harvesting of wild fruits, and agricultural activities.

In particular, there are persistent violations against life, integrity, and property, which are not visible or reported in all cases due to the duress exerted on the population by illegal armed groups and the distrust of institutions in some territories. This affects the performance of some roles and offices, especially in territories with an armed confrontation between illegal armed groups and with a context of illegality.

Members of the teaching and management staff of education centers in rural and urban areas have been the target of threats, extortion,[[20]](#footnote-21) theft, and coercion in order to drive them out of their positions or to prevent the actions committed by illegal armed groups against communities, for example, from being visible. For instance, in the municipality of Ituango, Antioquia, violations against educators are social control measures taken by dissident or residual FARC‑EP groups to prohibit them from entering the territory because they are outsiders. In the same vein, the staff of the Technological University of Chocó has been targeted by threats circulated through pamphlets and attacks by criminal armed groups. These pamphlets were signed by the “Los Mexicanos” group, presumed to have an alliance with the ELN.

People who operate public service vehicles and boats are required to pay extortion money, are coerced into complying with mobility restrictions, and are forced to transport members of illegal armed groups or weapons and supplies for illicit economies. In the event of noncompliance with these measures, vehicles are stolen, burned, or used as tools to attack public infrastructure, as was the case in Antioquia,[[21]](#footnote-22) Arauca, Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Valle del Cauca, primarily.

In rural areas, medical and health care staff are forced to provide care outside health centers to members of illegal armed groups who become injured in armed clashes[[22]](#footnote-23) or who fall ill. They have also fallen victim to theft during medical missions, as was the case in the first quarter of the year in the municipalities of Alto Baudó (Chocó)[[23]](#footnote-24) and Teorama (Norte de Santander).[[24]](#footnote-25)

It should be noted that as part of the Rapid Response Prevention and Alert System,[[25]](#footnote-26) the Early Warning System (SAT) of the Office of the Ombudsperson monitored and warned of risks to the civilian population through the issuance of 13 early warnings. As a result, the Interinstitutional Commission for Rapid Response to Early Warnings (CIPRAT) created spaces for coordination with top‑level local and national institutions through the development of territorial follow‑up sessions to implement recommendations aimed at mitigating threats to community safety.[[26]](#footnote-27)

In the same vein, the Ministry of the Interior headed Territorial Rapid Response Bodies concentrated primarily in municipalities hardest hit by violence.[[27]](#footnote-28) This is a meaningful effort to move forward with the coordinated adoption of preventive and immediate response measures against risk factors and threats identified by institutions.

* + 1. ***De facto* justice exercised by illegal armed groups**

In Norte de Santander, the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia, and the Pacific region of Nariño, illegal armed groups take, for the most part, *de facto* justice actions. In municipalities such as Convención, Hacarí, La Playa, Tibú, Sardinata, Villa del Rosario, Puerto Santander, San Calixto, Ocaña, and Teorama in the department of Norte de Santander, residual or dissident FARC‑EP groups, especially the ELN, have tightened their grip on the population with the imposition of increasingly restrictive rules on conduct and coexistence, such as the prohibition of mobility between and within municipalities, night curfews, and conflict resolution within communities.[[28]](#footnote-29) This has led to an increase in killings as the maximum punishment for rule breakers.

In the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia, illegal social control rules were imposed at the beginning of the year as part of the confrontation between the AGC/Clan del Golfo and Los Caparros, leading to confinement, curfews, targeted killings (some with signs of torture), and increased extortion. These actions were taken primarily against ranchers, farmers, merchants, and miners. In the Pacific region of Nariño, the dynamics of crime and the diversity of the illegal armed groups present there triggered confinements, mobility restrictions, and extortion, particularly in the municipalities of Roberto Payán, Santa Bárbara, Olaya Herrera, and Magüí Payán.

Lastly, during the days of National Strike demonstrations in Meta and Putumayo, some dissident or residual FARC‑EP armed groups attempted to infiltrate and delegitimize the social protests, putting pressure on communities and members of Community Action Councils (JACs) to participate in such events and threatening those who did not comply with mandatory payments. Many communities therefore decided to join forces and pay the money so that they would not have to participate in the social demonstrations under armed pressure.

* + 1. **Conscription, forced recruitment, and use of and sexual violence against children and adolescents**

With regard to the protection of children, the 22 entities comprising the Intersectoral Commission to Prevent the Recruitment and Use of and Sexual Violence against Children and Adolescents by Illegal Armed Groups and Organized Crime Groups (CIPRUNNA)[[29]](#footnote-30) made progress in implementing the “Join for Me” strategy through virtual and in‑person activities held in the territory in the form of training, technical assistance, donations for social integration programs, and psychosocial support for families, among others.[[30]](#footnote-31) Advances were also made in aligning prevention pathways for the migrant and refugee population and the creation of 91 immediate action teams at the municipal level, directly affecting 4,393,861 children, adolescents, and young people and 2,767 public servants in 19 departments across the country.[[31]](#footnote-32)

In February, the Office of the Ombudsperson launched a strategy called “2021, Year against the Forced Recruitment of Children and Adolescents,” the purpose of which is to provide assistance to minors and their families and to activate the jurisdictional apparatus in order to investigate, prosecute, and punish forced recruitment.

Despite the aforementioned progress, risk scenarios for children, adolescents, and young people are incessant. School dropouts continue, especially in dispersed rural areas where educational institutions lack Internet and electricity services, technological means, access roads, and school supplies, among other shortcomings. In some areas, schools have yet to reopen due to the lack of biosafety measures on the premises, which puts adolescents and young people at greater risk.

One recruitment strategy used by illegal armed groups is to build relationships of trust with minors and their protective environment[[32]](#footnote-33) through sports activities, where they provide items and food not easy to obtain in remote regions. In this relationship‑building, the community is also persuaded that the children’s and adolescents’ involvement with illegal armed groups does not imply an exclusive dedication to illegal activities, but rather is an option for them to work, in parallel, in agricultural operations with the possibility of staying in their homes. Some of these proposals offer payments of up to Col$2,000,000, which in some cases are not made or serve as loans, generating a commitment and a threat in the event of noncompliance with the activities they are subsequently ordered to perform.

Residual or dissident FARC‑EP armed groups take different approaches. In Putumayo, for example, they encourage communities to convince families to allow their children to join the groups by using either political discourse or offering them financial remuneration. In Norte de Santander, they go through homes and make promises of delivering weapons and bestowing military rank.

In the Pacific region of Nariño, ethnic populations have been harder hit;[[33]](#footnote-34) in Santa Bárbara, the community issued a warning regarding the risk of recruitment of apparently 15 children and adolescents from Afro‑descendent communities in the dispersed rural area. However, the institutions in charge could not implement protection measures involving the transfer or mobilization of minors because of the presence of armed actors in the territory.

In the Catatumbo region, the ELN enlists children and adolescents through surveillance work without giving them weapons, whereas in the department of Cesar, children and adolescents are used in micro‑trafficking activities. In the urban area of the District of Buenaventura in the department of Valle del Cauca, the ELN has forged an alliance with the La Empresa illegal armed group to forcibly recruit children and adolescents and involve them in surveillance, the transportation of narcotics, and extortion collection, among other activities, all with the aim of controlling drug and weapons trafficking.

To strengthen their military capacity with the aim of tackling the territorial dispute with residual or dissident FARC‑EP groups, the AGC/Clan del Golfo threaten family members to allow adolescents to join them on the pretense that they are old enough to fight. This dynamic was identified in the municipality of Apartadó and the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia. In Chocó, indigenous authorities in the municipality of Juradó have been intimidated for opposing the forced recruitment of adolescents aged 15 to 17 from the Emberá peoples. In the municipality of Unguía, institutions took actions to prevent the imminent risk of forced recruitment and to guarantee a protective environment due to the existence of a list of adolescents threatened for not abiding by behavioral norms.

Los Caparros in the Bajo Cauca region illicitly recruited eight young people who were traveling as stowaways in a truck by offering them Col$1,000,000 to join the illegal armed group. However, due to complaints from the families and the visibility of this case in the media, seven of them were freed.

It is a challenge to continue to strengthen strategies to transform collective imaginations in some communities that normalize the recruitment dynamic as a voluntary option for children and adolescents to join illegal armed groups, without seeing it as a violation of their rights. It is also challenging to deal with this phenomenon from a differential and intersectional perspective, addressing the specific impacts on children, adolescents, women, indigenous communities, and Afro‑descendants.

In particular, as stated in the Twenty‑Sixth Semiannual Report, serious violations of the human rights of children and adolescents persist in the department of Chocó. Communities denounce the systemic harassment of and violence against the body and life of children and adolescents by illegal armed groups. In the municipality of Alto Baudó, the Mission noted cases of sexual violence perpetrated by the ELN against young and adolescent girls from the indigenous and Afro‑descendent communities in this area. These acts occur after the illegal armed group forces families to hand over their daughters. The communities do not formally report these cases out of fear of reprisals by this group. In Norte de Santander, meanwhile, indigenous authorities in the town of Motilón‑Barí issued warnings regarding an increase in the forced recruitment of children and adolescents by the ELN in its territory.

In rural areas, children and adolescents have been killed during armed interactions between illegal armed groups and government forces and during bombings of illegal encampments. In urban areas, where adolescents and children as young as 10 are used in micro‑trafficking and extortion, minors have been victims of homicide in disputes between criminal gangs.

In this context, effective measures to fully protect children and adolescents from armed conflict and the dynamics of crime must urgently be strengthened, making their best interests a priority. The GS/OAS reiterates that children and adolescents must stay out of all dynamics of conflict and violence that notably violate their rights to life, integrity, freedom, and security. Their protection must also be urgently strengthened, in full compliance with the regulations of the Colombian State and its constitutional precepts of the prevalence of the rights of children and adolescents as well as the standards of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

Children and adolescents who break away from illegal armed groups do so mainly through community protection systems, such as JACs, teachers, or indigenous guards, without institutional assistance.[[34]](#footnote-35) This leads to threats to the life and integrity and to the forced displacement of those attempting to stop children and adolescents from becoming involved in illegal activities. National Army operations have also succeeded in breaking children and adolescents away from these groups, and efforts are underway to restore their rights in various departments across the country.

**2.2.3. Accidents caused by or presence of antipersonnel mines, unexploded ordnance, and improvised explosive devices**

According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP), 172 municipalities were declared free from suspected APMs on June 25, 2021, out of the 180 that had been set as a target for 2021. The National Government also fostered dialogue to build the capacities of the National Network of Landmine Survivors Associations, develop prevention programs with mine risk education activities,[[35]](#footnote-36) and publish open data on the official OACP page detailing the monitoring of the phenomenon, the highest risk areas, intervention actions, clear zones, and AICMA response activities.

Illegal armed groups continue to use APMs and explosive devices as a war strategy or to protect the dynamics of illegality,[[36]](#footnote-37) putting communities at risk. In Chocó, Nariño, and the Catatumbo region (Norte de Santander) in particular, the population has seen an increase in APM and UXO contamination in places that have been the epicenter of confrontations between illegal armed groups.[[37]](#footnote-38) APMs have also been placed again in areas that had previously been declared free from them in Putumayo, Guaviare, and Nariño.[[38]](#footnote-39) They have also seen a rise in the use of IEDs in populated centers and high‑traffic areas targeting government forces, particularly in Antioquia, Arauca, Norte de Santander, and Guaviare. In the department of Guaviare, dissident or residual FARC‑EP groups are using devices that explode at face height to inflict greater damage on members of government forces.

Persistent explosive device contamination and use by illegal armed groups have erased previous demarcations of dangerous areas. Therefore, the information available on the presence of APMs and IEDs is limited to warnings issued by illegal armed groups to communities regarding their location or the occurrence of events. Where this happens, the population decides to forcibly displace or confine itself as a self‑protection measure, as was the case in Murindó and Bojayá in Chocó as well as in the Telembí and Sanquianga regions in Nariño.

Most victims of APM, UXO, or IED events are civilians,[[39]](#footnote-40) with children, adolescents, and indigenous communities being the hardest hit.[[40]](#footnote-41) This is due in part to the fact that explosive devices are placed indiscriminately on rural roads, in rivers, in food crops,[[41]](#footnote-42) in logging areas, and near schools, places through which government forces and illegal armed groups[[42]](#footnote-43) usually pass.

A large proportion of accidents[[43]](#footnote-44) occurred because communities were unaware of the dangers of handling explosive devices and because people traveled to risk areas. Consequently, the rural communities of Antioquia, Guaviare, Meta, Nariño, and Norte de Santander, primarily, continue to seek AICMA’s intervention in humanitarian demining operations.

Illegal armed groups are responsible for making threats against and extorting anyone who carries out demining operations, like in Antioquia, Guaviare, and Meta, and for intimidating those who report contaminated areas in Antioquia, Chocó, and Valle del Cauca, which ends up hindering or restricting clean‑up activities in the territories[[44]](#footnote-45) and even mine risk education activities.

* + 1. **Negative impacts on social leaders and community** **representatives**

There is no end to the many violations by illegal armed groups against ethnic territorial authorities, human rights defenders, community representatives, and social, community, and peasant leaders in Antioquia, Cauca, Caquetá, Chocó, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca.[[45]](#footnote-46)

Threats, homicides, coercion, and forced displacement continue to be the most recurrent. Illegal armed groups are mainly interested in having the population impede the development of state actions, comply with the imposed rules of social control, attend meetings these groups call, renounce political activities, refrain from reporting or exposing any type of violations to institutions (especially all the recruitment of children and adolescents and negative impacts on natural resources), and abandon ancestral territories.

The materialization of risk stemming from armed confrontations and threats against social leaders and public servants cause people to abandon the territory as a means of protecting their personal integrity. For example, in January, 11 councilors from Argelia, Cauca, were forced to move to Popayán as a result of threats from illegal armed groups.

The Mission is also concerned about the noted patterns in gender‑based violence (GBV) and the increase in the extraordinary gender risk[[46]](#footnote-47) faced by women in exercising leadership as a consequence of armed conflict and criminal activity in some parts of the country. In places such as the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia, Magdalena Medio, and Catatumbo, and in the municipalities of Chocó, Cauca, and Putumayo, coercive dynamics have emerged against women and young and adolescent girls,[[47]](#footnote-48) whose individual and collective impacts undermine the exercise of their human rights, including the civil and political rights conferred on them following the signature of the Final Agreement. Femicide, forced disappearance, torture, human trafficking, violence against women in politics, and persecution against forms of mobilization and organization by women persist.

* + 1. **Negative impacts on the population in the process of reincorporation and their families**

The Inter‑Agency Coordinating Panel for the Safety of Persons in the Process of Reincorporation[[48]](#footnote-49) at the national and territorial levels has positioned itself as a key space for coordination, the socialization of progress, and the estimation of improvement actions in that regard. The National Protection Unit (UNP) also granted 324 protection arrangements,[[49]](#footnote-50) and on June 30, 2021, the Office of the Attorney General (FGN) reported 52.9‑percent progress in the investigation of 380 cases known to this entity since the signing of the Final Agreement.[[50]](#footnote-51)

As for prevention measures, there are noteworthy experiences in Antioquia and Cauca, where victim extraction with interinstitutional support was an effective response to cases of imminent risk. In Chocó, strategies such as the “halfway house” (*casa de paso*) approach, which provides shelter and medical care to persons in the process of reincorporation (PPRs) and their families, are highly valued.[[51]](#footnote-52)

The National Government put in place the Security and Protection Strategic Plan, which includes eight strategic lines: (i) prevention, (ii) immaterial prevention actions, (iii) protection, (iv) coordination for investigation and prosecution, (v) comprehensive human security, (vi) differential gender focus, and (vii) security guarantees in electoral participation. This plan is set forth in Decree Law 895 of 2017, which establishes the Integral System for Security in the Exercise of Politics (SISEP), one of the points covered in the Final Agreement.

During the period from January to June 2021, institutions recorded 33 acts of violence against PPRs and 3 against their families,[[52]](#footnote-53) classified as threats, homicides, and attempted homicides. The departments where these offenses occurred were Antioquia, Cauca, Caquetá, Meta, and Nariño. At the municipal level, they took place primarily in Argelia (Cauca), Cali (Valle del Cauca), Ituango (Antioquia), Puerto Asís (Putumayo), and Tumaco (Nariño).

For women in the process of reincorporation, there is an additional risk scenario. It is common for illegal armed groups to identify them as alleged informants for government forces or a rival illegal armed group as a result of an emotional relationship with one of their members, leading to assaults on their physical integrity or that of their family units.

Violations of the right to life of PPRs were mainly tied to retaliation by illegal armed groups, whereas a few cases occurred within the framework of citizen coexistence. A large proportion of victims were also noted to be men who were former FARC‑EP members[[53]](#footnote-54) and, to a lesser extent, men who were part of their family.

The forced displacement of PPRs and their family units was, in some cases, a means of self‑protection after receiving threats. In other cases, it is as a consequence of the refusal by PPRs to join illegal armed groups or because they are perceived by such groups as “untrustworthy.” Kidnappings of those in the process of reincorporation were less recurrent. When they did occur, they resulted in violations against life and physical integrity as well as homicide and torture.[[54]](#footnote-55)

In addition, factors such as territorial and family roots, access to farms, and work opportunities in rural areas have prompted PPRs to take matters into their own hands by leaving the AETCRs where many began their reincorporation. This departure affected their safety because of the long distances between the areas to which they relocated and the areas in which institutional offerings are located, meaning that they must travel far to attend meetings or access health and education services. These displacements are one of the scenarios of greater vulnerability for the occurrence of violent acts against PPRs.

**3. DYNAMICS IN BORDER AREAS**

The Colombian State issued the Comprehensive Migration Policy,[[55]](#footnote-56) which establishes guidelines and responsibilities for the development of institutional actions that guarantee the rights of the migrant population in Colombia as well as other actions to strengthen and protect the Colombian community abroad with a view to promoting safe, orderly, and regular migration. The Border Law[[56]](#footnote-57) was also passed. It lays down special provisions for strengthening the development of border departments and communities and for boosting local economies through cross‑border trade, logistics corridors, and differentiated customs regimes.

Moreover, the National Government implemented actions to welcome and integrate the Venezuelan migrant population with the aim of providing, *inter alia*, access to basic services, labor regularization, health care, and education.[[57]](#footnote-58) In May, Migración Colombia and Gerencia de Fronteras launched the Temporary Protection Statute for Venezuelan Migrants (ETPMV) and registered 968,624 Venezuelans.[[58]](#footnote-59) However, in population centers where it was implemented, difficulties were encountered with registration system access, poor institutional capacity, confusion between entities over roles, and irregularities attributed to some people attempting to access the benefits offered by the Statute.[[59]](#footnote-60)

Institutions also made progress in strengthening the implementation of the ETPMV through coordination between Migración Colombia and the ICBF to give priority to migrant children, adolescents, and young people through the Administrative Procedure for the Restoration of Rights (PARD) linked to the Adolescent Criminal Responsibility System (SRPA). The ICBF also takes actions to expand the coverage of its programs and strategies and to bring its institutional offering closer to the migrant population.[[60]](#footnote-61)

The gradual reopening of borders[[61]](#footnote-62) did not stimulate the local economy or trade in Colombian border communities as expected due to the low migratory flow through authorized crossings[[62]](#footnote-63) and the persistence of informal economies,[[63]](#footnote-64) among other reasons. However, there were increased inflows of the Venezuelan population interested in both staying in the departments of Nariño, Valle del Cauca, Putumayo, and Norte de Santander, and crossing Colombia in order to migrate to Peru and Chile.

The massive influx into the municipality of Necoclí (Antioquia) of approximately 10,000 transcontinental migrants—most of Haitian nationality[[64]](#footnote-65) seeking to cross the jungle between Colombia and Panama[[65]](#footnote-66) to make it to North America—demonstrated the magnitude of the migratory phenomenon. This had impacts on border communities, especially due to the collapse of local infrastructure, increased migrant smuggling, the dollarization of the local economy, the loss of tourism, and higher crime. The National Government tackled this humanitarian emergency by developing spaces for international cooperation and working groups with the states involved.

On the border with Venezuela, Colombian institutions provided assistance and humanitarian aid to the displaced population from the La Victoria rural area (state of Apure, Venezuela) following its arrival in the department of Arauca, Colombia, as a result of fighting between residual or dissident FARC‑EP groups and the Bolivarian National Armed Force of Venezuela.

The foreign population, especially binational indigenous peoples, children and adolescents, young people, and women, continues to fall victim to homicide, femicide, sexual violence, human trafficking,[[66]](#footnote-67) disappearance, forced displacement, extortion, and the conscription and use of children and adolescents,[[67]](#footnote-68) the result of control by illegal armed groups along the borders with Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama, in the departments of Antioquia, Valle del Cauca, Cauca, and Meta, in the Cordillera region of Nariño,[[68]](#footnote-69) and in southern Bolívar. Because of a lack of reporting due to fear of reprisals by illegal armed groups, these events are severely underreported and unknown to institutions.

**4. JUSTICE IN THE TERRITORIES**

The Ministry of Justice and Law has made progress in training processes and in the design of a toolbox with conceptual, pedagogical, communication, and practical components on family and gender‑based violence for local justice operators. Through training, it created strengthening strategies for institutions and social leaders to facilitate access to justice and land for rural women. The Ministry also provided technical support to continue the implementation of local and rural justice systems through the creation of departmental and municipal justice committees.

In June, approval was granted for the reform of the Statutory Law on the Administration of Justice, providing for an increase in the judicial branch budget,[[69]](#footnote-70) which is expected to improve its performance at the local level. It also provides for digitalization and the use of new technologies in the administration of justice, a challenge due to the limited or non‑existent access to electricity and Internet for some urban and rural communities[[70]](#footnote-71) as well as lacking knowledge on the use of digital tools. This increases mistrust and widens gaps in access to judicial institutions among citizens, who prefer to approach justice operators directly to ask questions and file complaints.

Courts and prosecutors’ offices continue to work virtually, which has impacted the workload of administrative justice bodies that carry out work in person, such as police inspectorates and commissioner’s offices for families, as they have had to prepare citizen requests and complaints. This dynamic, for example, has been identified in Hacarí, Ocaña, Puerto Santander, San Calixto, and Sardinata (Norte de Santander). When these institutions are unable to handle all the cases, citizens must turn to private consultants since public defenders or legal clinics, which provide this service for free, do not have a presence in all municipalities.

As stated in the Thirtieth Semiannual Report, cases of family, gender‑based, and sexual violence, especially against women, continue to rise in Antioquia, Bolívar, Guaviare, and Norte de Santander, primarily. Judicial operators there were found to not know how to deal with these types of cases, leading to the revictimization of the complainants in many instances. Coupled with the normalization of violent practices, the fear of social stigma, and the limited progress in legal proceedings, this situation has led to even fewer reports being filed with the competent authorities.

* 1. **Special Indigenous Jurisdiction (JEI)**

The AGC/Clan del Golfo, the ELN, and residual or dissident FARC‑EP armed groups continue to take hostile actions against indigenous jurisdictional authorities. The threats made and limitations imposed by these groups against the JEI at the beginning of the confinement have turned into direct attacks.

In general, these events relate to own justice decisions that illegal armed groups view as a challenge to their authority in the territory; actions for territorial control carried out by the indigenous guard in their jurisdiction; self‑government decisions, in particular on the use and allocation of resources, the development of life plans, the establishment of environmental rules, the protection of children and adolescents against forced recruitment,[[71]](#footnote-72) and participation in National Government programs, especially associated with the reduction of illicit crops; and reporting and participation in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and in regional organizational processes.

In Chocó, the indigenous jurisdictional authorities, particularly the Association of Indigenous Municipal Councils of Alto Baudó, were victims of attacks. In Bajo Baudó, two indigenous guards from the Río Purricha and Tahami Alto Andágueda reserves were killed, whereas in Carmen del Darién, the Uradá‑Jiguamiandó reserve was attacked with explosives, wounding two coordinators and a guard, and another guard who had already been threatened was kidnapped. In Bagadó, meanwhile, a traditional healer and guard from Cevedé was killed.

In Valle del Cauca, an indigenous guard from the community of Nonam Dur disappeared; the La Meseta municipal council (*cabildo*) and two of its guards were threatened; the guard of the Triunfo Cristal Páez reserve was the target of an explosives attack that left its coordinator injured; and five indigenous authorities and representatives of the Regional Indigenous Organization of Valle del Cauca (ORIVAC)[[72]](#footnote-73) have received constant threats. In Nariño, in the Piguambí Palangala reserve, the municipal council’s prosecutor was killed, a former woman governor and traditional healer was attacked, and a fire was set to the home of the guard’s coordinator.

In Magdalena, there was a direct attack on the family of an Arhuaco governor, while in Norte de Santander, threats were made against the chief and the human rights coordinator of the Motilón‑Barí peoples. In Córdoba, recurring threats have been reported against the governors of the municipal councils of Zenú Vende Agujas and Santa Fe Las Claras, the captain of the Nueva Victoria municipal council, and the former governor of the Santa Fe Alto San Jorge municipal council. In Caquetá, the secretary of the Muruí Ja+en+ D+ona municipal council was forcibly displaced, whereas in Antioquia, two Zenú chiefs from the La Amargura and Campanario reserves and the ancestral healer from the Campanario reserve were forcibly displaced as well.

These dynamics undermine the autonomy and territorial control of indigenous authorities[[73]](#footnote-74) because there is a tendency to punish government and own justice processes and to progressively weaken the institutions of indigenous peoples so that they are not problematic for illegal armed groups and illicit economies. This has created an atmosphere of fear among indigenous authorities, which have ceded relevant spaces of their activity in order to avoid being affected or to prevent their communities from being affected, thereby limiting their community organization and welfare activities. This harms institutions and the social fabric and could end in the disappearance of traditional forms of organization, development, and own justice among indigenous peoples.

In this context, the Presidential Councils for Human Rights and International Affairs, for National Security, and for Stabilization and Consolidation, as well as the Ministry of the Interior developed actions aimed at strengthening the Awá Indigenous Guard in Nariño,[[74]](#footnote-75) creating a Human Rights Roundtable to coordinate interventions with the eight indigenous peoples of Chocó so as to prevent violations in ethnic territories, supporting guards in the Barí territory of Norte de Santander, and producing scenarios for coordination and monitoring of the ethnic chapter of the Framework Implementation Plan for the Final Agreement. The Ministry of Justice and Law approved 90 projects to strengthen the JEI, and the FGN supported the coordination of processes in the School of Own Law of the Zenú peoples.

1. **PARTICIPATION, DIALOGUE, AND SOCIAL MOBILIZATION**

The limitations imposed as a result of the public health emergency caused by COVID‑19 stopped citizens’ democratic exercises and affected the development of participation spaces, mechanisms, and processes. Despite efforts by institutions and civil society to maintain them virtually, they were only revitalized with the gradual lifting of restrictions and the possibility to hold them in person. Citizens’ expectations to contribute to state‑building with their own proposals were once again impacted by negative public health measures that restricted any type of gatherings. This led, for example, to the further postponement of OAC elections, which had a negative effect on community work.[[75]](#footnote-76) The decrease in participatory space and the worsening of unmet basic needs because of the public health emergency have also generated higher levels of conflict and polarization.[[76]](#footnote-77)

In this context of greater desire to participate but a reduced possibility of doing so, citizens’ aspirations were quashed by the resumption of social demonstrations, which began on April 28 and lasted until the end of June, despite a new peak in COVID‑19 infections. These National Strike protests were spurred by a broad and diverse general public. Not only did traditional trade union sectors represented on the National Strike Committee take to the streets, but a diverse crowd also expressed their need to participate in making decisions that affect them. The diversity of sectoral demands, positions, and interests as well as emerging territorial leadership was notable.

The cities of Cali, Medellín, Bogotá, Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, Pereira, and Manizales and the departments of Cauca, Nariño, Valle del Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Meta had the largest social protest rallies. The Minga Indígena del Suroccidente also made an appearance in Cali, a city that became the epicenter of national mobilization.

The Colombian State reported that, within the framework of the National Strike, there were 12,478 protests in 862 municipalities across the 32 departments between April 28 and June 4, including: 6,328 rallies, 2,300 marches, 3,190 blockades, 632 mobilizations, and 28 assemblies. Some 89 percent of the protests—that is 11,060—took place without acts of violence and with support from municipal officials, peacekeepers, ombudsperson officials, and police officers.[[77]](#footnote-78)

Although these social protests were largely peaceful, some escalated to violent clashes with serious harm to life, freedom, and personal integrity. Dozens of people died as a result and thousands were injured, displaced,[[78]](#footnote-79) and detained. There were also attacks on medical missions and dozens of cases of GBV against women and persons with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities, among others. All of these acts of violence affected both protest participants and members of government forces, primarily the National Police. Riots and violent actions tended to occur in the afternoon and at night. That is also when most acts of excessive use of force reported by demonstrators also took place.

The Presidential Council for Human Rights and International Affairs reported that, between April 28 and June 13, 1,140 civilians and 1,454 uniformed officers were injured. Additionally, 113 acts of GBV were documented.[[79]](#footnote-80) In contrast, social organizations, such as the Institute of Studies for Development and Peace (INDEPAZ) and the nongovernmental organization Temblores, reported a total of 3,486 cases of police violence, including homicides presumably attributable to government forces, and victims of eye, physical, and sexual violence.[[80]](#footnote-81) These records are the result of the collection of information provided by human rights defenders, victims, and families. Moreover, the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC) reported that there were 2 homicides, 3 physical assaults, 159 incidents of harassment, and 21 victims of attacks in connection with the National Strike.[[81]](#footnote-82)

Roadblocks were set up in some cities for over a month that at times violated the right to life by preventing ambulances and medical supplies from passing through. These actions limited the population’s access to vital services. There were also attacks on medical missions, injuries to health care staff, and other violations, such as to the right to work and the free movement of citizens. In the midst of all this, the National Government decided to empower the Military Forces[[82]](#footnote-83) to restore order and road safety.[[83]](#footnote-84)

Material damage was also caused to public and private property, and other citizen rights were violated as well. This included damage to the facilities of public entities and institutions in the cities of Popayán, Jamundí, and Tuluá, mass transportation systems and road and police infrastructure mainly in Cali, Bogotá, Medellín, and Popayán, media outlet headquarters in Bogotá, and, generally, automated teller machines, banks, and retailers with the looting of chain stores and supermarkets. Cultural property, especially statues and monuments, was also impacted.

Although the public’s call was widespread, segments of the population did not agree with the protests and organized to demonstrate against them in the form of a “Silent March,” which took place in Cali, Medellín, and Bogotá. These demonstrations demanded guarantees for the right to life and work and the removal of roadblocks. Although the demonstrations against the National Strike were peaceful for the most part, some disturbing acts of violence occurred whereby civilians used firearms to shoot at demonstrators, revealing the country’s deep polarization.

Fake news and misinformation increased in this context, prompting public opinion to construct narratives about the National Strike as the scene of peaceful marches or as pointless acts of vandalism. These messages were spread mainly through social networks, which deepened the perception of chaos and a humanitarian crisis instead of de‑escalating the conflict and engaging in dialogue.

At that juncture, approximately 650 civil society organizations and the Joint Peace Committee of the Congress of the Republic made a joint appeal to the Inter‑American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) for a working visit to be arranged so that the human rights situation in the context of the social demonstrations could be observed. Further to bilateral discussions between the Government of Colombia and the IACHR, on May 25, the Colombian government invited the Commission to conduct the visit from June 8 to 10.

During this visit, the IACHR held meetings with the authorities of the different branches of public power and control bodies at the national, departmental, district, and municipal levels. Meetings were also held with victims of human rights violations, human rights defenders, women’s groups, Afro‑descendent and indigenous peoples, journalists, social movement representatives, business associations, agents of government forces, and representatives of multilateral organizations and the diplomatic corps. It also received information from 302 individual and collective testimonies in which representativeness and diversity criteria were given priority.[[84]](#footnote-85)

At the request of the IACHR and with the consent of the National Government and the GS/OAS, the Mission collaborated with the visit. In that respect, it contributed to reading the national and territorial context, building a plural and balanced agenda, building relationships with institutional and civil society actors at the national and territorial level, taking testimony, and monitoring the June 9 National Strike on site in Bogotá, Cali, and Popayán.

Faced with citizens’ insistent requests to hold a dialogue with the State and to initiate or resume agendas that will lead to agreed solutions, local authorities reached agreements to facilitate humanitarian corridors in the territories, accompanied in many cases by the MAPP/OAS.[[85]](#footnote-86) The Catholic Church and civil society had a key role to play in this regard, showing their openness to dialogue together with local governments. The OAC, as a collective, reiterated the call for non‑violence, provided spaces for rapprochement and dialogue, and appointed delegates to sit on the National Strike Committee. Similarly, community women expressed the need for democracy to guarantee youth the right to say what they think and encouraged everyone to work in a culture of dialogue and respect for differences as a means of overcoming polarization.

Multiple dialogue roundtables, both formal and ad hoc, were set up at rally points. The National Government made a great display in the territories of its participation in these processes, taking a listening attitude in search of a solution to citizens’ demands through specific agreements. Initially, the positive government call for dialogue was sufficiently inclusive, particularly for invisible sectors such as women and youth.

The youth and student sector, in its civic aspiration to be a key actor in the democratic exercise, managed to open a space for direct dialogue with national and territorial government representatives to tackle demands and solutions linked to social unrest. In that respect, the ICBF and the Presidential Council for Youth headed listening processes in various territories over the course of several weeks as part of the “Colombia Pact with Youth,” with the participation of over 15,145 young people in a total of 502 roundtables,[[86]](#footnote-87) many of them accompanied by the MAPP/OAS.

Despite the National Government’s efforts to recognize youth and their transformative potential, problems arose in the listening spaces with the design of a clear and effective methodology that would involve broad and diverse youth representation. Even though these spaces started spontaneously, they gradually consolidated and gave rise to significant expectations in the youth sector, which will need to be addressed in the near future.

That is why it is crucial to continue to maintain this dialogue with youth and channel these listening spaces toward structures with greater impact for youth proposals as well as to capitalize on and promote the upcoming election of Municipal and Departmental Youth Councils in order to develop the civic capacities of youth and encourage greater participation and democracy‑building by this segment of the population.

The Mission notes that demonstrations with civil society’s various demand agendas and territorial unrest will be continuing scenarios. Under the circumstances, it is essential to guarantee the right to peaceful protest, protecting life and human rights, and to promote broad, diverse, and inclusive dialogue that makes real participation by Colombian society possible and allows for direct communication with institutions, a preventive approach to social conflicts, and a stronger culture of democratic dialogue.

It is also necessary to continue processes that strengthen and enhance capacities for a collaborative and responsible approach to the social unrest, both in institutions and in civil society, as a way of advancing in capacity building for genuine dialogue and consensus building toward sustainable agreements.

**5.1 Social mobilization investigations and prosecutions**

With regard to the investigation and prosecution of the acts of violence perpetrated during social mobilizations, the FGN prioritized cases by defining lines of investigation and designating teams of prosecutors specializing in human rights. As a result, charges were brought against 251 individuals allegedly responsible for various crimes committed as part of the National Strike and 100 orders for preventive detention (*medidas de aseguramiento*) were imposed. This leaves a balance of 1,068 crime reports for injuries to 1,167 police officers and 570 cases of civilian injuries in respect of which 486 investigations were launched for alleged abuse of authority and personal injury.[[87]](#footnote-88)

The Office of the Procurator General (PGN) initiated 268 disciplinary proceedings against officials of government forces for their involvement in the protests, with special attention on homicides, attempted homicides, injuries, sexual violence, and complaints of disappearances. Furthermore, the Police General Inspectorate launched 139 disciplinary investigations at the national level for conduct related to alleged excess in the legitimate use of force, and the Military Criminal Justice Court launched 44 investigations into homicides, personal injuries, and abuse of authority that occurred during the demonstrations.[[88]](#footnote-89) The PGN also created special agencies through a commission of court procurators who intervene in criminal proceedings on an ongoing basis before the Ordinary Jurisdiction and the Military Criminal Justice Court to guarantee due process, expeditious proceedings, and the rights of victims.

Despite the above, there are challenges in conducting investigations and effectively prosecuting cases in this context. On the one hand, there are issues in obtaining physical evidence and evidentiary material for clarification of the facts and the individualization of those responsible for multiple acts, such as violence against civilians, public servants, and public entities, homicides and attempted homicides, and sexual violence.

On the other hand, it is challenging to ensure due process for those arrested during the National Strike through adequate technical defense and support from the Public Prosecutor’s Office, bearing in mind that the speed with which hearings were held to formalize the arrests, charges, and preventive detention orders made it difficult for those arrested to contact defenders to mount a defense.

1. **IMPACT OF STRATEGIES AND POLICIES FOR REGIONAL TRANSFORMATION**
	1. **Regional Development Programs (PDETs)**

As a result of the impact of the public health emergency caused by COVID‑19 on PDET participatory implementation processes, the Territorial Renewal Agency (ART) adjusted its communication channels with Impetus Group (GM) delegates and the community in general, developed training on citizen engagement and communications, facilitating the transmission of messages between delegations and the communities they represent, and held in‑person community validation activities on the institutional proposal for prioritizing initiatives contained in the Single Roadmap (HRU).

The ART also made progress in establishing Special Consultation Mechanisms (MEC) for the incorporation of an ethnic and cultural approach as a guarantee of effective participation in PDETs by ethnic peoples and communities.[[89]](#footnote-90) Operating these mechanisms is a challenge in terms of management capacity with a differential ethnic approach and institutional coordination to achieve consensus with the more than 100 ethnic authorities in PDET territories.

The completion and delivery of PDET works[[90]](#footnote-91) and the implementation of other types of social or productive initiatives are advances in the installation of goods, public services, and rights that have a positive effect on communities’ social appropriation and the perception of trust, progress, and implementation of PDETs and, thus, the Final Agreement. Strategies for building closer ties with communities enabled the Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation and the ART to strengthen the positioning of these programs and their legitimacy in most subregions.

Municipal Land Offices and Project Management Units, recently created in most PDET municipalities, coupled with the institutional restructuring carried out in some of them, are an opportunity to instill local technical capacities for participatory development, accountability, management, and financing of projects arising from PDET initiatives given priority through the HRU and local development plans.[[91]](#footnote-92)

PDET financing mechanisms were strengthened through the activation of the advance under the General Royalties System, international cooperation contributions, and significant private‑sector resources through the Works by Taxes mechanism.[[92]](#footnote-93) Similarly, mayors’ and governors’ offices, international cooperation agencies, the private sector, and the ART, with the participation of public and private structuring agents, advanced in the formulation of 7,942 projects and initiatives. However, given the high volume of rejections of structured projects received by territorial entities, the most common reasons for the rejections must be identified so that corrective action can be taken.

According to official figures from the National Land Agency (ANT),[[93]](#footnote-94) the National Land Fund—the main tool for democratization and access to land for rural communities without or with insufficient land—has 1,402,068 hectares of a total of 3 million set as a target in point 1.1.1 of the Final Agreement. The ANT reports that 244,762 hectares have been awarded through the Fund to ethnic communities, benefiting 8,410 families, in addition to 247,021 hectares benefiting 10,032 families and 2,259 hectares for 1,173 peasant families and public law entities, of which 691 (58.90 percent) are women with titles granted in their name or shared with their partners.

The formalization of 2,233,867 hectares,[[94]](#footnote-95) of a total of 7 million set as the target,[[95]](#footnote-96) is also reported. This formalization is applied in favor of rural communities that physically owned the plots but did not have this relationship regularized through a registered legal title. These actions are allowing for progress in appropriate access to and use of the land in compliance with environmental sustainability, soil utilization, land‑use planning, and community participation criteria.

Despite significant progress, formalizing plots in favor of territorial entities continues to be a challenge, especially for rural schools and health centers. Formalizing them enables investment in construction, improvements, and/or equipment as well as the incorporation of these locations into the inventories of the Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of Health and Social Protection, guaranteeing the sustainability of public property and the rights exercised therein. The financial and security difficulties encountered in the social and environmental planning of rural property have led to a perception that there is little impact in land access and formalization for peasant and ethnic communities. In addition, environmental resources essential for the sustainability of communities in territories hardest hit by armed conflict and crime have been deteriorating rapidly.

As indicated in the Thirtieth Semiannual Report, challenges persist in confidently communicating to the communities and local authorities the execution timelines for program implementation and the stakeholders involved, the citizen participation and oversight scenarios, and the effectiveness in recognizing state actions and works as part of PDETs. Involving ethnic authorities and communities in the development and implementation of initiatives increases the perception of participation and facilitates the strengthening of GMs and MECs as well as communities’ social appropriation of PDETs, reaffirming their role as active and responsible participants in the governance of their territories.[[96]](#footnote-97)

The progress and coordination experience of PDETs and the implementation of 13 of the 16 national sectoral plans contained in the Final Agreement facilitate the coordinated execution of other commitments established in point 1 on the Integral Rural Reform, especially those related to institutional coverage of goods and services in non‑PDET municipalities. In this respect, steps must be taken to approve the three remaining plans, especially the Rural Property Mass Formalization Plan and the National Environmental Zoning Plan, which, together with the agrarian jurisdiction, continue to be vital strategic elements for overcoming the structural causes of armed conflict and the achievement of PDET objectives.[[97]](#footnote-98)

The effective participation in the PDET that ethnic and peasant communities demand is an opportunity to strengthen the exercise of citizenship and democracy in rural Colombia and transform the social unrest in territories hardest hit by armed conflict, especially relative to the activation of the 16 Special Transitory Electoral Districts for Peace in the Congress of the Republic, one for each PDET subregion.

* 1. **Illicit crop reduction strategies**

Colombia reported a 7‑percent decrease in the area sown with coca leaf crops in 2020.[[98]](#footnote-99) Nevertheless, the presence of illegal armed groups, their interest in controlling the drug trafficking chain, and the revival of the coca and derivatives market are maintaining the illicit crop dynamics, primarily in Antioquia, Caquetá, Guaviare, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca.

There are two other particular dynamics in connection with the presence of illicit crops. In Chocó, the area sown with coca crops in municipalities like Carmen del Darién, Medio Baudó, Riosucio, and Unguía is being expanded, despite the fact that this department is among those with the lowest illicit crop density. In Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), where coca crops are most widely sown, the reseeding of illicit crops is being facilitated by the emergence of a new variety of coca leaf called “*la pinocha*” [pine needle] due to its resistance to pesticides and herbicides used in crop eradication.[[99]](#footnote-100)

After four years of implementation of the National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS), 44,185 hectares of coca leaves have been voluntarily substituted in 14 departments and 56 municipalities.[[100]](#footnote-101) The program’s participatory bodies have resumed in‑person sessions[[101]](#footnote-102) in accordance with biosafety protocols, but village representatives view these as spaces for socialization, imposition, or accountability rather than coordination and participation. Moreover, the Bureau for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (DSCI) carried out actions with the PNIS beneficiary population located within the six national parks (PNN)[[102]](#footnote-103) to develop environmentally sustainable projects. One example of this was the signature of conservation agreements[[103]](#footnote-104) with 94 women beneficiaries of the program in protected areas of the municipality of El Retorno, Guaviare.

With regard to the Integral Plans for Substitution and Alternative Development (PISDA) in the eight PNIS municipalities not part of the PDET,[[104]](#footnote-105) the DSCI has deployed a strategy that links national, regional, and local actors with the aim of activating each of the development initiatives comprising this PNIS component. However, in Valle del Cauca, participatory PISDA spaces could not be developed in Bolívar, Dagua, and El Dovio due to the National Strike.

In Antioquia, Bolívar, Cauca, Córdoba, Meta, Norte de Santander,[[105]](#footnote-106) Putumayo, Valle del Cauca, and Vichada, the drafting of voluntary substitution proposals is making headway under the “Made to Order” model involving families that are not PNIS beneficiaries. In Nariño, joint work was carried out to design a model of this type based on the departmental “Root Agreements” strategy between the Office of the Governor, the DSCI, and the peasant and Afro‑descendent communities of the municipalities of El Charco, Cumbitara, El Rosario, Leiva, Policarpa, and Samaniego.

With regard to the “Plan to Coordinate Security Actions for Leadership in Support of Voluntary Illicit Crop Substitution Models,” the Council for Stabilization and Consolidation, in coordination with the DSCI, proceeded to develop support protocols[[106]](#footnote-107) for a coordinated institutional response to violations against voluntary substitution beneficiaries and leaders and to strengthen the prevention and protection capacities of DSCI territorial offices.

The implementation of voluntary substitution models, including the PNIS, continues to be a risk factor for the safety of communities, the leaders who promote them, and the beneficiary population, subjected to forced displacement, threats, and homicides in Antioquia, Cauca, Córdoba, Meta, Nariño, and Putumayo. The Mission noted three homicides among the PNIS beneficiary population in the municipalities of Tarazá and Cáceres in the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia and in Tierralta, Córdoba, as well as restrictions imposed by illegal armed groups on the DSCI and technical assistance operators for entering the municipalities of Anorí and Ituango in Antioquia, Puerto Concordia, Mesetas, and Uribe in Meta and in Putumayo.

The eradication strategy advanced by government forces is still the National Government’s main tool for reducing illicit crops. In the first half of 2021, institutions reported the eradication of 37,800 hectares of coca leaf crops in 176 municipalities across 20 departments,[[107]](#footnote-108) more than 61 percent of which are concentrated in Putumayo, Nariño, and Bolívar.

In Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Putumayo, social mobilizations took place as a result of communities’ opposition to forced eradication and strategies for a transition to legal economies. In most cases, communities focused their efforts on halting forced eradication campaigns in situ. Social tensions escalated to the point of public order disturbances between the civilian population and government forces or Mobile Eradication Groups. For example, in the municipalities of Anorí, Cáceres, and El Bagre in Antioquia, altercations between communities and troops led to the suspension of forced eradication operations as a rapid response to de‑escalate the conflict.[[108]](#footnote-109)

In Nariño, talks with national, departmental, and municipal governments as part of the National Strike focused on communities’ demand for alternatives to the manual or chemical destruction of coca leaf crops.[[109]](#footnote-110) Moreover, ethnic communities are demanding consultations prior to the implementation of forced eradication strategies in their territories.[[110]](#footnote-111)

Illegal armed groups are financing the production of illicit crops, taking advantage of the complex economic situation arising from the public health emergency caused by COVID‑19. In the Cordillera region of Nariño, the dissident or residual FARC‑EP Comando Coordinador de Occidente group has offered the population up to Col$30 million to keep planting coca leaf crops. The situation is similar with the ELN and the dissident or residual FARC‑EP groups in the municipalities of Tibú and Sardinata in Norte de Santander. This strategy has involved greater social control of communities by illegal armed groups through their demands that the money granted be returned, increasing the risk for the population.

* 1. **Victims and Land Restitution Law[[111]](#footnote-112)**

The isolation measures implemented to reduce the spread of COVID‑19 made income generation difficult, affecting food security, especially among populations that are victims of armed conflict. For community leaders in particular, this restricted their scope of action and reduced knowledge of the dynamics in their territories and their effects on the local public agenda.

For OACs, community activism is a driving factor for social integration, personal autonomy, identity, and dignity and, consequently, citizenship building. Community leaders did not identify clear prioritization criteria for victims in the measures taken in connection with the public health emergency. Risks to and victimizations of community members continued as well during the pandemic. In 2020, there were reports[[112]](#footnote-113) of 154 threats,[[113]](#footnote-114) 44 homicides, and 29 incidents of persecution and stigmatization.[[114]](#footnote-115)

In the face of collective reparation, OACs reactivated the process, proceeding with the development of their Collective Reparation Plan by appointing a drafting committee and identifying potential reparation actions. However, the persistence of the armed conflict and the dynamics of crime are an obstacle to collective reparation and guarantees of non‑repetition. In that respect, institutions must continue to provide a timely and appropriate response to reduce these conditions and provide prompt support with a view to building a relationship of trust with citizens.

As for land restitution, 46 new areas located in 42 municipalities were microtargeted.[[115]](#footnote-116) One reason behind this achievement was the coordination with PDETs, giving territories that could not be reached during the initial 10‑year term the necessary backing for security conditions and guarantees for their return. This increases trust in institutions and opens the administrative process to more claimants.

Despite the above, the exacerbation of the armed conflict and the dynamics of crime as well as new victimizations of the civilian population, including against land restitution applicants, are the main barrier to ethnic and peasant communities’ access to rights derived from restitution, as is the case in the departments of Meta, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca and in the Catatumbo region. This is due to not only the suspension of administrative and judicial proceedings, which delays the process and final decision making, but also the impact on claimants’ willingness to return to the plots that had been taken away from them or that they were forced to abandon.

Changes in security conditions in the territories initially considered suitable for restitution have shown that, despite their microtargeting and the start of the process, sometimes there is no guarantee of the stability required for an effective return, the usufruct of the restituted properties, and guarantees of non‑repetition. This situation became evident in Mesetas (Meta), where in late May families and institutions reported the disappearance of two applicants, a Land Restitution Unit collaborator, and a driver, who were involved in the administrative due diligence process for the plot sought in restitution. More than a month later, their bodies were found along the boundary of the municipalities of Uribe and Mesetas.

Claimants in various territories state that they prefer compensation out of fear of returning, and some judicial offices have reported an increase in judicial decisions in this regard, which is a financial challenge in light of the need for more resources for monetary compensation or a larger number of properties suitable for equivalent restitution.[[116]](#footnote-117)

With regard to the ethnic route for the restitution of territorial rights, although judicial offices have been prompt in dealing with the requests for precautionary measures that have been filed, these have been insufficient to mitigate the impact of the public health emergency caused by COVID‑19 and the presence and actions of illegal armed groups, particularly in the indigenous and Afro‑descendent communities of the departments of Chocó, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño and the Catatumbo region, areas in which violations and risks in connection with territorial disputes with these groups persist.

In the northern parts of Urabá, Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, Norte de Santander, and Nariño, there is a high negative impact on security that has hampered land restitution processes. This has restricted field trips and consequently limited progress in receiving and processing land restitution applications, while making new microtargeting to expand the coverage of the restitution process impossible. The land restitution process is also affected by suspected mine areas in the departments of Antioquia, Chocó, Cauca, Guaviare, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca.

In addition to the above, the promotion of restitution of territorial rights continues to be a challenge not only because of the small number of final decisions made, but also due to the low rate of implementation of such decisions. Of the 19 ethnic judgments resolved,[[117]](#footnote-118) none have been fully implemented, a situation that has become worse during the pandemic since entities have experienced financial or logistical difficulties in traveling to ethnic territories and carrying out activities to comply with the orders.

* 1. **Strategic Zones for Comprehensive Intervention (ZEII) or “Future Zones”**

The ZEII strategy moved forward with the interinstitutional coordination of actions to build and adapt health and education infrastructure and with the development of community strengthening campaigns in the municipalities of Bojayá, in Chocó, Tumaco, in Nariño, and San José del Guaviare, in Guaviare, as well as with the preparation of projects to be developed in these same areas in Arauca.

In the Pacific region of Nariño, the infrastructure work through the ZEII comprising the new binational corridor[[118]](#footnote-119) on the La Espriella–Río Mataje route was accelerated and delivered. This will boost trade between Colombia and Ecuador, moving the regional transformation forward and generating enhanced economic opportunities for these communities.

The strategy’s Executive Committee designated new financial resources, estimated at Col$194.5 million, for the implementation of Immediate Response Plans in each ZEII. These actions help to meet the health, education, connectivity, and other needs of these territories and contribute to the consolidation of the institutional offering and the guarantee of public protection measures.

In relation to water, biodiversity, and environmental protection actions, the National Government reported the recovery of approximately 14,535 hectares of national parks, which includes the Chiribiquete ZEII and nearby parks,[[119]](#footnote-120) as part of Operation Artemis. Nevertheless, such actions cause social tensions between communities, government forces, and environmental authorities in Caquetá, Meta, and Guaviare. The main challenge in recovering forest reserve areas is deforestation due to extensive livestock farming, illicit crop growing, and the construction of illegal roads within national parks.

Government forces have launched operations in the Bajo Cauca region and in Chocó to offset the damage to water sources caused by the illicit exploitation of mining deposits.[[120]](#footnote-121) However, challenges persist with river pollution caused by the dumping of residues from illegal mining, a situation that continues to impact the socioeconomic activities of riverside communities.

Local and Rural Justice Models were developed in 42 PDET territories[[121]](#footnote-122) to coordinate and enhance access to justice and the justice response at the territorial level. The hope is that they will be expanded to 845 municipalities across the country. The Ministry of Justice and Law also implemented actions to restart equity conciliation (*conciliación en equidad*) in 16 municipalities, 14 of which are given priority under the strategy.[[122]](#footnote-123) This process involved the execution of the first two of four phases, namely conflict assessment and conciliator awareness, coordination, and appointment.

The allocation of technical and financial resources under the PDET acceleration component produced initial results, such as the creation of Municipal Land Offices, the formalization of public law entities where goods and services are presented, the update of land‑use planning tools, the establishment of the multipurpose cadaster, and other initiatives included in pillar 1 on the Integral Rural Reform.

Some challenges remain in implementing the strategies in the territories, such as the need to strengthen community participation mechanisms, overcome the perception of militarization, mitigate acts of violence committed by illegal armed groups,[[123]](#footnote-124) and increase the presence of Technical Investigation Corps and Criminal Investigation Section personnel to enhance investigation and prosecution[[124]](#footnote-125) as part of actions aimed at dismantling criminal organizations.

**7. WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP IN THE GENDER AND PEACE AGENDA**

National, departmental, and municipal governments have promoted actions to structure and revive the Public Policies on Women and Gender in some of the areas of greatest conflict in the country.[[125]](#footnote-126) The PDET also supported this revival in some regions, especially through initiatives associated with Women’s Homes, Women’s Advisory Councils, and strategies to prevent, address, and punish GBV.

The Special Body on Women of the CSIVI,[[126]](#footnote-127) as a mechanism for participation, is one of the world’s most recognized achievements in transitional justice, and its renewal has revived the debate on the progress and challenges of the gender and peace agenda. After a year‑long postponement due to the impacts of the public health emergency caused by COVID‑19, the process moved forward with meetings to elect the new women that would represent this body.[[127]](#footnote-128) These meetings could take place despite the various difficulties encountered as a result of the pandemic, the National Strike, and the complex security conditions in the territories. Derly Pastrana, a well‑known Huila leader nominated as part of the renewal of this body, was killed in the context of such security conditions.

As stated in section 2.2.4, the dynamics of armed conflict and crime, as well as the direct socioeconomic effects of the pandemic on women,[[128]](#footnote-129) have increased the extraordinary gender risk[[129]](#footnote-130) for women in performing a leadership role. This means that, in some territories in the Catatumbo, Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, and Magdalena Medio regions and the departments of Putumayo, Cauca, and Chocó, women leaders and rights defenders are at the mercy of social control by illegal armed groups, becoming victims of persecution in their forms of mobilization and organization and of political violence. In addition, the predominance of virtual communications in state actions leads women leaders to perceive the institutional response to comprehensive security guarantees to be ineffective, slow, and detached from their own reality.

The suspension of the integration of the gender focus into the CNGS[[130]](#footnote-131) and into the SISEP[[131]](#footnote-132) affects the design and implementation of public policies to mitigate the effects of violence against women in the fulfillment of their leadership responsibilities. In that respect, actions should be taken to integrate them and, in turn, accelerate the implementation of the Comprehensive Program of Guarantees for Women Leaders (PIG‑Mujeres) in Antioquia, Norte de Santander, Cauca, and Chocó. National and local governments are also encouraged to step up their efforts to eliminate GBV, including violence against women in politics.

**8. COMPREHENSIVE TRUTH, JUSTICE, REPARATION, AND NON‑REPETITION SYSTEM (SIVJRNR)**

**8.1.** **Disappeared Persons Search Unit (UBPD)**

The UBPD, organizations, ethnic peoples, and state entities prioritized areas in which to intervene in the short and medium terms according to the established lines of extrajudicial investigation,[[132]](#footnote-133) managing to consolidate 16 Regional Search Plans.[[133]](#footnote-134) These plans are designed to by dynamic, interconnected processes that draw on data and accounts to locate disappeared persons. Owing to their collective and mass approach, breakthroughs in one case contribute to others.

The contributions of search organizations, through the submission of reports, search requests, or case documents, help to shed light on other events. The provision of information by the former FARC‑EP Secretariat in JEP Case 01 “Taking of hostages and severe deprivation of liberty” is in addition to the contributions from people who played a direct or indirect part in the hostilities. The sheer estimated number of disappeared persons requires an immense, resolute, swift, and proportionate contribution of information to reduce the uncertainty for their families.

The mandate of the UBPD is to fulfill the debt to the thousands of families that for decades have been searching for disappeared persons in connection with the armed conflict. Through the Unit, the Colombian State brings these victimizations to light and gives them humanitarian and extrajudicial priority, considering the needs and expectations of the searching families and making the victims the central focus, as set forth in the Final Agreement. Through coordinated actions with the JEP, precautionary measures have been advised in places where the search for disappeared persons is to be undertaken,[[134]](#footnote-135) urging the SIVJRNR to make joint contributions for peace in favor of victims’ rights.

The UBPD developed actions for territorial rollout and dissemination in the territories through community radio stations, timeline creation, information gathering, mandate visibility campaigns, awareness in schools, and training for civil society, the judicial sector, and government forces, among others. This work is also aimed at establishing trust in communities in order to access cases and is complemented by the coordination of competent institutions.

The Unit is tasked with positioning the recognition of disappeared persons locally and nationally and conducting searches, something that involves society as a whole. In this context, it spearheaded the signature of eight Regional Pacts,[[135]](#footnote-136) an expression of the local, national, and international political will on the matter, calling for a coordinated institutional response and reaffirming the importance of intervention by the search organizations as a contribution to guaranteed participation and victims’ rights to truth and reparation. The Mission supports these spaces and actively promotes the inclusion of searches in local and national public agendas.

Society as a whole and the State must coordinate efforts in searching for disappeared persons, guarantee information mechanisms, expedite responses that alleviate the uncertainty for those searching, and advocate for putting a stop to the disappearances under guarantees of non‑repetition, particularly in a context impacted by the COVID‑19 pandemic and social mobilizations,[[136]](#footnote-137) where risk scenarios persist for social leaders. What must be determined to this end is how many persons have disappeared and where they are located.

**8.2. Commission for Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition (CEV)**

As part of transitional justice, knowing what happened not only contributes to the reparation to victims, but also raises awareness, based on memory, of the importance of coexistence and non‑repetition, thus fostering the reconciliation process. With that in mind, the CEV took action in its third year to listen to the different actors in an inclusive manner, aiming to reveal the findings to Colombian society through a Final Report.[[137]](#footnote-138) This report faces various challenges, however, such as maintaining its relevance for multiple sectors and actors, not worsening the country’s polarization but instead eliciting a willingness to understand and appropriate it, reaching the entire national territory, being an active part of the country’s history and its collective construction, bringing dignity to the victims and recognizing them as political subjects, and helping to consolidate social dialogue as a central tool in peacebuilding.

In addition, the recommendations made by the CEV in the Final Report will have to be widely disseminated among the Colombian public so that their implementation can be monitored and incorporated into the public agenda to account for the effective institutional, cultural, political, and social transformation sought in transitional justice.

The progress made by the CEV includes building closer ties with and listening to segments of Colombian society, such as the business sector, that are not always identified as key players in describing what happened and contributing to non‑repetition. During the mandate’s development, the Commission conducted a total of 13,449 interviews and listened to 24,887 individuals in various individual and collective settings across the country[[138]](#footnote-139) and abroad and promoted more than 30 acknowledgments of (public and private) responsibility.[[139]](#footnote-140)

The CEV carried out territorial and national actions to help combat the normalization of violence and widespread indifference through various listening spaces in Meta, Nariño, Cauca, and Guaviare, acknowledgments in Cauca and Valle del Cauca, and dialogue on non‑repetition with victims, the parties responsible, and witnesses from all sectors.

The GS/OAS renews the commitment to peace through the construction of truth and recognizes the Commission’s crucial contribution through the Legacy, which is why it will support the appropriation and monitoring of the Final Report and its recommendations and will continue to uphold victims’ right to be heard by the entity, access that was limited as a result of the public health emergency. It therefore welcomes the extension of its mandate until August 27, 2022.[[140]](#footnote-141) Lastly, State institutions are encouraged to support the SIVJRNR through the Commission and its Legacy, as the sustainability of the proposal in terms of its appropriation requires a collective effort to find out the truth as a condition for transformation.

**8.3. Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP)**

To guarantee the effective participation of victims and given the difficulties caused by the public health emergency, the JEP decided to definitively extend the report submission deadline for victim, ethnic, and human rights organizations until March 21, 2022. This decision is expected to encourage participation in macrocases that have been given priority, especially in those with a low validation rate to date, as in Case No. 07 “Recruitment and use of children in armed conflict.”

As a measure, the jurisdiction decided to implement a plan identifying organizations that, despite willing to participate in the preparation of such reports, have been unable to do so. This would seek to guide and strengthen communities’ capacities when submitting their reports.

It is also hoped that the presentation of new facts and their verification against reports submitted by civil society organizations, international agencies, and State institutions will prompt the opening of more macrocases and the launch of a process focused exclusively on sexual and gender‑based violence where the use of sexual violence as a recurring practice in armed conflict and, in many cases, as a strategy to punish, terrorize, or destroy the civilian population is analyzed.

To support victim, ethnic, and human rights communities in filing reports, the MAPP/OAS has carried out approximately 17 initiatives for report building in Antioquia, Arauca, Bolívar, Cauca, Caquetá, Chocó, Córdoba, Guaviare, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Putumayo. Such is the case of Mujeres del Plantón, which presented their case before the JEP Chamber for Recognition on July 8. In a similar vein, the “Communities on the Road to Justice” project was launched with support from the Government of Germany to provide technical and logistical assistance with the preparation and submission to the JEP of eight reports by indigenous communities and victim and women’s organizations.

Despite the measures put in place, challenges remain in the organizational processes involved in report building, which requires significant financial support. Moreover, the security conditions discourage victims from participating in the process, especially in regions where residual or dissident FARC‑EP armed groups have expanded their presence and see report building as a threat to their criminal activity, as is the case in Chocó, Cauca, and Meta, in the Pacific region of Nariño, and in the Catatumbo region.

With regard to Case 001 “Illegal detention of persons by FARC‑EP groups,” the Chamber for Recognition issued Order 19 of 2021, which establishes the criminal responsibility of the members of the Secretariat of the former FARC‑EP guerrilla as direct perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity as well as their command responsibility for failing to control the commission of crimes by their subordinates. With this decision, the Chamber offers those appearing before it the opportunity to accept responsibility for the actions attributed to them and allows victims to bring forth evidence regarding the case.

As part of the central focus on victims, it is important to step up strategies fostering their participation in judicial scenarios by setting up more side‑by‑side rooms[[141]](#footnote-142) for testimonies and other proceedings, particularly during recognition hearings. For sentencing, the Recognition Section will have to enlist victims and communities and build closer ties with them in order to avoid multiple interpretations of what the appropriate penalties should be.

In May, the JEP launched a protocol for building relationships with black, Afro‑descendent, and Raizal peoples, which is the Colombian State’s first legally binding instrument for intercultural dialogue and inter-justice coordination with these peoples. The Investigation and Accusation Unit also strengthened the ethnic differential focus through interjurisdictional coordination with the Wounan, Wayuu, Palenquero, and Afro peoples to produce an ethnically relevant judicial investigation manual with coordination components. Nevertheless, it is important for the Jurisdiction to consider opening a macro-case to investigate the negative impacts on ethnic peoples as a result of the armed conflict.

**9. JUSTICE AND PEACE**

Since arriving in Colombia, the MAPP/OAS has guided and monitored the implementation of various transitional justice mechanisms seeking to guarantee victims’ rights in the framework of peacebuilding. To date, the implementation of Law 975 of 2005 (Justice and Peace) continues to be a relevant component and, at the same time, a precedent for achieving the consolidation of a comprehensive transitional justice framework aiming to construct memory and truth, obtain justice and reparation, and guarantee participation and non‑repetition.

Sixteen years after the adoption of the Justice and Peace Law, institutional support for the process has decreased, even though approximately 400,000 victims are still hoping for a judicial response under that law and a large number of applicants willing to reintegrate into society remain.

Through its measures, Law 1592 of 2012[[142]](#footnote-143) provided for the prioritization of cases and the identification of macro criminal patterns for investigation and prosecution, which were expected to lead to greater effectiveness in clarifying the events that had occurred. The Ministry of Justice and Law, together with entities such as the FGN and the Superior Judicial Council, have made significant efforts to build judges’ and prosecutors’ capacities with the aim of removing bottlenecks in justice and peace proceedings. Despite this, jurisdictional tribunals, magistrates with a guarantee control function, and courts responsible for sentence enforcement are currently overwhelmed with cases without a sufficient capacity to handle them because each office has only two professionals.

There is an obligation for interinstitutional coordination[[143]](#footnote-144) that facilitates broad victim participation in voluntary testimony (*versión libre*) proceedings and court hearings, including comprehensive repatriation,[[144]](#footnote-145) which, despite being the climactic moment of participation, in practice provides victims with very little access and does not fulfill the purpose for which it was created. Moreover, the constant changes in prosecutors who leave to go to other prosecutors’ offices are slowing down the judicial proceedings, the testimonies are thematically repetitive, and, in many cases, the investigative verification procedures are duplicated.

In this scenario, the special justice and peace judicial process would take about 32 more years[[145]](#footnote-146) before the last hearing to verify compliance with the ruling could be held. Ordinary justice as a possible solution to this problem is not a viable alternative because of the risk of impunity and because it would involve a learning curve in terms of international crimes. Any delays violate due process and directly affect victims and applicants, while victims do not see their comprehensive reparation expectations met and applicants become bogged down in judicial proceedings that have negatively impacted their life toward reintegration.[[146]](#footnote-147)

This is in addition to the difficult security context faced by demobilized former combatants from the United Self‑Defense Forces of Colombia. According to institutional figures, over 4,600 have been killed[[147]](#footnote-148) as a result of violence since 2004. In some cases, there are indications that the killings are connected to voluntary testimonies, such as in the case of Danilo José Hernández “El Indio,” who was killed in May 2021 in Valledupar, Cesar. Through the MAPP/OAS, the GS/OAS is helping to generate regional spaces to mitigate the procedural and physical risks, while at the same time giving victims a more central focus.

**10. RECOMMENDATIONS**

**10.1 To the Ministry of National Defense**

*10.1.1.* Continue to take actions to prevent the emergence, reconfiguration, regrouping, expansion, and territorial consolidation of illegal armed groups with the aim of mitigating the impacts of their actions on the civilian population, with a special observance of human rights and international humanitarian law, which helps to guarantee safe conditions and strengthen peacebuilding in the territories.

* + 1. Guarantee the security of territories that have not been microtargeted and the stability of those that have, building up state presence to ensure effective returns, community trust, and the sustainability of the land and territory restitution policy.

**10.2. To the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace**

Continue actions to build sustainability in mine risk education, primarily in places that receive displaced populations or are affected by disputes between illegal armed groups in order to increase the adoption of safe behaviors in communities considering the gender, age, and ethnic focus.

**10.3. To the Ministry of the Interior**

* + 1. Strengthen Communal Security Roundtables through the implementation of action and monitoring plans so that they are spaces for dialogue and consultation on security between community leaders and institutions.
		2. Proceed with the issuance of the regulatory decree for Special Transitory Electoral Districts for Peace, which guarantees a transparent, broad, and inclusive electoral process.
		3. In coordination with the Presidential Council for Youth and with ICBF support, strengthen the civic and political capacities of youth to guarantee their full participation in Territorial Youth Council elections, supporting the various candidates with a particular focus on gender and preparing the electorate in the different territories with an emphasis on rural regions.

**10.4. To the Ministry of the Interior, the Presidential Council for Human Rights, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Defense**

Move ahead with the consolidation of protection mechanisms that help offset the risk scenarios faced by indigenous authorities and their communities by formalizing the Collective Protection Decree for Indigenous Peoples developed with the National Commission on the Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In addition, with the support of the Delegate for Ethnic Affairs of the Office of the Ombudsperson, provide indigenous authorities with ongoing support to protect institutions and own processes.

**10.5. To the Ministry of Justice and** **Law**

Optimize the Interinstitutional Justice and Peace Committee to find a comprehensive solution in order to expedite the process as well as the legal and physical guarantee of the parties involved.

**10.6. To the Ministry of Justice and Law, the Superior Judicial Council, and the Office of the Attorney General**

Assess the appropriateness, by territory, of setting up primarily virtual judicial services, bearing in mind the municipality’s electrical and telecommunications capacity. Otherwise, continue and strengthen the provision of justice services in person, especially in prosecutor’s offices and courts. Also, address and respond judicially to family and gender‑based violence to improve the perception of impunity and build a better relationship of trust with victims.

**10.7. To the Ministry of Justice and Law, the Superior Judicial Council, and the Office of the Attorney General**

Enhance interinstitutional coordination to strengthen justice at the local level with the aim of making more progress in the implementation of Strategic Plans for Comprehensive Intervention (PEII).

**10.8. To the Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation**

Consider setting up more “halfway houses” for PPRs and their families facing an imminent risk to their safety and continue with air extractions supported by government forces.

**10.9. To the Presidential Council for Human Rights and International Affairs and CIPRUNNA**

Strengthen the “Join for Me – Environments for Protecting Children and Adolescents” strategy by: (i) coordinating with ethnic authorities for the prevention and protection of indigenous and Afro‑descendent children and adolescents; (ii) creating youth platforms and programs that increase their participation in prevention and protection decisions; and (iii) build trust in the institutions to encourage reporting of violation cases involving children, adolescents, and young people.

**10.10. To the Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation, the Presidential Council for Women’s Equity, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, the Ministry of the Interior, the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the Ombudsperson, and the Office of the Procurator General**

Step up efforts to move fully forward with: (i) PIG‑Mujeres;[[148]](#footnote-149) (ii) the Dismantling Policy with a gender focus as part of the CNGS; (iii) Comprehensive Guarantees for the Exercise of Politics with a gender focus as part of the SISEP; and (iv) the design and implementation of PMI gender indicators, especially those related to security and non‑repetition guarantees. The purpose of the above is to mitigate and offset the differential and disproportionate impacts of armed conflict on women and young and adolescent girls.

**10.11. To the Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation and the Presidential Council for Women’s Equity**

Provide greater guarantees for the exercise of the Special Body on Women of the CSIVI by designing and implementing an operational architecture and territorialized policy linking departmental and municipal authorities in respect of gender and peace governance, thus enabling the Body’s action plan and its local representation. Moreover, apply the principle of equality so that this mechanism has the guarantees that have been granted to other victim and/or civil society participation arrangements in the context of peacebuilding.

**10.12. To the Territorial Renewal Agency**

*10.12.1.* In coordination with the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry of the Interior, promote and strengthen the organizational capacities of rural communities, citizen participation, and PDET oversight, especially with GM delegates and Special Consultation Mechanisms as well as other active social leaders responsible for the governance of their territories. The foregoing will make it possible to process the participation claims surrounding PDET implementation and to reinforce the positioning of initiatives in the local policy, the appropriation, management, and social control of resources, and the sustainability of projects that give rise to the structural transformation and close the gaps for rural Colombia.

*10.12.2.* Through the Bureau for the Substitution of Illicit Crops, implement voluntary substitution models with an ethnic and territorial differential focus in areas not prioritized for the PNIS or where forced eradication has encountered obstacles to implementation with a view to reducing the threat of expansion of coca crops in environmentally protected areas, such as national parks, forest reserve zones, indigenous reserves, and black community territories.

* 1. **To the Superior Judicial Council**

Allocate more financial and human resources to strengthen the capacity of justice and peace offices with a view to promoting and accelerating investigation and prosecution.

* 1. **To the Office of the Attorney General**

Open a special line of investigation for threats and attacks on indigenous authorities, as these cases seem to follow specific patterns that differ from the negative impacts on other population groups. It may be useful to study the factual assumptions and criminogenic factors identified in this report for the purpose of the aforementioned investigations.

* 1. **To the Office of the Attorney General, the Superior Judicial Council, and the Office of the Procurator General**

*10.15.1.* Continue to promote investigation and prosecution in connection with social protests, ensuring that protest participants are not stigmatized and that due process takes place in the criminal punishment of the people arrested during the acts of violence perpetrated.

*10.15.2.* Intensify the investigation, prosecution, and timely punishment of: (i) homicides of public servants and civilians; (ii) sexual violence, as that occurring in the cities of Popayán and Bogotá; (iii) assaults by armed civilians on demonstrators and indigenous peoples in the southern part of the city of Cali; (iv) threats against 30 social leaders, strike spokespeople, and public servants; (v) violent attacks on humanitarian commissions; (vi) those responsible for the detention and assault of eight National Police members in Palmira; (vii) the destruction of the Palace of Justice of Tuluá; and (viii) the damage caused to merchants due to the looting and destruction of their businesses.

* 1. **To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

Continue to strengthen and coordinate actions aimed at serving the migrant population, especially women, children and adolescents, and binational indigenous communities in a state of vulnerability and promote their economic and social integration. Also, maintain contingency plans with neighboring countries and dialogue spaces in the region to address the humanitarian crises of migrants.

* 1. **To the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP)**

*10.17.1.* Consult with institution, civil society organizations, and other agencies regarding the possibility of providing economic and technical support for the preparation and submission of reports by those organizations that have had difficulties doing so. In addition, guarantee their participation taking account of the current risks in the territories heavily influenced by illegal armed groups.

*10.17.2.* At the JEP Chamber for Recognition, explore the possibility of opening a new macro-case focused specifically on acts of sexual and gender‑based violence as well as others to investigate violations against ethnic peoples committed during the armed conflict.

* 1. **To the Disappeared Persons Search Unit (UBPD)**

Strengthen awareness‑raising strategies, especially among the former combatant population, to increase its contribution to locating disappeared persons.

* 1. **To the Commission on Truth, Coexistence, and Non‑Repetition**

*10.19.1.* Carry out preliminary work with the network of partners[[149]](#footnote-150) and the Working Groups for the Effective Participation of Victims to publicize the objective, content, and scope of the Final Report in order to consider its use in strategic spaces and to have it serve as a guide and tool for non‑repetition.

*10.19.2.* Take actions that contribute to the appropriation of the Final Report and its legacy by the UBPD and the JEP for progress in the comprehensive guarantee of victims’ rights.

**LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE REPORT**

ACIN - Association of Indigenous Municipal Councils of Norte del Cauca

AETCR ‑ Former Territorial Spaces for Training and Reincorporation

AGC ‑ Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia

AICMA ‑ Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines

APM ‑ Antipersonnel mines

ART ‑ Territorial Renewal Agency

CEDISCO ‑ Center for Social Dialogue and Coexistence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace

CEP - Police Elite Corps

CEV ‑ Commission on Truth, Coexistence, and Non‑Repetition

CIPRAT ‑ Interinstitutional Commission for Rapid Response to Early Warnings

CIPRUNNA ‑ Intersectoral Commission to Prevent the Recruitment and Use of and Sexual Violence against Children and Adolescents by Illegal Armed Groups and Organized Crime Groups

CNGS ‑ National Commission on Security Guarantees

CSIVI ‑ Commission for Monitoring, Impetus, and Verification of Implementation

DSCI ‑ Bureau for the Substitution of Illicit Crops

ELN ‑ National Liberation Army

EPL ‑ People’s Liberation Army

ERM ‑ Education on Risks of Antipersonnel Mines

ETPMV ‑ Temporary Protected Status for Venezuelan Migrants

FARC - Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

FARC‑EP ‑ Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People’s Army

FGN ‑ Office of the Attorney General

FOS ‑ Frente Oliver Sinisterra

GAI ‑ Illegal armed groups

GBV ‑ Gender‑based violence

GM ‑ Impetus Group

HRU ‑ Single Roadmap

IACHR ‑ Inter‑American Commission on Human Rights

ICBF ‑ Colombian Family Welfare Institute

IED ‑ Improved explosive devices

JAC ‑ Community Action Council

JEI ‑ Special Indigenous Jurisdiction

JEP ‑ Special Jurisdiction for Peace

MAPP/OAS - Mission in Support of the Peace Process in Colombia of the Organization of American States

MEC ‑ Special Consultation Mechanisms

NNA ‑ Children and adolescents

OAC ‑ Community Action Entities

OACP ‑ Office of the High Commissioner for Peace

OCAD‑Paz ‑ Collegial Entity for Administration and Decision

PDD ‑ Disappeared persons

PDET ‑ Rural Development Programs

PECIG ‑ Environmental Management Plan of the Program for Eradication of Illicit Crops Using the Herbicide Glyphosate

PGN ‑ Office of the Procurator General

PIG‑Mujeres ‑ Comprehensive Program of Guarantees for Women Leaders and Women Human Rights Defenders

PISDA ‑ Integral Plans for Substitution and Alternative Development

PMU ‑ Unified Command Post

PNIS ‑ National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops

PPR ‑ Persons in the process of reincorporation

PNN ‑ National parks

PRI ‑ Immediate Response Plan

REDPHANA ‑ Human Rights Network of the Pacific Region of Nariño

SAT ‑ Early Warning System

SIEDCO ‑ National Police Statistical, Delinquency, Offenses, and Operations Information System

SISEP ‑ Integral System for Security in the Exercise of Politics

SIVJRNR ‑ Comprehensive Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non‑Repetition System

UBPD ‑ Disappeared Persons Search Unit

UNIPA ‑ Indigenous Unit of the Awá People

UXO ‑ Unexploded ordnance

ZEII ‑ Strategic Zone for Comprehensive Intervention

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1. . The mandate of the MAPP/OAS derives from the agreement entered into by the Government of Colombia and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States on January 23, 2004, as well as from Permanent Council resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04), adopted on February 6, 2004. The mandate has been broadened and renewed eight times, with the most recent renewal extending until January 24, 2025. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. . Conducted through videoconferences, telephone calls, and e-mail, among other means, to maintain smooth communication with community leaders, civil society representatives, and local institutions. This provided timely, real-time information on topics related to the MAPP/OAS mandate. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. . “Secondment” is a system whereby a country assigns one of its nationals to perform a job for a specific period of time. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. . Advances are noted in health care and education and in interinstitutional coordination to improve the offering to former combatants, which translate into positive satisfaction indices. Despite this, progress must be made in policy based on lessons learned from previous processes to achieve greater participant (former combatant) attachment to programs. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. . The Legacy is a strategy consisting of three components: the network of partners from organizations of civil society entities, institutions, sectors, and international organizations; the Final Report, which is the narrative document relating the conflict and the persistence factors in terms of non-repetition and coexistence; and transmedia storytelling, which are digital initiatives that will support and maximize knowledge and appropriation of the Final Report. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. . This report will refer to illegal armed groups with the following names, which combine government decisions and the way they are recognized in the territories: National Liberation Army (ELN), dissident or residual FARC-EP groups, People’s Liberation Army or Los Pelusos (EPL/Pelusos), Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia or Clan del Golfo (AGC/Clan del Golfo), Bloque Virgilio Peralta Arenas, or Los Caparros. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. . In informal crossings or “*trochas*,” there are various rules governing behavior and control by illegal armed groups aimed at not only the transient population, but also baggage handlers, motorcycle taxi drivers, smugglers, and informants. When one of these rules is broken, punishment includes torture and cruel treatment, to the point of homicide. All illegal armed groups are involved in these practices. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. . This is the case with Save the Children, which on March 12, 2021, published a press release on its website stating that it had been a victim of security incidents in the municipality of Teorama (Norte de Santander). Available at: <https://savethechildren.org.co/save-the-children-colombia-suspende-operacion-en-teorama-y-convencion-norte-de-santander-debido-a-incidentes-de-seguridad/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. . In early July 2021, clashes erupted between the ELN and “Frente 37” on the boundaries between the municipalities of Montecristo and Santa Rosa del Sur, Bolívar. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. . In mid-July 2021, the ELN clashed with “Frente 33” in the rural area of the municipality of Convención (Norte de Santander). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. . This group is viewed as dissident or residual of “Frente 48.” In 2020, it took on the name “Comandos de la Frontera,” and a video circulating in March 2021 announced that it had joined “Segunda Marquetalia,” which is why it is currently known us “Comandos de la Frontera – Ejército Bolivariano.” [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. . It consists of firearm attacks on uniformed officers in small groups perpetrated by individuals acting alone. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. . As reported by the Ministry of National Defense to the MAPP/OAS, the number of killings of National Police members in Antioquia increased from zero in the first half of 2020 to seven in the first half of 2021. In the departments of Chocó and Córdoba, the number rose from zero in 2020 to two in 2021 during the first half of the year. Injuries in Antioquia were up from 15 cases in the first half of 2020 to 37 cases during the same period in 2021, whereas in the department of Chocó, the number of injured rose from zero in the first half of 2020 to three in 2021. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. . Three men known as “Milton,” “Sato,” and “Macho”—pegged as replacements for “Cóndor” and “Japonés” who had been arrested in 2020—were reportedly arrested in January, March, and June 2021, respectively. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. . Following the death of a man known as “Caín” during a National Army operation in November 2020, “El Evangélico” turned himself in to authorities in April 2021, whereas in May of that year, “Flechas” was killed during a joint National Police–National Army operation. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. . Negative impacts (*afectaciones*) are understood to be the violent or irregular actions, incidents, or conduct perpetrated in the context and on occasion of the Colombian armed conflict and the dynamics of criminal activity. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. . National Police Statistical, Delinquency, Offenses, and Operations Information System – SIEDCO. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. . Statistical data obtained by the MAPP/OAS from the SIEDCO database. Retrieved on August 10, 2021, from <https://www.policia.gov.co/grupo-informacion-criminalidad/estadistica-delictiva>. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. . In the Mayasquer (Cumbal) indigenous reserve (*resguardo indígena*), social control by the ELN has intensified through the implementation of mobility schedules, residence paper checks to enter the territory, and monitoring of cell and Internet use. There has also been an increase in social control of communities of the Barí indigenous peoples as well as a confrontation between GAOR 33 and the ELN in their collective territory. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. . The extortion of teachers who receive a monthly payroll payment is recurrent in areas where the majority of income sources are informal. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. . Between the municipalities of Tarazá and Valdivia, the ELN has been the main group responsible for setting fire to vehicles passing through the Troncal del Caribe (National Route 90). It is common for members of this illegal armed group to force passengers out of their vehicles and then set those vehicles on fire, leaving behind flags alluding to their organization. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. . This occurs not only in the region of Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), but also in many other parts of the country. Similarly, these groups coerce ethnic communities into providing assistance to, for example, members injured in fighting. This leads to retaliation by rivals, who accuse them of being alleged associates. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. . In January, a medical mission was sent to the community of Miácora, Alto Baudó, and was boarded on the river route presumably by members of the AGC/Clan del Golfo, who robbed the medical staff and prevented them from continuing their journey. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. . In the El Aserrío sector, a medical mission truck was robbed as well, presumably by the ELN, which mounted similar attacks on vehicles of international cooperation agencies and state institutions as part of its territorial control strategies in this sector and along the Teorama–Ocaña route. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. . Decree 2124 of December 18, 2017, of the Ministry of the Interior. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. . During the period from January to June 2021, CIPRAT held territorial follow-up workshops for the 12 early warnings issued. These sessions were held in person and were chaired by the Minister of the Interior or the Deputy Ministers of the portfolio, with the participation of the National Defense sector, the Ministry of the Interior, the National Protection Unit (UNP), governor’s or mayor’s offices, and other entities. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. . During the period from January to June 2021, the Ministry of the Interior provided technical assistance to 93 priority municipalities under the PDET to create the Territorial Rapid Response Body. In all, 13 in-person and 2 virtual sessions were held to this end. “Estrategia de asistencia técnica para la constitución de la instancia de respuesta rápida en municipios PDET priorizados, en el marco de las Alertas Tempranas” (CIPRAT, 2021), pp. 1–2. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. . Illegal armed groups tell communities to come to them with any problems or conflicts that need to be resolved. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. . In particular, the Presidential Council for Human Rights and International Affairs, the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF), the Ministry of National Education, and the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization as well as their implementing partners. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. . As reported by the ICBF to the MAPP/OAS, this strategy served 11,265 children and adolescents in the priority territories of 15 departments and strengthened protective environments for 2,242 families, 1,243 community actors, 629 education agents, and 515 territorial officials. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. . Intersectoral Commission to Prevent the Recruitment and Use of and Sexual Violence against Children and Adolescents by Illegal Armed Groups and Organized Crime Groups – CIPRUNNA – OFI21-00116338 / IDM 13050000 (2021). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. . A protective environment develops in a space free from any form of violence, abuse, or exploitation, where family and community members ensure that the rights and interests of children and adolescents are respected. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. . The Awá Inda Guacaray indigenous reserve and the Recuerdo de Nuestros Ancestros del Río Mejicano and Rescate Las Varas community councils of the municipalities of Tumaco and Barbacoas. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. Because these cases are not brought to the attention of any state entities. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. . In particular, 20,973 prevention activities were carried out in highly affected territories, with appropriation in six native languages. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. . As mentioned in the Thirtieth Semiannual Report, according to monitoring efforts, APM/UXO contamination by illegal armed groups in the territories is generally done (i) to delimit the territory they seek to control, (ii) to keep government forces from moving into zones where they exercise greater control, (iii) to create protective cordons for illicit crops in the face of forced eradication, and (iv) in confrontations with other illegal armed groups. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. . These dynamics also occur in Bajo Putumayo (Puerto Leguizamo), Valle del Cauca (Jamundí), and Antioquia (Caucasia and Tarazá) and along the Arauca (Arauquita) border. This contamination is usually carried out for the potential protection of encampments or to protect their withdrawal from combat with rival groups. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. . There have been warnings of greater APM contamination with the arrival of government forces to implement government strategies, as was the case in Samaniego, Nariño, with the municipality’s inclusion in the Future Zones program, and in Guaviare, as a practice to protect illicit crops. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. . Generic name used to describe accidents or incidents caused by APMs, IEDs, and UXO. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. . Those affected also include women, the peasant population, and Venezuelan migrants. There is concern as to the risk faced by indigenous communities in Bajo Cauca (Antioquia) and in Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), especially the Motilón-Barí indigenous peoples. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. . This is the name given to crops that meet some of the food needs of a given population, including maize, yucca, and plantain. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. . As reported by the Ministry of National Defense to the Mission, there was a considerable decrease in civilian injuries from APMs, but a significant increase in civilian injuries from UXO in the first half of 2021 compared to the same period in 2020. The number of reported deaths from explosive devices is on a slight downward trend compared to the first half of 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. . An undesirable event caused by an APM, IED, and UXO and resulting in physical and/or psychological harm to one or more persons. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. . Due to unfavorable security conditions, civilian operators have stopped continuing or developing humanitarian demining activities in San Andrés de Cuerquia and Cáceres (Antioquia), Miraflores (Guaviare), and La Macarena (Meta). [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. . The National Police Elite Corps has 14 commissions, 3 of which were created in 2021 to strengthen the criminal and situational analysis for timely police response in Chocó, Arauca, and the southern subregion of Bolívar. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. . Pursuant to Decree 098/2013 and its amendments, the presumption of extraordinary gender risk must be applied in cases of threats against women leaders and human rights defenders. This presumption therefore means that, where women turn to the authorities to request protection, the competent authority must assume that the requester does indeed face an extraordinary risk to her life, safety, and personal integrity and that such risk would result in acts of gender-based violence. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. . Coercive situations involving women and young and adolescent girls exist when, in a given territory, coercion and/or criminal restraint is reinforced through family and interpersonal, public and private, relationships that are stereotyped by gender roles and reinforced by subordination, discrimination, and GBV. Criminal power is strengthened by this type of unequal gender relationship, and the women and young and adolescent girls end up subjected to the criminal and macro-criminal actions of that structure. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. . During the period from January to June 2021, the group held 16 sessions (2 in person, 10 virtual, and 4 hybrid). [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. . A total of 264 individuals, 26 for the Former Territorial Spaces for Training and Reincorporation (AETCR), 32 for groups outside the AETCR, and 2 for headquarters. Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation, “Informe de seguridad y protección ex integrantes Farc.” January–June 2021. p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. . Of the 380 negative impacts on PPRs and their families from the date of signature of the Final Agreement until June 30, 2021, the FGN has reported 52.9-percent progress in investigations. Police Elite Corps Coordination Center, “Análisis táctico delictual, 7 de julio del 2021,” (CEP, 2021) p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. . Risk prevention and rights promotion measures have also focused on PPR family groups. For example, the ICBF has implemented rights promotion and risk prevention measures to care for boys, girls, adolescents, young people, and their families, in addition to moving ahead with administrative processes to restore rights in cases involving threats and violations. In the first half of 2021, over 2,000 minors were assisted by this entity. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
52. . *Ibid.* [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
53. . Some of the former FACR-EP members identified in the reincorporation process were involved in legal activities, while others had been linked to criminal activities run by illegal armed groups or criminal gangs. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
54. . For example, a PPR representative leader in Antioquia was kidnapped on January 23 by armed men while riding a motorcycle on the San Andrés de Cuerquia–Toledo route. On February 13, his body was found in a rural area. The motive behind this event was presumably the leader’s refusal to join the “Los Pachelly” criminal gang, which is why the group retaliated against him. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
55. . Law 2136 of August 4, 2021. Available at:

<https://dapre.presidencia.gov.co/normativa/normativa/LEY%202136%20DEL%204%20DE%20AGOSTO%20DE%202021.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
56. . Law 2135 of August 4, 2021. Available at:

<https://dapre.presidencia.gov.co/normativa/normativa/LEY%202135%20DEL%204%20DE%20AGOSTO%20DE%202021.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
57. . Such as the authorization of humanitarian corridors, easier money transfers, assistance through the Solidarity Income program, programs, and the coordination of measures in critical migration points such as Maicao, Villa del Rosario, and Ipiales. Presidency of the Republic, “Brief: Respuesta a fenómeno migratorio. Abril de 2021” (Desk for migration from Venezuela, 2021). [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
58. . Consulted at: <https://idm.presidencia.gov.co/prensa/mas-de-968000-personas-registrado-estatuto-temporal-proteccion-migrantes-210610>. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
59. . The Mission noted cases involving some migrants in irregular situations who were offering money to leaseholders, JAC members, or public servants in exchange for the issuance of a document to justify their stay in Colombia. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
60. . During this period, the Mission noted the steps taken toward interinstitutional coordination between the ICBF and Migración Colombia in the 25 pre-registration sessions, with the participation of 2,088 beneficiaries, and the development of the joint guidance circular and the information exchange agreement for the virtual pre-registration of institutionalized children, adolescents, and young people with the PARD or in the SRPA. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
61. . Following the issuance of Resolution 0667 of May 19, 2021, and Resolution 0746 of June 1, 2021. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
62. . This dynamic excludes communities that have received transcontinental migration flows from South America because they have revived their economies due to the purchasing power in dollars of this type of migration. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
63. . Contraband, informal trade, and informal labor continue to be the main obstacles to strengthening local border economies. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
64. . According to figures from the Mayor’s Office of Necoclí, Antioquia. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
65. . A rugged crossing with a high risk to physical safety, particularly for children, adolescents, and women. In addition, this is where illegal armed groups operate and are responsible for thefts, sexual violence, disappearances, and homicides involving the migrant population. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
66. . In the border area with Venezuela, victims of human trafficking are caught and locked away for months in order to be forced into various trades, most of them sexual in nature. In some cases, their families hand them over to traffickers in exchange for money. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
67. . The conscription of foreign children, adolescents, and young people as well as those who are binational indigenous from the Wayuu, Yukpa, and Motilón-Barí peoples into the illicit crop production chain, and the forced recruitment of children and adolescents in Venezuela and their subsequent transfer to Colombia. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
68. . In Leiva, Nariño, residual or dissident FARC-EP groups accused the Venezuelan population of cooperating with the AGC/Clan del Golfo, which resulted in mass displacement. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
69. . Law 270 of 1996 – Statute on the Administration of Justice, reformed on June 16 following the passing of Senate draft law 475 of 2021. It set the revenue budget and capital resources of the national treasury at a fixed 3 percent annually. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
70. . One of the regions that best exemplifies this situation is Alto and Medio Baudó in Chocó, where electrical connections and Internet access are scarce and intermittent, a situation that has made it difficult for the local prosecutor to connect to virtual hearings and has forced him to travel to urban centers such as Quibdó, Chocó, to hold these proceedings. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
71. . It is worth highlighting the role that indigenous authorities and guards have assumed in order to confront illegal armed groups and rescue forcibly recruited indigenous children and adolescents, as was the case in Juradó (Chocó) and Barbacoas (Nariño), and the own justice efforts with adults who have some sort of ties to armed groups, like in the communities of Chocó, Cauca, and Valle del Cauca, work that has led to threats and intimidation against them. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
72. . At the end of this report, the Mission took note of a pamphlet threatening the Association of Indigenous Municipal Councils of Norte del Cauca (ACIN) and the ORIVAC, including indigenous senator Feliciano Valencia. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
73. . It is important to note that in Antioquia, Cauca, Chocó, Córdoba, Nariño, and Norte de Santander, these actions against authorities have been accompanied by other attacks by illegal armed groups, in some cases including confinement, the use of APMs, crossfire, displacement, and forced recruitment. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
74. . According to the UNIPA, from March 2020 to August 2021, the Awá people experienced a total of 109 victimizing events: 29 threats, 2 extortions, 8 forced displacements, 6 disappearances, 8 crossfire situations, 44 homicides, 6 incidents of harassment, 4 confinements, and 4 APM/UXO events. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
75. . There has been an increase in resignations from management positions and a decrease in the development of activities. OAC members also report an increase in threats against their physical integrity and a generalized feeling of resignation, frustration, and fatigue. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
76. . In April, in addition to the existing social mobilization scenarios, there was a demonstration against the issuance of Decree 380 of 2021, which seeks to regulate the control of risks to health and the environment as part of the eradication of illicit crops through aerial spraying with glyphosate, and the draft Sustainable Solidarity Law tabled by the National Government in the Congress of the Republic. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
77. . Available at: https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/ObservacionesVisita\_CIDH\_Colombia\_ENG.pdf. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
78. . According to figures from the Presidential Council for Human Rights and International Affairs, 84 people of the 572 initially recorded were missing as of June 10, 2021. The Urgent Search Mechanism was still active with respect to these 84 cases in October 2021. There are also four formal complaints for alleged disappearance. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
79. . Presidential Council for Human Rights and International Affairs, Bulletin No. 32: Human Rights in the framework of the 2021 National Strike, p. 1.

<http://www.derechoshumanos.gov.co/Prensa/2021/Documents/250621-ESP-Infografia-DDHH-Paro-Nacional-2021.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
80. . INDEPAZ and TEMBLORES ONG, conflict observatory records, and DDHH de INDEPAZ and TEMBLORES ONG. <http://www.indepaz.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/3.-INFORME-VIOLENCIAS-EN-EL-MARCO-DEL-PARO-NACIONAL-2021.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
81. . National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC). *Informe Ejecutivo sobre el contexto y las afectaciones a los derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas dentro del Paro y Minga Nacional en Colombia*. p. 12. <https://www.onic.org.co/comunicados-onic/4304-informe-ejecutivo-sobre-el-contexto-y-las-afectaciones-a-los-derechos-de-los-pueblos-indigenas-dentro-del-paro-y-minga-nacional-en-colombia>. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
82. . Pursuant to the National Code of Citizen Coexistence and Security. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
83. . Colombian Ministry of the Interior, Decree 575 of May 28, 2021, whereby various governors and mayors were ordered to coordinate “military assistance” to “address and overcome the incidents that have led to grave disturbances to security and coexistence in the roadways of their jurisdictions.” However, the decree was temporarily suspended by the State Council until it could be established that it does not pose a potential risk to the exercise of social protest. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
84. . By the end of the visit, the IACHR had received a total of 2,908 requests to provide testimony, managing to collect at least 302 individual and collective testimonies while prioritizing representativeness and diversity. This involved listening to over 500 people. Available at:

<https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2021/167.asp>. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
85. . In the departments of Arauca, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
86. . As reported by the ICBF to the MAPP/OAS as of August 13, 2021. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
87. . Office of the Attorney General, “Consolidado de acciones judiciales realizadas y hechos conocidos por la entidad, en el marco del Puesto de Mando Unificado Judicial (PMU),” <https://twitter.com/FiscaliaCol/status/1404773347930542087/photo/1> (Accessed on June 15, 2021). [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
88. . Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Colombia, *Garantías a la manifestación pacífica y control de acciones violentas. Periodo 28 de abril a 4 de junio de 2021*, <https://www.policia.gov.co/sites/default/files/informe_sector_defensa_-_garantias_a_la_manifestacion_pacifica_y_control_de_acciones_violentas_-_28_de_abril_a_4_de_junio_de_2021_20210609_vf.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
89. . Three “Technical–Operational Guidelines for Participation by Indigenous Peoples and Black and Afro-Colombian Communities During the Implementation and Monitoring of the PDET Ethnic Component” were developed, bringing to 11 the number of guidelines produced since 2019, as many as there are subregions, namely: Sierra Nevada–Perijá (2019); Putumayo, Sur de Córdoba, Montes de María, Chocó, Pacífico and Frontera Nariñense, Sur de Tolima, and Arauca (2020); and Bajo Cauca and Nordeste Antioqueño, Urabá Antioqueño and Alto Patía, and Norte del Cauca (2021). [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
90. . The ART reports that 1,320 works have been completed and delivered as of July 31, 2021. While some of these are significant works, such as roads, agricultural product collection and processing centers, rural schools, health centers, and community infrastructure, among others, communities frequently voice their discontent as to how *transformative* or not the delivered works are and express their expectations regarding *major infrastructure* works. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
91. . Of the 32,808 PDET initiatives to be developed over the 15 years of implementation of the Final Agreement, 11,913 (36.31 percent) have been incorporated into local and departmental development plans that will be valid during the period from 2020 to 2023. Consulted at: <https://www.renovacionterritorio.gov.co/descargar.php?idFile=33303>. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
92. . According to the ART, Col$9.37 billion has been mobilized for PDET implementation under the current government: OCAD-Peace, Col$4.7 billion (50.21 percent); National General Budget Peacemaker, Col$2.8 billion (30.18 percent); ART – Colombia in Peace Fund, Col$838,632,000 (8.95 percent); Works by Taxes, Col$613,253,000 (6.54 percent); and international cooperation, Col$385,630,000 (4.11 percent). [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
93. . As of September 30, 2021. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
94. . Based on figures provided by the ANT, 1,164,042.82 hectares (52.10 percent) have 54,833 issued and registered titles, benefiting 54,625 peasant families, and 1,069,824.25 hectares (47.89 percent) have 113 titles, benefiting ethnic communities. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
95. . Under the current government, 730,000 hectares have been formalized in favor of 39,927 families, or 10.42 percent. According to the same entity, through the Fund, 496,230 hectares have been formalized in favor of ethnic communities and 175,119 hectares in favor of the peasant population. Of the latter, 75,339 hectares benefited 15,248 rural women (56.24 percent). [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
96. . This would also allow communities to recognize efforts made by the institutions to plan, comply with the standards, and acquire and manage financial resources, efforts that are not currently praised by the communities. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
97. . Ensure the wellbeing of and good living conditions for rural populations, giving effect to their political, economic, social, and cultural rights. Point 1.2.1 Objectives of Rural Development Programs in the Final Agreement. Consulted at:

<https://www.jep.gov.co/Marco%20Normativo/Normativa_v2/01%20ACUERDOS/N01.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
98. . It decreased from 154,476 hectares in 2019 to 143,000 hectares the following year. *Monitoreo de territorios afectados por cultivos ilícitos 2020* (Bogotá: UNODC-SIMCI, 2021). Available at: <https://biesimci.org/fileadmin/2020/documentos/censo/censo_2020.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
99. . This, together with other factors, such as the border area location, the reshuffling of illegal armed groups, and the dispute over illicit economies. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
100. . Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation, “Informe Avanza la sustitución con legalidad – junio 2021,” pp. 5 and 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
101. . Between January and June 2021, 131 spaces were organized for PNIS participatory bodies (7 Territorial Advisory Councils, 75 Municipal Participatory Planning Commissions, and 49 Municipal Evaluation and Monitoring Councils). [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
102. . The aforementioned actions are concentrated in Paramillo, La Macarena, Tinigua, Farallones, Alto Fragua, and La Paya. Presidential Council for Stabilization and Consolidation, “Informe Avanza la sustitución con legalidad – junio 2021,” p. 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
103. . Right-of-use contracts for 10 years to resolve land occupation and ownership conflicts. The objective is to benefit families that have no titles to their plots because they are located in these protected areas and are in the PNIS or that want to voluntarily eradicate their coca crops. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
104. . Rosas and Piamonte in Cauca; Ipiales in Nariño; Bolívar, Dagua, and El Dovio in Valle del Cauca; Cumaribo in Vichada; and Barrancominas in Guainía. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
105. . Especially the initiative of the Cúcuta Mayor’s Office in Vereda El 25 in the rural area of the municipality and in the district (*corregimiento*) of Las Mercedes, in Sardinata, as an initiative of the Office of the Governor. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
106. . As part of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Panel and its Support and Monitoring Commission regarding the negative impacts on the population in voluntary illicit crop substitution models, the following protocols were developed: (i) immediate support for cases requiring such support; (ii) coordination for support in early warning situations; and (iii) a women and gender approach for the safety of PNIS women leaders. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
107. . Observatory of Drugs in Colombia of the Ministry of Justice and Law, “Cifras erradicación de cultivos de hoja de coca año 2021” (ODC, 2021). Consulted at:

<http://www.odc.gov.co/sidco/oferta/erradicacion>. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
108. . A similar dynamic took place in the municipalities of Puerto Asís and San Miguel (Putumayo), Montelíbano (Córdoba), Riosucio (Chocó), Sardinata (Norte de Santander), and Argelia and El Tambo (Cauca). [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
109. . In the department of Putumayo and the regions of Catatumbo (Norte de Santander) and Río Guayabero in Meta and Guaviare, petitions shared this demand as one of the central points of dialogue with the National Government. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
110. . Through legal instruments such as the writ for protection (*tutela*) filed by the Human Rights Network of the Pacific Region of Nariño (REDPHANA) with the Superior Court of the Judicial District of Pasto, given the alleged violation of the right to prior consultation of indigenous and Afro-descendent communities of the Pacific region of Nariño, in the framework of the process to amend the Environmental Management Plan (PMA) of the Program for the Eradication of Illicit Crops through Aerial Spraying with Glyphosate Herbicide (PECIG). Dispute with ruling in favor of REDPHANA with the National Government order to hold and guarantee prior consultations with the ethnic population of that area. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
111. . Law 1448 of 2011 extended by Law 2078 of January 8, 2021. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
112. Figures compiled during the first half of 2021 based on MAPP/OAS data on attacks on and violations against community members. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
113. 9 collective and 145 individual. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
114. 20 persecutions and 9 stigmatizations. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
115. Determination of which geographic area is suitable for initiating the restitution process. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
116. Restitution mechanism whereby the restituted person is given a plot with an appraisal equivalent to the one claimed in restitution. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
117. . There were 21 in total at the time of submission of this report. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
118. . The Binational Bridge, the largest infrastructure project in the region’s history, was unveiled in the presence of various National Government institutions and with the attendance of the Government of the Republic of Ecuador. Jobs were also created for the region’s inhabitants through the National Roads Institute as the entity responsible for the project’s execution. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
119. . In the Serranía de Chiribiquete, Tinigua, Cordillera de Los Picachos, and Serranía de La Macarena national parks and the Amazon Forest Reserve Zone. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
120. . According to Ministry of Defense data, the main actions for offsetting the illicit exploitation of mining deposits in the Bajo Cauca region were interventions in 187 illegal mines, the arrest of 129 people, and the seizure of 44 pieces of yellow machinery used for this illicit activity. Similarly, in Chocó, these operations involved interventions in 47 illegal mines, the arrest of 19 people, and the seizure of 29 pieces of yellow machinery. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
121. . October 2021. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
122. . El Charco, La Tola, Olaya Herrera, Santa Bárbara, Mosquera, and Roberto Payán (Nariño), Convención, El Carmen, Hacarí, and San Calixto (Norte de Santander), Calamar, El Retorno (Guaviare), and Puerto Concordia and Vista Hermosa (Meta). [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
123. . In Arauca, these violent actions have mainly taken the form of attacks on members of government forces and the department’s oil infrastructure. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
124. . In Future Zones, the current security conditions, combined with the impacts caused by the pandemic, have limited the movements of judicial investigation personnel and justice operators in general even further. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
125. . In the departments of Caquetá, Cesar, and La Guajira and the municipalities of San Andrés de Cuerquia and El Bagre (Antioquia), San José de Fragua (Caquetá), Manaure and La Paz (Cesar), and Fonseca and San Juan del Cesar (La Guajira). [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
126. . Commission to Follow Up on, Promote, and Verify the Implementation of the Final Agreement between FARC-EP Groups and the Colombian Government. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
127. . This body began its work in 2017 with seven women leaders representing women’s organizations in Colombia, adding an eighth for black, Afro-Colombian, Raizal, and Palenquero women. It established a regulation that today allows for the election of eight main members and eight alternates and the participation of one woman former combatant as a permanent guest. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
128. . The increase in unemployment and poverty among women, which weakens their leadership role and participation in various organizations. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
129. . Pursuant to Decree 098/2013 and its amendments, the presumption of extraordinary gender risk must be applied in cases of threats against women leaders and human rights defenders. This presumption therefore means that, where women turn to the authorities to request protection, the competent authority must assume that the requester does indeed face an extraordinary risk to her life, safety, and personal integrity and that such risk would result in acts of gender-based violence. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
130. . National Commission on Security Guarantees (CNGS). [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
131. . Integral System for Security in the Exercise of Politics (SISEP). [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
132. . Forced disappearance, kidnapping, participation in hostilities, recruitment, and push for the identification of unidentified bodies. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
133. . Centro-Oriente del Meta, Magdalena Medio Caldense, Caquetá, Bajo Putumayo, Sur del Huila, Alto and Medio Atrato, Pacífico Sur, Suroccidente del Casanare, Oriente and Centro del Cauca, Sarare, Catatumbo, San Juanito, Pacifico Vallecaucano, Centro del Cesar, and Missing Military Personnel. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
134. . In Magdalena Medio Caldense, Centro-Oriente del Meta, Morrosquillo, and Pacífico Vallecaucano. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
135. . As of June 3, 2021: Meta, Magdalena, Antioquia, Puerto Berrio, Bogotá-Cundinamarca, Caquetá, Buenaventura-Valle del Cauca, and Norte de Santander. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
136. . During the social mobilizations that took place in the first half of 2021, the disappearance of persons was demonstrated, which prompted the request for action to this entity. Although there is no possibility of these new cases being worked on since the events pre-date the signing of the Final Agreement, the UBPD has encouraged an active role in society’s call for an end to the disappearances. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
137. . The report is supported by transmedia and the Network of Partners. Its purpose is to divulge what happened during the conflict, encouraging reflection and identifying not only the factors behind the conflict’s continuation, but also the conditions that must lead to social transformations toward peace. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
138. . For example, the CEV–Guaviare fostered dialogue for non-repetition in La Trocha Ganadera and developed audiovisual material to raise awareness of the events that took place during the armed conflict. More than 600 testimonies were compiled from the territory. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
139. . As of August 20, 2021. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
140. . On October 1, 2021, the Constitutional Court unanimously decided to extend the CEV’s mandate for another nine months: seven for the Final Report and the consolidation of the Legacy and two additional ones for the socialization of the Final Report across the country. [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
141. . These are adjacent rooms in which the victims involved in the matter sit, with the proceedings transmitted in real time or with a time lag. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
142. . Introducing amendments to Law 975 of 2005 “through which provisions are issued for the reintegration of members of organized armed groups acting outside the law, who contribute effectively to the achievement of national peace, in addition to other provisions issued for humanitarian agreements” as well as other provisions. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
143. . Decree 3391 of 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
144. . Part of the criminal process that, at the victim’s request, is carried out after the oral hearing where the FGN or PGN seeks reparation for the harm caused to the victim of an offense. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
145. . Calculation performed by the MAPP/OAS based on hourly load (12 hours per official), number of cases to resolve, number of courts, and average court hearing time. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
146. There is evidence that many of the applicants who are free today had spent more time participating in judicial proceedings than they did enjoying the said freedom, something that prevents them from effectively joining labor formality. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
147. Ministry of Justice and Law. Interinstitutional Transitional Justice Information System. Available at: https://sej.minjusticia.gov.co/JusticiaTransicional/Paginas/SIIJT.aspx. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
148. . In Putumayo, Chocó, Cauca, Antioquia, and Norte de Santander. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
149. . International cooperation actors, academics, victims, former combatants, political actors, and government forces that have contributed to identifying the factors behind the conflict’s continuation and the construction of truth. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)